FINAL REPORT

EVALUATION OF THE SOCIAL STABILIZATION AND MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT STRENGTHENING PROJECT (MEA PROJECT)

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
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

While the Social Stabilization and Municipal Development Strengthening Project ("MEA Project") is being phased out over the next two years, it is important to preserve the lessons learned from this fascinating experiment in participatory local government. Arising from the context of civil war, when virtually all government development programs were aimed at counter-insurgency, MEA turned into a vehicle for strengthening local democracy.

The Government of El Salvador (GOES) developed the MEA Program in a rather hit-ormiss fashion in an attempt to find an effective way to rebuild small scale infrastructure in areas of FMLN activity. With the assistance of USAID, the government began in 1986 to channel funds to local government mayors for building the small infrastructure projects.

A year later, in 1987, the MEA process began. To promote popular support for the government, USAID began to require that all infrastructure projects be identified at an open town meeting, called *cabildo abierto*. While already formally required to hold *cabildos* four times a year by the 1986 revision of the municipal code, the mayor now had real financial incentive to convene *cabildos*: to receive MEA funds from CONARA. All projects had to be identified by the community at a *cabildo abierto*, then prioritized and selected by the municipal council, over which the mayor presides. CONARA then transferred the funds for eligible projects to the mayors for implementation.

By 1989 the MEA program was able to work in the entire country, with the exception of 19 northern municipalities controlled by the FMLN. Since 1989, municipal governments have implemented nearly 9,000 projects, primarily in roads, schools, water, and electrification, reaching into remote rural cantons throughout the country. In the past year, MEA projects have been implemented in all 261 municipalities of the country (except the capital city), and MEA has become a cornerstone of the National Reconstruction Program.

Based on selected field interviews with mayors and beneficiaries, previous evaluations contracted by USAID indicated that the MEA process was successful in promoting participation and improving attitudes toward local government. According to both USAID officials and representatives of the left, the FMLN did not destroy a single MEA project because the projects were chosen by the people.

Despite these earlier evaluations, the program attracted critics. In 1992 and 1993 two Washington-based NGOs published highly critical reports on MEA based on field visits to a number of communities in the ex-conflict zones (Yariv and Curtis, 1992; Sollis, 1993). Community leaders told them the mayors did not invite all community groups to the cabildos abiertos (Sollis, p. 28; Yariv and Curtis, p. 13), that the mayors selected projects that benefited the wealthy few (Yariv and Curtis, p. 10), and that the implemented projects did not reflect grassroots priorities (Sollis, p. 25). The authors reported widespread mistrust of local government in a highly polarized situation made even more tense by what they characterized as the negative image of CONARA and its successor organization, the SRN (Yariv and Curtis, pp. 13 and 16). These sharp attacks were heard in the halls of the U.S. Congress.

In the race of the diametrically opposed findings from these previous studies, USAID decided to incorporate a full-fledged public opinion survey in this final evaluation of MEA. A major purpose of this evaluation, then, was to conduct the survey. The results of a random sample of over 1,000 people from throughout the country, ex-conflict and non-conflict zones alike, are reported here.

Another purpose of the evaluation is to assess the attitude of mayors towards MEA, looking particularly at changes implemented recently to wean the mayors from a "give-away" mentality to one of cost-recovery and self-sufficiency. The evaluation also assesses the evolving institutional context surrounding MEA and the effectiveness with which it continues to deliver small scale public works to remote locations. Finally, the evaluation makes recommendations for sustaining the achievements of the program beyond its expected two-year phase out, and points out particular concerns and opportunities arising from the post-election context in 1994, when up to 40 first-time FMLN mayors are expected to take office.

B. FINDINGS

1. Popular Attitudes Toward Municipal Government

The survey results show that there is a significant level of support for local and national government, and that the level is higher among those who know of, or have attended, the cabildos abiertos, or who have benefitted from a MEA project. Thus, it can be concluded that the MEA process has increased popular support for the constitutional political process.

The survey also shows that most people have at least some degree of confidence in local government, even in the ex-conflict zones. Public opinion ranks local government below churches and community organizations; above the military, labor unions, and political parties; and about the same as national government. Name recognition of the mayors is high--in fact, much higher than that reported in a prior CID/Gallup poll (Seligson, 1993). Almost everyone plans on voting in the 1994 mayoral elections.

People have much more contact with local government than national government. They have much more contact with mayors than any other elected officials. Thus local government is the principal interface between the citizenry and the state. The survey shows that as people gain confidence in local government, their attitude toward national government improves as well.

The survey does point out a major weakness of local government. Despite the growth in cabildos abiertos, people perceive a lack of opportunity for popular participation in local government. The municipal councils contribute to this perception. The municipal code currently allows council meetings to be closed to the public. Very rarely do councils hold open meetings or call consultas populares, which are similar to referendums. Public confidence in the councils is very low compared to public confidence in the mayors.

People see community organizations as the most important promoter of their interests and want local government to work more closely with their organizations. Ironically, communities that have legally recognized community organizations show higher confidence in local government than those communities that do not, and those individuals who are active in their community organizations have higher confidence in local government than those who are not. Thus it would be in the mayor's interest to promote community organization and work with the community organizations.

2. Popular Attitudes Toward Cabildos Abiertos

The MEA program has had a large impact on public awareness of cabildos abiertos. The people see the mayors' efforts to hold cabildos as a genuine expression of concern for the community's needs. They consider the cabildos to be open to all and broadly representative of the various communities in the municipality. They appreciate the opportunity to be heard and would attend cabildos even if the mayor had no funds to distribute.

Nevertheless, the people are dissatisfied with the level of participation that the *cabildos* afford. They want to do more than just ask for projects. They want to be involved in discussing problems, proposing solutions, and prioritizing projects. They are willing to contribute their own resources to have more projects, if only the mayor would ask.

3. Popular Attitudes Toward CONARA/MEA Projects

MEA projects have widespread visibility and benefit a large majority of the population. People feel that infrastructure projects are the best use of the funds and consider road projects to be the most beneficial. Residents of county seats feel that the projects have met a large part of their infrastructure needs, while rural residents feel they have covered only a small part, in spite of MEA's 3:1 ratio favoring rural areas.

Most of the beneficiaries feel the projects were identified by the community, and as a result many feel a sense of community responsibility for maintaining them. Nevertheless, most do not consider the *cabildos* to have been very important to the project identification process. They also feel that the mayors have not done much to involve them in project implementation, other than through direct labor.

CONARA (SRN) enjoys a positive public image throughout the country, including exconflict zones. Its allocation of funds among municipalities is seen as apolitical, in spite of the fact that *cabildo* attendees in the ex-conflict zones feel a smaller percentage of their requests have been implemented than do attendees in the non-conflict zones. The survey results also show that the popular image of CONARA/SRN would be further enhanced if it were to work more with community organizations.

4. Institutional Sustainability

USAID has supported three institutions for implementing the MEA program:

- a. The Secretariat for National Reconstruction (SRN), formerly CONARA, does an effective job of getting the funds out to virtually all municipalities and helping the local governments with project implementation.
- b. ISDEM provides training and technical assistance to the mayors on issues ranging from revenue generation, financial management and strategic planning, to voter registration. Although closely tied to the party in office, ISDEM is perceived by most mayors, community leaders, and other government officials as a non-partisan technical agency. It has been particularly successful in helping municipalities to increase revenue generation.
- c. COMURES, the national association of mayors, is the lead institution in promoting a national policy dialogue on decentralization. In spite of the fact that 60 percent of the country's mayors are from one party, COMURES has created a multi-partisan image that has turned it into an effective voice for decentralization.

The general consensus among the thirty mayors interviewed for this evaluation is that the MEA program is the most effective mechanism in the country for responding to citizens' needs for local infrastructure. With limited financial and administrative capacity, local governments have implemented nearly 9,000 MEA projects. Price Waterhouse audits show less than one percent of questionable costs.

The major challenge facing USAID and the MEA program during its last two years of funding is how to sustain the program's achievements beyond the life of the project. The three major issues involved in sustainability are how to transfer more financial responsibility for future infrastructure projects to the municipal government, how to

encourage the mayors to continue the *cabildos* without direct financial incentive, and how to incorporate the new mayors elected under peacetime conditions next year.

USAID has already begun to address the issue of financial sustainability. Through ISDEM's technical assistance to the local governments, revenue generation has improved markedly in most of the municipalities. USAID established a new incentive fund administered by SRN to reward local governments for cost recovery; it has been used at a brisk pace. Nevertheless, the current mayors evidence little interest in setting aside a portion of increased revenues for infrastructure projects, preferring to spend the money on administration. And while the mayors have been taking advantage of the incentive fund, they show little attitudinal change about the importance of cost recovery. The predominant sentiment is that they need not worry about these issues during their term while foreign aid is still plentiful.

While this attitude may seem alarming for the sustainability of the MEA process, it appears that the new mayoral candidates and candidates for re-election are aware of the decline in foreign aid and the need to find local resources to make projects possible. They will need assistance in generating those local resources, but USAID's new Municipal Development Project has directly anticipated that need.

On the legal front COMURES has already been making efforts to promote municipal property tax legislation, but with no indication that the desired results are close at hand. Nevertheless, USAID has done what it can by making such legislation a condition for continuing its new Municipal Development Project. COMURES should probably try to get legislators and NGOs represented on its inter-institutional decentralization committee, in order to increase its clout.

A crucial factor in the sustainability of the MEA process is the mayors' attitude toward the cabildos abiertos. Interviews with more than thirty mayors indicate that despite the best efforts of the MEA program, most of the mayors do not see an inherent benefit to them in holding cabildos. Even with MEA's financial incentives, mayors as a whole have not held the legally required number of cabildos. What may replace MEA's financial incentive, however, may be even more effective: the popular demand for cabildos that the MEA program has generated. As the survey results show, the citizens like the cabildos and want further opportunities to participate.

Another issue is how to preserve the managerial and technical capacity for assisting local governments that has been developed in the three national implementing institutions. The largest of these is SRN, which is designated to close at the end of the National Reconstruction Project in about five years. Reasonable proposals are being developed to absorb some of the capacity into already existing departmental committees of mayors and some into the larger municipalities.

Finally, a number of mayors have brought up the issue of how to accommodate the needs of MEA "graduates"—i.e. mayors who are ready to move beyond isolated, small scale projects. To some extent the mayors have been taking care of this problem on their own. Many have begun to coordinate investments at a multi-municipal or departmental level, through the departmental committees of mayors known as CEDs. Some have begun to ask ISDEM and the Vice Ministry of Housing and Urban Development for technical assistance in doing strategic development plans for their municipality. While a number of these MEA "graduates" find MEA's size limits on infrastructure investments to be frustrating, it is probably advisable to keep them in place in order to provide broader coverage and maintain the emphasis on process.

The issue of how to incorporate the new mayors to be elected for the first time under peacetime conditions in 1994 has not yet been addressed by USAID officials. They found that the learning curve of the new mayors after the last election was rapid and that the elections created no real impediment to sustainability. However, a major difference with the upcoming elections is that a significant number of FMLN mayors may be trying their hands at institutionalized change for the first time. This issue remains the greatest weakness in USAID's efforts to sustain the MEA process, and some recommended actions are included below.

5. Conclusions

The survey results are conclusive that the MEA program has had widespread success in increasing confidence in local government. It is clear that the MEA program contributes directly to two of USAID's strategic objectives: (1) to help the country make the transition from war to peace by building local level democratic institutions and increasing civic participation; and (2) to promote enduring democratic institutions by strengthening local government and responding to the basic infrastructure needs of the community.

Contrary to the findings of the Washington studies (Sollis, 1993, and Yariv and Curtis, 1992), people see the *cabildos* as a genuine expression of the mayor's concern for the community's needs. They consider the *cabildos* to be a representative forum open to all members of the community. They consider the projects implemented to be beneficial to the community.

The positive impact of the MEA program on attitudes toward local government has been felt almost as strongly in the ex-conflict zones as in the rest of the country. Most surprisingly, the popular image of CONARA is quite positive in both ex-conflict and non-conflict zones, based on the agency's ability to respond to people's needs for infrastructure.

The people of El Salvador are much further along the road to reconciliation than most ideologues and politicos imagine, whether they are from government or non-governmental

organizations. A deep-seated faith in legitimate government institutions and a strong desire to work with them permeate the Salvadoran population.

Yet at the same time something the Washington critics were saying is accurate. People have great faith in the community itself to solve its own problems. Most of El Salvador's rural communities and urban barrios are organized into legally recognized community associations. Most of them want to work with local government. Mayors should build bridges to the community groups. They are a powerful source of support for local development.

6. Lessons Learned

Abstracting from the case of El Salvador, there are some important findings for other developing nations interested in strengthening local government and promoting participatory democracy:

- Local government is an effective vehicle for prioritizing and implementing multisectoral investments.
- Mayors are willing to collaborate at a regional level to prioritize investments and plan strategically.
- The popular image of national government is enhanced by improving the image of local government.
- Organized communities have a more positive attitude toward local government than do unorganized communities. A natural bridge is waiting to be built between local government and community organizations.
- People want to participate in local government. The more they participate, the more willing they are to contribute their own resources and to help maintain projects.

7. Recommendations

- a. To promote reconciliation and the transition to peace in El Salvador, USAID should push for rapid resolution of land tenure issues, which are an impediment to MEA projects.
- b. USAID should promote better working relationships between local government and community organizations.

- c. To address the needs of the first time mayors taking office in 1994, USAID will need to weigh the efficacy of pursuing cost recovery as rapidly as possible, versus allowing less restrictive funding to help the new mayors get more involved.
- d. The Government of El Salvador should channel all local-level public infrastructure investments through municipal government.

I. THE MEA PROCESS: VIEW FROM BELOW

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A. BACKGROUND

While the Social Stabilization and Municipal Development Strengthening Project ("MEA Project") is being phased out over the next two years, it is important to preserve the lessons learned from this fascinating experiment in participatory local government. Arising from the context of civil war, when virtually all government development programs were aimed at counter-insurgency, MEA turned into a vehicle for strengthening local democracy.

The Government of El Salvador (GOES) developed the MEA Program in a rather hit-ormiss fashion in an attempt to find an effective way to rebuild small scale infrastructure in areas of FMLN activity (interview: General Vargas, October, 1993). Attempts at using the central government's sectoral ministries -- e.g., Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Public Works--to provide small scale rural infrastructure quickly and cheaply had proven to be a failure. With the assistance of USAID, the government began in 1986 to channel directly to local government mayors for building the small infrastructure projects.

A year later, in 1987, the MEA process began: To promote popular support for the government, USAID began to require that all infrastructure projects be identified at an open town meeting, called *cabildo abierto*. While already formally required to hold *cabildos* four times a year by the 1986 revision of the municipal code, the mayor now had real financial incentive to convene *cabildos*: to receive MEA funds from CONARA. All projects had to be identified by the community at a *cabildo abierto*, then prioritized and selected by the municipal council, over which the mayor presides. CONARA then transferred the funds for eligible projects to the mayors for implementation. Initially CONARA allocated an equal amount of funds to each municipality, but after 1990 it changed to a need-based formula.

By 1989 the MEA program was able to work in the entire country, with the exception of 19 northern municipalities controlled by the FMLN. Since 1989, municipal governments have implemented nearly 9,000 projects, primarily in roads, schools, water, and electrification, reaching into remote rural cantons throughout the country. In the past year, MEA projects have been implemented in all 261 municipalities of the country (except the capital city), and MEA has become a cornerstone of the National Reconstruction Program.

Based on selected field interviews with mayors and beneficiaries, previous evaluations contracted by USAID indicated the MEA process was successful in promoting participation and improving attitudes toward local government (Austin, 1988; Stout, 1990). According to both USAID officials and at least one spokesperson for the left (Uzquiano interview, October, 1993), the FMLN did not destroy a single MEA project because the projects were chosen by the people.

Despite these earlier evaluations, the program has attracted critics. In 1992 and 1993 two Washington-based NGOs published highly critical reports on MEA based on field visits to a number of communities in the ex-conflict zones (Yariv and Curtis, 1992; Sollis, 1993). Community leaders told them the mayors did not invite all community groups to the *cabildos abiertos* (Sollis, p. 28; Yariv and Curtis, p. 13), that the mayors selected projects that benefitted the wealthy few (Yariv and Curtis, p. 10), and that the implemented projects did not reflect grassroots priorities (Sollis, p. 25). The authors reported widespread mistrust of local government in a highly polarized situation made even more tense by what they characterized as the negative popular image of CONARA and its successor organization, the SRN (Yariv and Curtis, pp. 13 and 16). These sharp attacks were heard in the halls of the U.S. Congress.

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Another purpose of the evaluation is to assess the attitude of mayors towards MEA, looking particularly at changes implemented recently to wean the mayors from a "give-away" mentality to one of cost-recovery and self-sufficiency. The evaluation also assesses the evolving institutional context surrounding MEA and the effectiveness with which it continues to deliver small scale public works to remote locations. Finally, the evaluation makes recommendations for sustaining the achievements of the program beyond its expected two-year phase out, and points out particular concerns and opportunities arising from the post-election context in 1994, when up to 40 first-time FMLN mayors are expected to take office (source: Mauricio Chávez interview, November, 1993).

Dr. Patricia A. Wilson, associate professor of community and regional planning at the University of Texas, Austin, served as Team Leader and was responsible for designing and interpreting the public opinion survey. Dr. Wilson was the primary author of Part I. Duke Banks, a municipal development consultant from Washington, D.C., was the primary author of Part II. Lewis Taylor, a civil engineering consultant from Oklahoma, was the primary author of Part III.

B. THE SURVEY

An hour-long questionnaire was administered to 1,034 people from throughout the country by a team of fifteen Salvadoran surveyors trained and experienced in surveying Salvadorans from all walks of life.

Twenty-four municipalities were chosen randomly from four different population size categories in order to represent the different regions as well as ex-conflict and non-conflict zones. Rural areas were given a greater weight in keeping with MEA allocation criteria. Within each municipality respondents were selected randomly by age and sex. The urban residents were selected by randomly sampling blocks and houses within the town where the municipal seat is located. Rural residents were selected by randomly choosing cantons, and within the chosen cantons, randomly sampling caserlos and residences. Within each residence, if more than one household member of the required age and sex cohort were present, then one was selected randomly on the basis of birthday.

Of the 24 municipal seats and 48 cantons that the survey team visited, in only one case did community leaders deny entry. In Del Taura, Tecoluca, an ex-conflict zone in San Vicente, the surveyor was told she would need permission from the local community organization to conduct the survey. The permission process would have delayed her beyond the time she had available.

The resulting survey population of 1,034 is consistent with the regional and demographic breakdown of the universe, although it emphasizes rural areas (see Table 1). The 24 municipalities chosen include 11 from ex-conflict zones (defined as one of the 115 municipalities in the National Reconstruction Program). Two of the forty municipalities where the mayor was in exile are represented in the sample. The proportion of municipalities with Arena mayors matches that for the entire country (around 60 percent). (See Appendix A for further detail on survey methodology and a map showing the places surveyed.)

C. POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

The survey results show that there is a significant level of support for local and national government, and that the level is higher among those who know of, or have attended, the cabildos abiertos, or who have benefitted from a MEA project. Thus, it can be concluded that the MEA process has increased popular support for the constitutional political process.

The survey shows that most people have at least some degree of confidence in local government, even in the ex-conflict zones. Public opinion ranks local government below churches and community organizations; above the military, labor unions, and political parties; and about the same as national government. Name recognition of the mayors is

high--in fact, much higher than that reported in a prior CID/Gallup poll (Seligson, 1993). Almost everyone plans on voting in the 1994 mayoral elections.

People have much more contact with local government than national government. They have much more contact with mayors than any other elected officials. Thus local government is the principal interface between the citizenry and the state. The survey shows that as people gain confidence in local government, their attitude toward national government improves as well.

The survey does point out a major weakness of local government. Despite the growth in cabildos abiertos, people perceive a lack of opportunity for popular participation in local government. The municipal councils contribute to this perception. The municipal code currently allows council meetings to be closed to the public. Very rarely do councils hold open meetings or call consultas populares, which are similar to referendums. Public confidence in the councils is very low compared to public confidence in the mayors.

People see community organizations as the most important promoter of their interests and want local government to work more closely with their organizations. Ironically, communities that have legally recognized community organizations show higher confidence in local government than those communities that do not, and those individuals who are active in their community organizations have higher confidence in local government than those who are not. Thus, it would be to the mayor's interest to promote community organization and work with the community organizations.

A summary of the relevant statistics supporting these findings follows:

Municipal government is the major point of interface between the population and the state.

- Most of the population has contacted the municipal government (alcaldia) to resolve a problem while a small percentage has contacted the national government. (See Table 2)
- Over 70 percent of the respondents know the name of the mayor, while less than 20 percent know the name of a legislator (diputado). (Table 2)
- While 54 percent have contacted the mayor, only 3 percent have ever contacted a diputado. (Table 2)
- Awareness of local government is high in both ex-conflict and non-conflict zones. (Table 2)

The large majority expresses at least some confidence in local government and looks forward to peaceful elections.

- Nearly two thirds of the population express at least some confidence in local government, including a quarter of the population that expresses strong confidence in local government (Table 3). The level of confidence is not influenced by the political party of the mayor. Expressed a different way, about half the population considers the work of the *alcaldia* to be good, and another 38 percent to be average. About half the population says their confidence in local government is growing, even in the ex-conflict zones and among non-beneficiaries of CONARA/MEA projects.
- While 64 percent voted in the last mayoral elections, 90 percent plan on voting this time.
- Eighty percent of the population believe that the *alcaldia* helps them to resolve their community's problems at least some of the time. Very few people consider the *alcaldia* a frequent obstacle to resolving the community's problems (11 percent), even in the ex-conflict zones (13 percent). However, nearly 40 percent say that it is sometimes an obstacle.
- Public opinion on the ability of local government to manage funds is divided, with thirty to forty percent even refusing to respond to questions on the subject. Those who have benefitted from a CONARA/MEA project and especially those who have attended a *cabildo* have a much more positive opinion, and are also more likely to believe the local government's capacity to manage funds is improving.

There is still a significant minority that expresses little confidence in local government.

- Up to a third of the population expresses low confidence in local government. (Table 3)
- Living in an ex-conflict zone influences ones confidence in municipal government less than whether or not one's community received a CONARA/MEA project.
- Table 4 lists various factors that influence public confidence in local government. The most important single factor is whether or not one's community received a CONARA/MEA project.

The level of confidence in municipal government is about the same as the level of confidence in national government.

- About half the population considers both local and national government to be doing a good job, ranking them well above labor unions and political parties, but below churches and community organizations. (Table 5)
- Less than 10 percent of the population consider the government--either municipal or national--to be doing a bad job. (Table 5)
- A large majority of people (about 85 percent) considers the decision for whom to vote at the national level as very important. A similar percentage also considers the decision for whom to vote at the local level as very important.
- The level of confidence in both municipal and national government is nearly as high (within 6 percentage points) in the ex-conflict zones as in the rest of the country.

The MEA program has increased confidence in both local and national government.

- Confidence in local government is significantly higher among those who have benefitted from a CONARA/MEA project and those who have attended a *cabildo*. (Table 4)
- Confidence in national government is also higher among MEA beneficiaries and cabildo attenders. Fifty percent of beneficiaries consider national government to be doing a good job, versus forty percent of non-beneficiaries. Similarly, 54 percent of cabildo attenders rank national government as doing a good job versus 44 percent of non-attenders.
- Those who have a positive attitude toward local government tend to have a more positive attitude toward national government.

Despite the growth in cabildos abiertos, local government is not seen as very participatory.

- Nearly two thirds of the population think the mayor makes very little effort to promote popular participation. (Table 6).
- Similarly, three fourths of the population know of little or no opportunity to participate in local government.
- Even those who have attended a *cabildo abierto* do not consider municipal government to be very participatory. (Table 6)

The consejo municipal is not seen as interested in public participation.

- While over sixty percent of the population realizes there is a municipal council, less than 5 percent generally take any problems to a council member.
- Fully 85 percent of the population know of few, if any, attempts by the municipal councils to seek community input.

Local government would benefit from making a greater effort to work with community groups.

- The majority of the population sees community organizations as the principal agent/promoter of the community's interests, while 40 percent see the mayor as the principal promoter of the community's interests.
- Confidence in local government is higher among those whose communities are organized, and among those people who are most active in community organizations.

D. POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD CABILDOS ABIERTOS

The MEA program has had a large impact on public awareness of cabildos abiertos. The people see the mayors' efforts to hold cabildos as a genuine expression of concern for the community's needs. They consider the cabildos to be open to all and broadly representative of the various communities in the municipality. They appreciate the opportunity to be heard and would attend cabildos even if the mayor had no funds to distribute.

Nevertheless, the people are dissatisfied with the level of participation that the *cabildos* afford. They want to do more than just ask for projects. They want to be involved in discussing problems, proposing solutions, and prioritizing projects. They are willing to contribute their own resources to have more projects, if only the mayor would ask.

Statistical support for these findings follows:

Awareness of the cabildos is widespread.

·超激化。 ·温斯克斯·西特斯克·西尔克克斯斯特 · 西尔克克斯斯 · 克

- Two-thirds of the population know what a *cabildo* is (Table 7).
- Residents of municipal seats show more awareness (70%) than do residents of the rural cantons (60%).

Attendance is much more limited.

- About a fourth of the population has attended a *cabildo*, and another fourth knows someone who has (Table 7).
- About the same percentage attends from the municipal seats as from the rural cantons.
- Only 13 percent of the population has attended a community meeting to help choose a representative to send to a *cabildo*.

Women's awareness of, and participation in, cabildos lags behind men's.

- About 76 percent of the men know what a *cabildo* is, while only 58 percent of the women do.
- Forty percent of the men have attended a *cabildo*, while only 16 percent of the women have.
- Nevertheless, of those who know about *cabildos*, most women (64%) perceive that they participate at least as much as the men, and most women (70%) perceive that the *cabildos* address their needs at least as much as they do the men's needs.

Popular opinion of the cabildos is very positive.

- The vast majority of those who know about cabildos believes that the mayors convene them not because it is required by law or required to get funds, but in order to find out the people's needs (Table 8).
- The vast majority believes that the *cabildos* are open to all who want to attend, not just to those whom the mayor invites (Table 9).
- Three-fourths believe that the *cabildos* represent all sectors of the community (Table 10).
- A majority believe that cabildos are more important now than before (Table 11).

Those who have attended cabildos say they would continue to attend even if no project funds were available.

• Almost all who attended a *cabildo* were satisfied with the experience, would attend another *cabildo*, and, in fact, plan to attend the next *cabildo* (Table 12).

• Nearly 90 percent would attend even if few project funds were available through the *cabildos*, and nearly 80 percent say they would attend even if there were no project funds available (Table 13).

Cabildos have improved popular attitudes towards local government and involvement in community organizations.

- Those who have attended *cabildos* have a much higher degree of confidence in municipal government than those who have not (Tables 4 and 6).
- Most of the attendees say that they are now more active in community organizations as a result of having attended a *cabildo* (Table 14).

Nevertheless, many people think that *cabildos* do not provide enough opportunity to participate.

- More than half of the population at large feels there is little opportunity to participate in local government (Table 6). About half of those who have attended a cabildo, while having more confidence in local government, also feel there is little opportunity to participate in local government (Table 6).
- In the ex-conflict zones fully half of those who know about *cabildos* feel that the they provide very brief and insufficient opportunities to participate (Table 10).
- Regardless of location, those who have attended *cabildos* see them as an opportunity to ask for projects, rather than as a vehicle for discussing problems and developing solutions (Table 15).

E. POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD CONARA/MEA PROJECTS

MEA projects have widespread visibility and benefit a large majority of the population. People feel that infrastructure projects are the best use of the funds and consider road projects to be the most beneficial. Residents of county seats feel that the projects have met a large part of their infrastructure needs, while rural residents feel they have covered only a small part, in spite of MEA's 3:1 ratio favoring rural areas.

Most of the beneficiaries feel the projects were identified by the community, and as a result many feel a sense of community responsibility for maintaining them. Nevertheless, most do not consider the *cabildos* to have been very important to the project identification process. They also feel that the mayors have not done much to involve them in project implementation other than through direct labor.

Nevertheless, respondents prefer the MEA process to that of the Social Investment Fund (FIS). Whereas MEA projects are identified locally and implemented by the local government, FIS projects involve neither local participation nor local government.

CONARA (SRN) enjoys a positive public image throughout the country, including exconflict zones. Its allocation of funds among municipalities is seen as apolitical, in spite of the fact that *cabildo* attendees in the ex-conflict zones feel a smaller percentage of their requests have been implemented than do attendees in the non-conflict zones. The survey results also show that the popular image of CONARA/SRN would be further enhanced if it were to work more with community organizations.

Supporting statistical results from the survey follow:

CONARA/MEA projects have received widespread visibility and benefitted a large majority of the population.

- When read a list of CONARA/MEA projects in their municipality, over ninety percent of the people knew of at least one of them (Table 16).
- Three-fourths of the people said they or their family had directly benefitted from at least one of them (Table 16).

Many people do not associate the projects with CONARA or the MEA process.

- Two thirds of the beneficiaries knew of a project following the CONARA/MEA process--i.e. a project identified at a *cabildo* and built by the municipal government.
- Less than half of this group was aware that the funds had come from CONARA.
- Virtually none was aware that the program through which the funds came was called MEA.

CONARA itself, however, enjoys high name recognition and positive image among the people.

- Among public works providers, CONARA (as SRN is still known popularly) ranks among the top four in terms of name recognition and among the top three in terms of positive image (Table 17).
- About 85 percent of the population know of CONARA and two-thirds rank it as good or very good compared to other public works providers (Table 17).

- CONARA's name recognition and image are almost equally positive in the exconflict zone as in the rest of the country (Table 17).
- About half the population (regardless of zone) feels that CONARA works adequately or well with their community organizations (Table 21).
- As with popular opinion of local government, popular opinion of CONARA is higher among those whose communities are organized and those who are active in their community organizations.
- o Ironically, people whose communities participate in Municipal Reconstruction Committees (participatory committees involving representatives from local government and the community, including the FMLN) have a higher opinion of CONARA/SRN than people in areas without the committees.

Awareness that the projects are identified through a cabildo is not widespread.

- About 40 percent of the general population consider the *cabildo* to have been very important in identifying the projects (Table 18).
- Of those who have attended a *cabildo*, 60 percent consider the *cabildo* as being very important for project identification, while of those who have not attended only 30 percent consider it to be very important.
- Regardless of whether they had attended a *cabildo*, people thought that about a quarter of the CONARA/MEA projects they recognized had been identified by the mayor (Table 19).
- Very few think that CONARA or the national government identified the projects (Table 19).

Project selection is seen as being shared by the municipal government and the community.

- People thought that about a third of the CONARA/MEA projects they recognized had been selected by the community and a third by the mayor (Table 19). The MEA process, however, calls for the community to identify projects and the mayor (along with the municipal council) to select from among those identified.
- CONARA was seen as playing a small role in project selection.

The community feels the mayor does not involve them much in project implementation.

- People believed the community had provided manual labor on about a third of the projects they identified (Table 20).
- People did not know of any community participation in implementing nearly half the projects (Table 20).
- For more than half the projects, people did not feel that the mayor had kept the community informed on the project's financial and physical progress (Table 21).
- Nevertheless, people rank the municipal government higher than the Social Investment Fund (FIS) in terms of using funds effectively; consulting the community; using the most local materials, contractors, and labor; project quality; project benefits; and project maintenance (Table 22).

The community does feel a responsibility to help maintain the projects.

- For more than a third of the projects, people thought the community was taking the responsibility to maintain them (Table 19).
- For nearly another third of the projects, people considered the municipal government to be responsible for maintaining them (Table 19).
- For over a fourth of the projects, people could not identify who was responsible for maintaining them (Table 19).

Rural communities do not feel that the CONARA projects have met their infrastructure needs as thoroughly as do the urban (cabecera) communities.

- About 60 percent of urban (cabecera) residents feel that the projects have covered a great part of their infrastructure needs, as compared to 38 percent of rural (canton) residents.
- In the ex-conflict zones, roads and schools are considered the most beneficial projects. In the non-conflict zones, water and electric projects are also considered very important.

Nearly all the respondents feel that basic infrastructure is the best use of CONARA funds.

- An overwhelming 95 percent of the people, regardless of zone, feel that basic infrastructure needs are the most important (Table 23). It should be pointed out, though, that alternatives were not prompted, but left to the respondent to identify.
- Roads are considered the most beneficial infrastructure projects (Table 24).

CONARA'S allocation of funds among municipalities is seen as apolitical, yet cabildo attendees in ex-conflict zones report a much lower percentage of requested projects being funded.

- More than three-fourths of the population, regardless of zone, believe that CONARA assigns funds to municipalities on the basis of need rather than political interests (Table 23).
- Nevertheless, less than half of the projects requested at *cabildos* in the ex-conflict zone are being funded, compared to nearly three-fourths in the non-conflict zones.
- Similarly, only 50 percent of *cabildo* attendees in *Oriente* region report getting their projects funded, compared to 74 percent in the *Occidente* region.

F. POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD DECENTRALIZATION

The common perception that most people expect the government to pay for local improvements appears to be unfounded. Most of the respondents said they would be willing to contribute their own resources in order to have more local projects, if the mayor would only ask. When it comes to the public's attitude about local government taking over basic service provision, there is more skepticism.

Statistical support for these findings follows:

The public is ready to contribute more of its own resources to local improvement projects.

- According to the vast majority of people, the mayor has not asked the community to help pay for local infrastructure projects (Table 25).
- Nevertheless, a majority say the mayor should ask (Table 25).
- Most are willing to contribute to such projects from their own resources (mainly labor, but also cash). (Table 25)

The public is not ready to support the decentralization of schools, electricity, or even water to municipal government.

• Most people do not believe that municipal government could administer the schools, electricity distribution, or water distribution better than the national government at this point (Table 26).

G. CONCLUSIONS

The survey results are conclusive that the MEA program has had widespread success in increasing confidence in local government. The vast majority of the population plans to vote in the upcoming mayoral elections. It is clear that the MEA program contributes directly to two of USAID's strategic objectives: (1) to help the country make the transition from war to peace by building local level democratic institutions and increasing civic participation; and (2) to promote enduring democratic institutions by strengthening local government and responding to the basic infrastructure needs of the community.

Contrary to the findings of the Washington studies (Sollis, 1993, and Yariv and Curtis, 1992), people see the *cabildos* as a genuine expression of the mayor's concern for the community's needs. They consider the *cabildos* to be a representative forum open to all members of the community. They consider the projects implemented to be beneficial to the community.

The positive impact of the MEA program on attitudes toward local government has been felt almost as strongly in the ex-conflict zones as in the rest of the country. The survey showed very small differences in results between the two areas of the country. Even in the war-torn areas of the country, the popular will is toward reconciliation and working with government institutions. Most surprisingly, the popular image of CONARA is quite positive in both ex-conflict and non-conflict zones, based on the agency's ability to respond to people's needs for infrastructure.

The people of El Salvador are much further along the road to reconciliation than most ideologues and politicos imagine, whether they are from government or non-governmental organizations. Faith in legitimate government institutions and a desire to work with them permeate the Salvadoran population.

Yet at the same time something the Washington critics were saying is true. People have great faith in the community itself to solve its own problems. Most of El Salvador's rural communities and urban barrios are organized into legally recognized community associations. Most of them want to work with local government. Mayors should build bridges to the community groups. They are a powerful source of support for local development.

H. LESSONS LEARNED

Abstracting from the case of El Salvador, there are some important findings for other developing nations interested in strengthening local government and promoting participatory democracy:

- The popular image of national government is enhanced by improving the image of local government. The coattail effect of increasing confidence in central government as confidence in local government goes up should be of particular interest to legislators, since as the survey shows their base of popular support is very thin in contrast to the base of support for mayors.
- Organized communities have a more positive attitude toward local government than do unorganized communities. Those who are more active in community organizations also have a better attitude toward local government. Thus a natural bridge is waiting to be built between local government and community organizations.
- Participating in *cabildos* motivates people to participate more in community organizations.
- People definitely want more opportunity to participate in local government. They want to do more than "pedir"--i.e. ask for projects. They want to plan, prioritize, problem solve, implement, help pay for, and maintain projects. They would attend cabildos even if the mayor had no project funds to distribute.
- Urban intellectuals are often more cynical about participatory government programs than are the grassroots groups themselves. In fact, reconciliation may take place first in the minds and hearts of 'the people' before it ever affects the hard shell of the urban intellectual.

The MEA program has generated interest in other Latin American countries because of its unique design and solid success in both process and product. MEA is often compared to Mexico's showcase of participatory local infrastructure provision, PRONASOL (National Solidarity Program), since both insist on local participation, putting at least as much emphasis on the participatory process as on the construction of small scale infrastructure projects. Yet the MEA program makes an important contribution beyond that of PRONASOL: MEA reinforces local democracy by channeling the funds through municipal government. Rarely has a central government in Latin America given such solid support for a decentralized multi-sectoral program channeled through local government.

MEA makes a further important contribution as well. By requiring the mayors to spend most of the funds in the rural areas of their municipalities by a ratio of 3:1, local

government in El Salvador is becoming responsive to the entire municipality. Rarely in Latin America have municipal mayors been so motivated to seek participation from residents in the rural cantons isolated by poor roads from the municipal seat.

I. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. USAID should examine why some cantons have received no MEA funding and seek to address the reasons.

Confidence in local government is directly related to whether or not a community has received CONARA/MEA projects. In the ex-conflict zones the people who have attended cabildos perceive that only half of their requests have been implemented, while in the non-conflict zones the people perceive that over three-fourths of their requests have been granted. The explanation of these results may lie in the fact that entire cantons, mainly in the ex-conflict zone, have not received projects.

2. To promote reconciliation and the transition to peace, USAID should push for rapid resolution of land tenure issues, which are an impediment to MEA projects.

The cantons that have not received MEA funding may largely be resettlement areas, where individual property ditles have not been regularized. USAID requires that individual property titles be held in order to negotiate legally valid easements for infrastructure improvements. Thus MEA projects have been impeded by legal difficulties in some of these resettlement areas.

Through the MEA program, USAID could create incentives for municipal governments to help settle property title disputes. These incentives could be tied in with municipal cadastre preparation and property valuations for municipal tax collection.

3. USAID should promote better working relationships between local government and community organizations.

One way to improve these relationships is to provide the mayors training and technical assistance on working with community organizations.

Another way is to provide a special incentive fund, such as USAID has done in the Philippines and elsewhere, to encourage mayors to work with local NGOs. This may be a particularly good vehicle to begin working with newly elected FMLN mayors.

^{1.} Municipalities in Latin America are like counties in the U.S.--an urban area that serves as the county seat surrounded by a rural hinterland. Each province, or department as they are known in Latin America, is divided into municipalities. In El Salvador the municipalities are further divided into municipal seat and rural cantons.

The proposals in the new Municipal Development Project to strengthen community/municipal relations should be actively pursued and progress monitored: eg. community advisory boards, geographically rotating cabildos, support of community organizations, public education on community-municipal relations, and open municipal council meetings (see Part II).

4. To address the needs of the first time mayors taking office in 1994, USAID will need to weigh the efficacy of pursuing cost recovery as rapidly as possible versus allowing less restrictive funds to help the new mayors get more involved.

The FMLN and its related NGOs show keen awareness of the need to become accountable in the management of funds, do strategic planning, promote productive investments, and pursue cost recovery (source: various NGO interviews, December, 1993). Yet newly elected mayors may have a difficult time in implementing such steps. FMLN mayors in particular rnay represent communities where the local government does not have a strong track record in implementing MEA projects. Thus USAID should allow some MEA funding during the first two years that is free of any requirements to show a track record and incorporate cost recovery.

TABLE NO. 1: UNIVERSE AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEY TARGET POPULATION

	yak(eleme)	PULATION			
	UNIVERSE	%	TOTAL	%	
TOTAL	3,751,242	100	1,034	100	
REGION					
WEST	1,066,824	28	185	18	
CENTRAL	1,051,071	28	257	25	
MIDEAST	517,911	14	210	20	
EAST	1,115,436	30	382	37	

TYPE OF POPULATION					
URBAN	1,379,654	37	369	36	
RURAL.	2,371,588	63	665	64	
					
ZONE	0 470 500	0.0	F70		
NON-CONFLICT	2,479,563	66	573	55	
EX-CONFLICT	1,271,679	34	461	45	
GENDER					
MALE	1,823,577	49	464	45	
FEMALE	1,927,665	51	570	55	
[FEVIALE]	1,927,005	31	370]35]	
AGEGROUPS					
20-29	1,472,929	39	274	26	
30-49	1,584,984	42	478	46	
50-65	693,329	18	282	27	
POPULATION STRATA			<u> </u>		
A (>80,000)	569,802	15	55	5	
B (40,000-80,000)	794,675	21	74	7	
C (20,000-39,999)	819,193	22	76	7	
D (<20,000)	1,567,572	42	829	80	

^{*}Source: Preliminary Results of the National Census - Oct.'93.

TABLE 2 AWARENESS OF MUNICIPAL VS. NATIONAL GOVERNMENT							
	T	ZONE					
	TOTAL	EX-CON	NON-CON				
	%	%	%				
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT							
Know name of mayor	72	71	73				
Have ever contacted mayor	54	53	55				
Have ever contacted municipal employee	60	64	58				
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT	j						
Know name of any "diputado"	18	17	18				
Have ever contacted any "diputado"	3	3	3				
Have ever contacted a national gov't. employee	17	20	14				
	N = 1034	N = 461	N = 573				

TABLE 3	CONFIDENCE IN MUNICIPA	NCE IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT				
		TOTAL	ZONE			
		RESPON.	EX-CON	NON-CON		
		%	%	%		
 High		24	21	27		
MEDIUM		38	38	38		
LOW		31	35	29		
No Response		7	7	7		
		N = 1034	N = 461	N = 573		

Note: "Mucha," "algo," and "poca" translated as "high," "medium," and "low."

TABLE 4								
CONFIDENCE IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT								
	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	NR	ТО	TAL		
	<u>%</u>	%	<u>%</u>	%	%	NO.		
ALL RESPONDENTS	24	38	31	7	100	1034		
VERY ACTIVE IN COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION	38	29	30	3	100	73		
SOMEWHAT ACTIVE	34	41	24	1	100	119		
NOT ACTIVE	22	38	33	8	100	842		
ATTENDED CABILDO	37	32	29	2	100	274		
DID NOT ATTEND	20	40	32	8	100	760		
MUNICIPIO HAS A CRM (MUN. RECON. COM.)	34	38	24	4	100	128		
DOES NOT HAVE	23	38	32	7	100	906		
VOTED FOR MAYOR	33	37	25	4	100	383		
DID NOT VOTE FOR MAYOR	19	38	35	8	100	276		
CONARAMEA BENEFICIARIES	27	39	27	7	100	795		
NON-BENEFICIARIES	15	34	45	6	100	239		
COMMUNITY CHOOSES "DIRECTIVOS"	27	40	29	4	100	767		
DOES NOT CHOOSE	16	31	40	13	100	267		
NON-CONFLICT ZONES	27	38	29	7	100	573		
EX-CONFLICT ZONES	21	38	35	7	100	461		
VOTED IN 1991	27	37	31	6	100	659		
DID NOT VOTE	20	40	33	7	100	375		
MAYOR WAS IN EXILE	26	42	31	1	100	84		
MAYOR WAS NOT IN EXILE	24	37	31	7	100	950		
	i							
N =	250	391	325	68		1034		

TABLE 5						
PUBLIC OPINION OF L	EADING INSTITU	TIONS				
		ZONE				
	TOTAL	EX-CON	NON-CON			
	%	%	%			
INSTITUTION BY DEGREE OF POPULARITY		Z O N E EX-CON NON-CO % % 70 73 61 60 48 51 45 49 38 47 20 23				
Religious Institutions	71	70	73			
Community Organizations	60	61	60			
Municipal Government	50	48	51			
National Government	47	45	49			
Armed Forces	43	38	47			
Labor Unions	22	20	23			
Political Parties	18	17	19			
	N = 1034	N = 461	N = 573			

NOTE: Total reflects percentage of respondents ranking the institution as "Good", as compared to "Average" and "Poor".

TABLE 6				
PERCEIVED OPENNESS OF MUNIC	IPAL GOVERN	IMENT TO F	POPULAR PA	RTICIPATION
		ZONE		ATTENDED
	TOTAL	EX-CON	NON-CON	CABILDO
	%	%	%	%
How often does the mayor consult				
the community's opinion?	Ì			
FREQUENTLY	10	7	12	15
OCCASIONALLY	26	23	29	34
SELDOM	32	35	29	31
NEVER	23	26	21	17
Do not know	9	9	9	3
How much opportunity do you have to			i !	
participate in your local government?	l l			
HIGH	5	5	5	13
MEDIUM	18	16	20	26
LOW .	59	64	56	52
No Response	17	15	19	9
	N = 1034	N = 461	N = 573	N = 274

TABLE 7								
AWARENESS OF AND PARTICIPATION IN CABILDOS								
	Z O N E ORGANIZED							
	TOTA	L EX-CON	NON-CON	COMMUNITY				
	%	%	%	%				
KNOW WHAT CABILDO IS BY NAME	60	61	59	63				
KNOW WHAT CABILDO IS, BUT NOT BY NAME	14	16	14	15				
HAVE ATTENDED A CABILDO	27	26	27	31				
HAVE NOT ATTENDED, BUT KNOW SOMEONE WHO HAS	74	77	71	78				
HAVE HELPED TO CHOOSE A REPRESENTATIVE TO ATTEND	22	22	21	25				
	N = 1034	N = 461	N = 573	N = 795				

TABLE 8 POPULAR PERCEPTION OF WHY MAYORS CONVENE CABILDOS





TABLE 9

POPULAR PERCEPTION OF WHO MAY ATTEND THE CABILDOS ABIERTOS



24

TABLE 10 REPRESENTATIVENESS OF CABILDOS					
		Zo	NE		
	TOTAL	EX-CON	NON-CON		
	%	%	%		
PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS AGREEING THAT					
Cabildos represent all sectors of the community	75	74	75		
Mayor calls cabildos only when s/he has money to distribute	39	40	38		
Mayor calls cabildos so the community can participate	79	75	81		
Cabildos offer few & very brief opportunities to participate	43	51	36		
	N = 680	N = 310	N = 370		

TABLE 11 IMPORTANCE OF CABILDOS						
		ZO	NE			
	TOTAL	EX-CON	NON-CON			
	%	%	%			
ARE CABILDOS MORE IMPORTANT NOW THAN BEFORE?						
More important than before	53	48	58			
Less important than before	3	4	3			
Equally important	35	37	33			
Do not know/no response	8	10	7			
	1	Ì				
	N = 680	N = 310	N = 370			

TABLE 12 PUBLIC OPINION OF THE CABILDOS					
		ΖO	NE		
	TOTAL	EX-CON	NON-CON		
	%	%	%		
PERCENT OF ATTENDEES THAT					
Were satisfied with the experience	85	82	88		
Would attend another cabildo	94	93	95		
Would attend the next cabildo	92	92	92		
	N = 274	N = 120	N = 154		

TABLE 13 ROLE OF PROJECT MONEY						
	-	z o	NE			
	TOTAL	EX-CON	NON-CON			
	%	%	%			
FOR THOSE WHO KNOW WHAT A CABILDO IS: Know of a project identified at a cabildo, implemented by local government	62	60	63			
	N = 680	N = 310	N = 370			
FOR THOSE WHO HAVE ATTENDED A CABILDO: Community asked for a project at a cabildo	96	92	99			
The requested project was built	61	48	71			
Would attend cabildo if little funds available for project	88	83	92			
Would attend cabildo if no funds available for project	78	69	84			
	N = 274	N = 120	N = 154			

TABLE 14 EFFECT OF CABILDOS ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION					
	ZONE				
	1	TOTAL	EX-CON	NON-CON	
		%	%	%	
For having attended a cabildo, are you now more active in community organizations?					
	YES	76	69	81	
	NO	24	3 1	19	
		N = 274	N = 120	N = 154	

TABLE 15
PRINCIPAL REASON FOR ATTENDING A CABILDO




TABLE 16 AWARENESS OF CONARA/MEA PROJECTS						
	TO.	TAL	Z C	NE		
	NO.	%	EX-CON	NON-CON		
			%	%		
KNOW OF A PROJECT BUILT WITH CONARA/MEA FUNDS	956	92	93	92		
FAMILY HAS DIRECTLY BENEFITTED FROM A PROJECT	795	77	79	75		
KNOW OF PROJECT IDENTIFIED AT CABILDO, BUILT BY MUN.	421	41	41	41		
Aware that funds came from CONARA	189	45	40	49		
Aware that funds came from MEA	1	0	0	0		
N =	1,034					

NOTE: Respondents were read a list of CONARA/MEA projects in their municipality. From that list they identified projects they knew, without necessarily knowing they were funded by CONARA/MEA.

TABLE 17 COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT PUBLIC WORKS PROVIDERS								
	KNOW VERY OF GOOD GOOD AVE. POOR POOR NR TOTA							TOTAL
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
AGENCY								
MINISTRY OF HEALTH	95	9	70	18	2	0	1	100
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION	94	9	70	18	1	0	1	100
NATIONAL WATER AGENCY (ANDA)	85	5	56	27	8	1	4	100
CONARA/SRN	85	15	63	16	1	0	4	100
SOCIAL INVESTMENT FUND (FIS)	65	11	62	17	1	0	9	100
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS (MOP)	44	4	52	32	6	0	5	100
MEA	6	3	58	23	2	14	0	100
N =	1,034							

TABLE 18	220 ICAT IN		0 11
ROLE OF CABILDOS IN	PHOJECI IDI	ENTIFICATI	ON
		ΖO	NE
	TOTAL	EX-CON	NON-CON
	%	%	%
importance of cabildos in identifying projects			
LOW	9	12	8
MEDIUM	19	21	18
HIGH	38	38	38
Do not know/no response	33	30	36
·		1	
	N = 1034	N = 461	N = 573

TABLE 19				
	M	EA PROCESS		
FOR ALL CONARA/MEA			Who implemented	Who maintains
PROJECTS IDENTIFIED	project?	project?	project?	project?
Į	%	%	<u>%</u>	%
Community	42	32	13	34
Municipal government	24	33	41	30
Central government	3	3	4	4
CONARA	6	8	15	2
Others	2	1	2	3
Do not know/no response	23	24	24	28
	100	100	100	100
	N = 2476	N = 2588	N = 2558	N = 2313

TABLE 20				
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN	CONARA/MEA PROJE	CTS		
	TOTAL	ΖO	NE	
	PROJECTS	EX-CON	NON-CON	
	%	%	%	
TYPE OF PARTICIPATION				
PROVIDED LABOR	33	34	32	
MONITORED FUNDS	5	5	5	
SELECTED CONTRACTORS	3	4	3	
OTHER	11	10	11	
NONE	18	20	17	
Do not know/no response	30	27	32	
	N = 2298	N = 983	N = 1315	

TABLE 21 COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN CONARA/MEA PROJECTS				
		ΖO	NE	
	TOTAL	EX-CON	NON-CON	
PERCENT RESPONDING YES	%	%	%	
MAYOR KEPT COMMUNITY INFORMED OF PROGRESS	44	41	47	
	N = 2193	N = 933	N = 1260	
CONARA WORKED WITH YOUR COMMUNITY'S ORGANIZATIONS	48	47	48	
IF YES, HOW WELL?	N = 1034	N = 461	N = 573	
WELL	69	68	70	
ADEQUATELY	27	28	26	
POORLY	1	1	1 1	
Do not know/no response	3	3	3	
	N = 493	N = 216	N = 277	

TABLE 22 COMPARISON OF AGENCY CHARACTERISTICS							
MUN. GOV'T. CONARA FIS OTHERS NON						DO NOT KNOW	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	
WHICH OF THESE AGENCIES							
MAKES MOST EFFECTIVE USE OF FUNDS?	42	30	10	2	2	21	
CONSULTS THE COMMUNITY THE MOST?	72	16	7	1	2	7	
USES THE MOST LOCAL MATERIALS?	36	12	3	1 1	12	37	
USES THE MOST LOCAL CONTRACTORS?	24	9	3	1	14	51	
USES THE MOST LOCAL LABOR?	53	16	4	1	7	24	
BUILDS THE BEST QUALITY PROJECTS?	29	41	15	3	3	24	
BUILDS THE MOST BENEFICIAL PROJECTS?	36	40	13	2	3	18	
MAINTAINS PROJECTS THE BEST?	34	21	6	2	10	31	
N = 1034							

NOTE: Row totals exceed 100% because some people responded with more than one institution.

TABLE 23					
OPINIONS OF CONARA/MEA					
	<u> </u>	ZONE			
	TOTAL	EX-CON	NON-CON		
	%	%	%		
HOW DOES CONARA ASSIGN FUNDS TO MUNICIPALITIES?					
COMMUNITY NEEDS	77	78	77		
POLITICAL INTERESTS	6	6	7		
OTHER	0	0	1		
Do not know/no response	16	16	15		
·	100	100	100		
WHAT IS THE BEST USE OF THE CONARA/MEA FUNDS?					
BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS ARE MOST IMPORTANT	95	96	95		
OTHER NEEDS ARE MORE IMPORTANT	3	3	4		
Do not know/no response	11	1	1		
•	100	100	100		
	N = 1034	N = 461	N = 573		
HOW MUCH OF YOUR COMMUNITY'S INFRASTRUCTURE	TOTAL	URBAN	RURAL		
NEEDS ARE MET BY THESE PROJECTS?	%	%	%		
ALMOST ALL	7	10	6		
A LARGE PART	40	50	34		
A SMALL PART	38	33	40		
ALMOST NONE	15	7	20		
	100	100	100		
	N = 1034	N = 369	N = 665		

TABLE 24 MOST BENIFICIAL PROJECTS					
				ZONE	
	TOTAL	EX-CON	NON-CON		
	%	%	%		
PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS CHOOSING	Ļ		ľ		
Roads	43	45	41		
Schools	25	30	20		
Water systems	15	9	19		
Electric projects	14	11	16		
Health facilities	3] 3	3		
Municipal buildings	2	2	1		
Community centers	1	0	1		
Other	2	0	3		
	N = 795	N = 365	N = 430		

TABLE 25 COST RECOVERY				
		ZONE		
	TOTAL	EX-CON	NON-CON	
PERCENT RESPONDING YES	%	%	%	
HAS MAYOR ASKED COMMUNITY TO PAY PART OF PROJECTS?	21	24	19	
	N = 1,034	N = 461	N = 573	
WHAT FORM OF PAYMENT?				
VOLUNTEER LABOR	43	43	43	
CASH CONTRIBUTION	45	41	48	
TAX INCREASES	9	12	7	
USERFEES	2	2	3	
CONTRIBUTED MATERIALS	7	5	្រែក	
OTHER	2	4	ໍ່ ຍ	
Do not know/no response	4	5	3	
	N = 217	N = 111	11 = 100	
SHOULD THE MAYOR ASK FOR SUCH CONTRIBUTIONS?	56	54	57	
	N = 1,034	N = 481	N a 67%	
ARE YOU WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE MORE OF YOUR OWN RESOURCES TO HAVE MORE PROJECTS?	83	78	57	
	N = 575	N = 250	N = 32/5	
IN WHAT FORM WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE?				
VOLUNTEER LABOR	71	74	69	
CASH CONTRIBUTION	27	26	28	
TAX INCREASES	3	2	3	
USERFEES	4	4	5	
CONTRIBUTED MATERIALS	5	5	6	
OTHER	1	1	1	
	N = 479	N = 195	N = 284	

DECENTRALIZATION								
TOTAL COUNTRY								
PRIV. ENT.	NAT'L. GOV.	MUN. GOV'T.	NO RESP.					
%	%	%	%					
	·							
20	45	26	9					
19	55	18	7					
9	76	11	4					
	EV CONELL	ICT ZONES						
DOW ENT								
		}	NO RESP.					
76	76	76	76					
21	45	25	8					
20	56	18	6					
8	77	12	3					
	PRIV. ENT. 20 19 9 PRIV. ENT. %	TOTAL C PRIV. ENT. NAT'L. GOV. % % 20 45 19 55 9 76 EX-CONFLI PRIV. ENT. NAT'L. GOV. % % 21 45 20 56	TOTAL COUNTRY PRIV. ENT. NAT'L. GOV. MUN. GOV'T. % % % 20 45 26 19 55 18 9 76 11 EX-CONFLICT ZONES PRIV. ENT. NAT'L. GOV. MUN. GOV'T. % % %					

II. INSTITUTIONAL SUSTAINABILITY

II. INSTITUTIONAL SUSTAINABILITY

A. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

Since the inception of the MEA program in 1986 USAID has channeled MEA funds through CONARA (former name of the SRN), which was created in 1983 as a semi-autonomous institution under the Ministry of Planning. The General Coordinator of CONARA is a presidential appointee.

Previous evaluations have focused on the ability of CONARA to deliver small-scale infrastructure projects to communities affected by the war. The evaluations gave CONARA high marks for implementing a successful program that promoted local participatory democracy and generated significant changes in attitudes while also delivering small scale infrastructure projects at relatively low cost. The 1990 evaluation stressed that an important lesson learned is that technically efficient programs which are apolitical and which respond to perceived needs can induce impressive attitudinal changes in a remarkable short time.

Major recommendations in the 1990 evaluation (Stout, Ternent and Orr, 1990) to strengthen the MEA program included:

- Initiating multi-year action plans.
- Phasing in user fees and cost recovery for public investment.
- Promoting the pre-cabildo process so as to strengthen grass roots participation.

Since 1990, USAID has responded to all three recommendations to differing degrees. It has encouraged multi-year action plans, but has been constrained by funding limitations. It has promoted legislation that allows municipalities to establish user fees based on the true cost of providing services. It has pushed for mayors to have more open council meetings. It has supported complementary efforts in promoting more open council meetings, such as the USAID/CLASP Project that trained approximately 140 mayors in the United States in 1991 and 1992. Other aspects of the pre-cabildo process, however, have received little attention.

Since these two evaluations, there have been significant changes in the environment in El Salvador that impact municipal development. The major changes have been the signing of the Peace Accords between the government and the FMLN in January 1992 that has resulted in the cessation of military and guerilla activity; and the establishment of a National Reconstruction plan (PRN) in February 1992 that increased MEA activity in the ex-conflict zones.

As part of the reconstruction plan CONARA was renamed Secretaria de Reconstrucción Nacional (SRN), and charged with directing the reconstruction effort. SRN is virtually the same as CONARA and many people still refer to the SRN as CONARA.

The MEA program has two funding sources that are channeled through the SRN. The first source is called "MEA Regular" and is earmarked for 146 municipalities not classified as ex-conflict zones. The second source is called "MEA/PRN" and is earmarked for 115 municipalities which are classified as ex-conflict zones. The only difference between the two funding sources is that the average allocation per municipality is higher in the MEA/PRN program because these municipalities were affected by the war. Likewise, "MEA Regular" funding is scheduled to expire in two years, whereas MEA/PRN will continue for the life of the Reconstruction Plan (an estimated five years). Until 1993, all municipalities were eligible for "MEA Regular" funds. Only in 1993 was a distinction made between ex-conflict zones and non-ex-conflict municipalities for purposes of determining MEA funding eligibility.

The MEA/PRN program is an important part of the National Reconstruction Plan. Funds are funneled through the SRN to one of three modalities: 1) the MEA/PRN for 115 municipalities, 2) a large number of NGOs, and 3) various central government institutions.

Both the MEA Regular and MEA/PRN use an allocation formula that distributes funds to all municipalities (except the capital city of San Salvador) weighing factors such as size, population, and relative poverty. Generally, the small poor, rural municipalities are favored in the allocation process. This allocation process results in an apolitical process whereby all municipalities have the opportunity to tap into the MEA program for funding infrastructure projects.

To oversee the process and provide technical advice to municipalities, the SRN maintains a head office, five regional and fourteen departmental offices throughout the country. USAID assists SRN with field personnel who monitor the MEA program by working with SRN field offices and attending *cabildos abiertos*. After completion of the National Plan for Reconstruction, the SRN is expected to dissolve.

USAID provides funds for technical assistance to two institutions: ISDEM and COMURES. ISDEM, the *Instituto Salvadoreño de Desarrollo Municipal*, was established in 1987 by presidential decree to provide technical advise to municipalities. It has recently helped 210 Salvadoran municipalities to update their user fee structures (*Ingresos Tributarios*). This has resulted in 157 municipalities reporting revenue increases of an average of 70 percent in comparison to the previous year. Also in 1993 ISDEM played a pivotal role in assisting in helping municipalities to register voters for elections scheduled in March 1994.

COMURES, the Corporación de Municipalidades de la República de El Salvador, was established in 1941 as an umbrella organization for the 262 mayors and municipalities of

the country. Whereas this organization remained inactive for many years, it has convened five consecutive annual congresses since 1987. Since its revitalization in 1987, the organization has been able to define itself as a non-partisan entity that can represent the interests of the municipalities to the central government and legislature. It has recently indirectly become involved with the MEA program because mayors sometimes invite COMURES to their cabildo abiertos. COMURES responds by sending social promoters from the Analysis Section who go to the cabildo abierto and provide assistance to the mayor. Assistance is provided by following up on behalf of the mayor with central government agencies to facilitate or improve specific service delivery in a given municipality. The Analysis Section is presently conducting a survey to determine the technical assistance and training requirements of all municipalities in the country.

Since the last evaluation, GOES has promoted state modernization efforts that were initiated as a result of the United Nation's Management Development Programme Project in 1991. State modernization efforts includes not only a decentralization component, put also privatization, reform of the civil service system, and streamline of central government operations (including transferring of some central government responsibilities to the local level). In May 1993, a Commission to coordinate the decentralization effort was established. Members of the commission, known as Comisión Coordinadora del Proceso de Descentralización y Desarrollo Municipal (CDM), include the President of ISDEM, the General Manager of ISDEM, the President of COMURES, the Vice-President of COMURES, the Planning Ministry, and the Secretary General of the SRN. In the near future it is expected that the Finance Minister will be incorporated into the Commission. USAID forms part of the Consultancy Committee to the Commission along with the GTZ, and the UNDP.

The technical arm of the commission has only recently been organized, and is expected to develop a decentralized framework that will facilitate MEA's goal of strengthening municipal government. It is presently working on developing an institutional framework for the delivery of public services at the Departmental level tentatively know as Consejos Departamentales de Desarrollo.

B. INSTITUTIONAL FINDINGS

SRN

The SRN continues to be a very effective organization in establishing a procedural system to "get the funds out" in a timely manner. This can be attributed to its staff depth in engineering and architecture. However, it does not give the same attention to the social dimensions of nurturing local participatory democracy. For example, several SRN staff members gave the impression that the *cabildo abierto* is the first step in the project cycle without underscoring the importance of the *cabildo* in strengthening participatory local government. Little emphasis is made on the need for, or importance of, pre-cabildo

activities and/or the community reconstruction committees as viable mechanisms to strengthen local participatory democracy.

ISDEM

ISDEM provides training and technical assistance to the mayors on issues ranging from revenue generation, financial management, and strategic planning, to voter registration. Although closely tied to the party in office, ISDEM is perceived by most mayors, community leaders, and other government officials interviewed as a non-partisan technical agency. It has been particularly successful in helping municipalities to increase revenue generation, as reflected in an increase in service fees by 157 municipalities.

COMURES

COMURES, the national association of mayors, is the lead institution in promoting a national policy dialogue on decentralization. In spite of the fact that 60 percent of the country's mayors are from one party, COMURES has created a multi-partisan image that has turned it into an effective voice for decentralization.

The technical arm of the CDM Commission is housed in COMURES. By being based in COMURES, the efforts of the mayors, sectoral ministries, and the Ministry of Planning to define an institutional framework for decentralization should be enhanced.

Municipal Institutional Capability

With limited financial and administrative capacity, local governments have implemented nearly 9,000 MEA projects. Price Waterhouse audits show less than one percent of questionable costs.

Municipal financial capability is severely limited in most municipalities, even with recent increases in user fee revenues. Until municipalities are provided with more revenue sources (more central government transfers, and/or authority to levy a property tax) it is not realistic to expect municipalities to be able to pay for their own infrastructure. A revenue sharing program where a percentage of the national budget is earmarked for municipalities is highly recommended. As an example, in Guatemala, 8 percent of the national budget is distributed to municipalities. The existing Fondo de Desarrollo Económico y Social (Economic and Social Development Fund) establishes precedent for a Revenue Sharing Program. However, the Fund only earmarks \$\psi 25\$ million to be distributed to the 262 municipalities, this represents less than one percent of the national budget, and provides each individual municipality with such limited resources that no major projects can be realized.

One of the main requisites towards promoting sustainability is sound fiscal management at the municipal level, including the need to distinguish between two types of budgets:

the capital budget, and the operating budget. It is also important to keep in mind the financial ratio of debt service as a percentage of total expenditures in he operating budget. From this perspective USAID needs to re-examine the requirement that a municipality dedicate 20 percent of its budget for infrastructure. This 20 percent makes the assumption of using recurring revenues to finance non-recurring expenditures, a precedent that could potentially undermine the credit worthiness of municipalities.

The MEA program to date has constructed over 8,600 projects, yet there has been no concerted effort to build up maintenance and operational capability at the municipal level for this infrastructure. Survey results do not indicate that popular perception of the maintenance of MEA projects has become a problem as yet, but the potential for the erosion of public confidence in local government due to poor maintenance and operations should not be underestimated. Because these are over 200 municipalities with less than 20,000 population which lack a critical organizational mass, maintenance and operational capability will probably be more effective if done from a departmental perspective.

Mayors' Attitudes and Perspectives

The general consensus among the thirty mayors interviewed for this evaluation is that the MEA program is the most effective mechanism in the country for responding to citizens' needs for local infrastructure in a timely manner. They were very cognizant that MEA projects were being done at less cost than equivalent FIS projects, and with more community involvement.

For the mayors the MEA project is the only existing program for municipal infrastructure. There is no other source of funds for municipalities to tap so that infrastructure programs can be implemented. If MEA funding were to cease, municipal infrastructure would grind to a halt in practically all Salvadoran municipalities.

Through the MEA program, the mayors feel that they are receiving technical assistance primarily from SRN. The technical assistance provided by SRN includes developing feasibility studies for project requests. However, several mayors complained that these studies are not done in a timely manner because there is too much dependence on using outside engineering consultants to develop project profiles. The delay in doing the studies makes the mayors hesitant to call another cabildo abierto until they have received a definitive notice from the SRN concerning the status of projects. The mayors feel frustrated because they feel that the time delays erodes their position as mayor, and makes the SRN assume a more important role than is desirable, thereby undermining their authority. This has resulted in several cases of local community leaders going directly to SRN to determine the status of a given project effectively bypassing the mayor as the representative spokesman for the community. This was confirmed by one of the evaluators that while at the SRN, he was able to observe one incident when eight community leaders came to the Operations Department inquiring about projects for their community, yet not one of them was a mayor.

While mayors recognize USAID field personnel, they are not aware of any specific technical assistance that is provided. Nevertheless, the mayors seem to enjoy their presence at cabildos to lend them credibility.

Concerning cabildos abiertos, the mayors feel that MEA projects are truly identified by the community. In these areas, the mayors expressed concern about manipulation from politically-motivated NGOs. In some of the resettlement areas, however, mayors expressed concern about the compaging interests between the resident community and the non-resident property owners.

The interviews with the mayors indicate they are hesitant to promote more open council meetings. While they appreciate the importance of the cabildo abierto to solicit community input for MEA projects, there is great reluctance to promote citizen involvement in the prioritization process or to promote dialogue to discuss community problems. Mayors generally have not made the connection between open participation and willingness to pay or contribute towards projects. If it were not for the financial incentive to receive MEA funds, mayors would prefer not to hold cabildos abiertos, even though they are required by law. In fact, even with the financial incentives mayors are not holding the number of cabildos required by law (see Appendix J). What may replace MEA's financial incentive, however, may be even more effective: the popular demand for cabildos that the MEA program has generated. As the survey results show, the citizens like the cabildos and want further opportunities to participate.

A number of mayors have brought up the issue of how to accommodate the needs of MEA 'graduates'--i.e. mayors who are ready to move beyond isolated, small scale projects. To some extent the mayors have been taking care of this problem on their own. Many have begun to coordinate investments at a multi-municipal or departmental level, through the departmental committees of mayors known as CEDs. Some have begun to ask ISDEM and the Vice Ministry of Housing and Urban Development for technical assistance in doing strategic development plans for their municipality. While a number of these MEA 'graduates' find MEA's size limits on infrastructure investments to be frustrating, it is probably advisable to keep them in place in order to provide broader coverage and maintain the emphasis on process.

Sustainability

The major challenge facing USAID and the MEA program during its last two years of funding is how to sustain the program's achievements beyond the life of the project. The three major issues involved in sustainability are how to transfer more financial responsibility for future infrastructure projects to the municipal government, how to encourage the mayors to continue the *cabildos* without direct financial incentive, and how to incorporate the new mayors elected under peacetime conditions next year.

USAID has already begun to address the issue of financial sustainability. Beginning in 1992, the MEA project was expanded to give mayors incentives to promote sustainability. These include two specific funds called the Fondo de Incentivo Municipal (FIM) (Municipal Incentive Fund), and the Fondo de Fortalecimiento Municipal (FFI) (Municipal Strengthening Fund). The FIM is designed to reward municipalities who have demonstrated improvement in project and financial management capabilities with additional projects. In order to qualify for this fund, municipalities need to have completed prior MEA projects in a timely manner, realized four cabildos abtertos during the past year, and increased their municipal service fees by 30 percent during the past year.

The FFI is designed to help municipalities improve their financial and management capabilities. As opposed to infrastructure projects, this fund encourages municipalities to improve their finance and management systems such as cadastral administration.

These new modalities of the MEA program have shown initial success. As of September 1993, 128 municipalities participated in the FMI fund which financed 190 projects totaling ¢15,999,995. During the same time period 39 municipalities participated in the FFM fund where 65 administrative improvement projects were financed. See Appendix I, Tables I-2 and I-3 for a breakdown of how these funds were distributed on a departmental basis.

Complementing these two modalities is a third fund available only to departmental communities of mayors, known as CEDs (Comité Especial Departamental). The purpose of this fund is to encourage two or more municipalities to jointly develop projects with a broader geographic impact. Through September 30, 1993, 163 municipalities had participated in this fund implementing 264 projects. See Appendix I, Table I-4 for a breakdown on how these funds were distributed on a departmental basis.

What is striking is that the initial success of the new modalities is not reflected in the general attitude of the mayors on the need to increase revenues as a first step towards financial autonomy. When asked how they intended to use the extra revenue generated by the increase user fees, most mayors indicated that the increased amount of revenue could not finance infrastructure projects, and they anticipated using the money primarily to cover administrative expenses. Likewise the mayors generally do not understand the policy criteria behind these special modalities. They continue to think of all funds as part of MEA and as a potential source of "free funds."

Mayors have not placed much emphasis on cost-recovery. As a group they do not appreciate the relationship of the need to generate more revenues from local resources so as to minimize central government transfers and thereby establish their own autonomy in a decentralized framework. Many mayors give the impression that sustainability will not occur under their mandate, and therefore it is a low priority item.

While this attitude may seem alarming for the sustainability of the MEA process, it appears that the new mayoral candidates and candidates for re-election are aware of the decline in foreign aid and the need to find local resources to make projects possible. They will need assistance in generating those local resources, and USAID's new Municipal Development Project has directly anticipated that need.

Also there is anecdotal evidence of cases where municipalities have made conscientious efforts to promote local contribution for projects. These include San Carlos in the Department of Morazán where the community complemented MEA funding by contributing \$162,000 to complete a water system; Apastepeque where a high school was build with local resources; Tecoluca where the Health Center was painted by the local community; San Antonio Masahuat where the local community funded the furnishings for the health center; Comacarán in the Department of San Miguel where the water distribution system was extended using community resources; and Santa Elena where the street system is being maintained with local resources. In several municipalities, such as Apopa and Texistepeque, the community has donated labor as its counterpart for infrastructure projects (Source: Interviews with USAID field personnel).

On the legal front COMURES has already been making efforts to promote municipal property tax legislation, but with no indication that the desired results are close at hand. Nevertheless, USAID has done what it can by making such legislation a condition for continuing its new Municipal Development Project. COMURES should probably try to get legislators and NGOs represented on its inter-institutional decentralization committee, in order to increase its clout.

Another issue is how to preserve the managerial and technical capacity for assisting local governments that has been developed in the three national implementing institutions. The largest of these is SRN, which is designated to close at the end of the National Reconstruction Project in about five years. Reasonable proposals are being developed to absorb some of the capacity into already existing departmental committees of mayors and some into the larger municipalities.

The issue of how to incorporate the new mayors to be elected for the first time under peacetime conditions in 1994 has not yet been addressed by USAID officials. They found that the learning curve of the new mayors after the last election was rapid and that the elections created no real impediment to sustainability. However, a major difference with the upcoming elections is that a significant number of FMLN mayors may be trying their hands at institutionalized change for the first time. This issue remains the greatest weakness in USAID's efforts to sustain the MEA process, and some recommended actions are included below.

Implications for New Municipal Development Projects

Beginning in 1994, a new Municipal Development Project (MDP, 519-0388) will come on-line. This five year, \$15 million dollar project is aimed at strengthening local democratic participation and increasing municipal institutional capacity. The first phase of the project is designed to reform policies that are crucial for municipal autonomy. These policy priorities include the introduction of legislation allowing for a property tax system at the municipal level and legislation authorizing the decentralization and devolution of water systems from ANDA to municipalities.

The MDP program should build on the lessons learned in MEA for increasing institutional capacity building at the municipal level. For example, following the recommendation of the International City Management report (Murphy, Ohnesorgen and Salcido, 1993), MEA project funds that are earmarked for a given municipality could be used to help that municipality develop its capital budget. In other words, funds received through MEA would be designated to a separate capital budget as opposed to being blended with the operating budget as it is presently done.

As a step towards developing two separate budgets, ISDEM could provide technical assistance to municipalities on the need to manage two separate budgets. By the end of 1994, the requirement of municipalities to have two separate budgets could then be incorporated as a precondition to receiving MEA funds.

C. CONCLUSIONS

The MEA process has proven a good way for mayors to coordinate public investments in their municipalities. The MEA process is replicable to other public investment projects, such as schools, and water systems which may be financed by other mechanisms such as FIS or within the budget of the various sectorial ministries. Because of the success of the MEA program, it would be desirable for the GOES to develop a policy that any infrastructure project, regardless of funding source, adopt the MEA process and consult with the mayors and their respective communities before initiating the project.

D. LESSONS LEARNED

One of the important lesson learned by the MEA project is that local development is multisectoral by nature. Yet, many development programs and projects try to force fit components of municipal development into a specific sector (eg. housing and urban development; water and sanitation; health; education). From a development perspective this results in various projects funding traditional central government sectors, and bypassing and/or under-utilizing local participation through the mayor. From the perspective of promoting decentralization, and to delivery more cost-effective development projects, where possible both multilateral and bilateral organizations should include

processes that incorporate the local mayor and his/her community so that they can define their respective community needs.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1. ISDEM, in collaboration with the Vice Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, should provide technical assistance to interested municipalities to help them develop strategic plans. Once a strategic plan is developed for a given municipality, MEA funded projects should be defined within the context of this plan, plus local community participation. It should be emphasized that the iterative process of developing a strategic plan will encourage community input, which should allow for more open council meetings and improved dialogue between elected local officials and the citizens.
- 2. For municipalities in non-conflict zones (eg. 146 municipalities that participate in the "MEA Regular" program), the minimum base-line requirement to receive initial funding should be the existing requirement of the Incentive Fund (FIM). This recommendation is already contemplated in the MPD, but could be implemented immediately.
- 3. All municipalities who participate in the MEA program should be required to place some portion of increased service fee revenues into an interest earning municipal reserve account. For the vast majority of municipalities the amounts deposited would be insufficient to fund any infrastructure project in the near future. However, with two or more years accumulated growth in that account, there should be sufficient amounts that the reserve funds can be used as counterpart funding for infrastructure projects. Likewise, by this time the MDP would have developed financial management guidelines to assist municipalities on how to use these reserve funds, and municipalities should begin receiving revenue from property taxes, assuming that property tax legislation is passed.
- 4. For those municipalities with a sizable reserve account balance, 70 percent of the reserve balance should be required to be used as counterpart funding for MEA projects. (Note: Balance figure and percentages should be based on the financial capability of the 25 municipalities classified in categories A and B by the GOES).
- 5. Project criteria for the Municipal Strengthening Fund (FFM) should be expanded to allow for funding of the development of municipal strategic plans as well as improved financial management systems.
- 6. Project criteria for the Municipal Strengthening Fund (FFM) should also be expanded to help municipalities establish and develop their operational and maintenance capability.
- 7. More technical assistance and training is required on *pre-cabildo* activity so as to promote more transparent, participatory local government, through open council meetings

as a condition for MEA funding in 1994. COMURES should be provided with technical assistance so that they can promote to all mayors the desirability of open meetings. The mayors should also be provided with on-going training on pre-cabildo techniques as a continued follow-up to the 1991 and 1992 CLASP Training Program. The iterative process of incorporating the community in developing a strategic plan should facilitate the acceptance by mayors of open council meetings. This would include incorporating the various Social Control, Technical Reconstruction, and Municipal Reconstruction Committees that presently exist. Likewise, the level of dialogue needs to be expanded so that instead of focusing primarily on soliciting from the community what projects they want, mayors also need to find out the degree of willingness of the local community to pay for the services they want.

III. INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES

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III. INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES

A. OVERVIEW

The MEA program supports and encourages development and credibility of local government by funding and building small infrastructure projects which have been requested by the local people. Since 1987 the MEA program has evolved a MEA mechanism for selecting, designing, funding, building, and accounting for funds for projects built by or under supervision of municipal government. The system works; it has been successful, and survey results show it to be respected by both the mayors and the majority of the people. It is, in fact, the only system now functioning that has the capability to execute projects in every municipality of the country simultaneously.

The MEA program has developed its own process, organization, and methodology. It has proven capable of performing project work in support of a broad range of other programs and projects. Thus, the MEA mechanism, or something very much like it, should be kept in place so long as infrastructure projects are being executed with funds from outside the municipality, whether from GOES or external donors.

B. ANALYSIS

Financial Resources and Project Outputs

USAID and SRN/CONARA documents record that 5,881 projects throughout the country have been completed with host country owned local currency, allocated directly to the MEA program since 1988. In addition, the municipalities have constructed at least 2,722 other projects funded by other special programs, from reforestation to emergency urban programs, to school construction, roads, and potable water.

The total of not less than 8,603 projects has been funded by a variety of programs in a total amount of approximately \$133,550,000. (The exchange rate has varied over the life of the project. An average of 7.5:1 has been used to reflect the changes from 5:1 to 8.7:1 from 1988 to 1993; weighted to try to compensate for greater funding in later years of the program.) The programs and projects for which work has been done, and the annual MEA funding increments are shown in Appendix I, Table of Financial Inputs.

In approximate order of priority, or number of projects built, the program has constructed or repaired roads and bridges, schools, electrical distribution extensions, and potable water supplies. One reason that water systems do not rank higher is that the size, and therefore the cost, of many desirable water supply projects is greater than can be funded by monies available to the municipality, at least until recently. The program has also built, in accord with requests from open town meetings, community buildings, health posts, public

markets, fences around schools, and retaining walls. Projects have been built which benefit all municipalities, although not in every canton.

Coverage of Infrastructure Needs

Financing is not in prospect to cover all the priority needs of the municipalities. That is especially true in the cases of municipal and neighborhood roads and municipal water systems.

- 1. With loans from IDB, and USAID Project 320 funds, MOP/Caminos is repairing and rebuilding roads on the national network. There is not adequate funding from similar, or any other, sources for the 2,500 kilometers of neighborhood roads. Some of those roads are closed, even to oxcarts; many are passable only in the dry season with automotive vehicles, and all that have been traversed by the evaluation team have been travelled at an average speed of about ten kilometers per hours in four wheel drive vehicles. The only funds available to date for these roads are from the MEA program which fund what usually are small projects. In other words, there exists a large gap between national road programs and the needs that can be met by MEA projects.
- 2. From the same funding sources, ANDA is rebuilding water systems which belong to ANDA in some municipal towns, and is installing small systems, usually hand pumps, in rural communities. FIS is also installing somewhat larger, although still small, systems in rural areas also.

MEA has begun, with limited funds, to install systems in municipal towns where no systems exist. Nevertheless, a large funding gap also exists in the water supply/sanitation sector. This is especially noticeable on systems owned and operated by municipalities, as well as in the cantons and caseríos.

3. The MEA mechanism is in place and ideally positioned to meet the needs of the people in both roads and water systems operated or installed by the municipalities.

MEA and Other Agencies of Government

Given the performance of the municipalities and MEA to date, the organization and methodology are well suited to execute infrastructure projects planned and funded by the ministries. MEA has built schools, some of them relatively large, at very economical cost. The mayors could do the same on schools funded by the Ministry of Education. The same can be said for rural and municipal health posts (probably not hospitals, which involve highly technical equipment, mechanical and electrical systems.)

MEA has shown an ability to build suitable electrical distribution systems and water supply networks. MEA should not, however, subsidize CEL, the electric distribution companies, and ANDA by paying for projects in those areas from the MEA budget

without reimbursement. Any work done on systems operated by those entities should be paid for by those entities.

MEA and Other USAID Projects

Most of the success of the MEA program can be attributed to the dedicated and enthusiastic professional employees of SRN in regional offices and the departmental representatives. If success of the MEA system is to be assured in support of other USAID projects, most of the organization should remain in place. If infrastructure funding from local currency or from the Peace and National Recovery Project No. 519-0394, is to obtain maximum benefit in national reconstruction or support Municipal Development Project No. 519-0388, most of the projects should be implemented through the municipalities, with continued MEA technical assistance.

MEA and Larger Projects

If MEA decides to permit larger projects, it is probable that the cost of some projects will exceed the \$250,000 threshold above which USAID host country contracting procedures vill be invoked. Such procedures require that the contracting process and administration be performed by a national agency having the necessary capability and capacity and that agency be certified by USAID to be eligible to do host country contracting.

Neither SRN nor any municipality has been certified as eligible to administer the host country contracting procedure. The construction management office in MIPLAN (Director General for Reconstruction), however, is a certified agency with more than five years experience in host contracting for various agencies and ministries. In fact, DGR assisted the office of the Mayor of San Salvador in construction of several public markets, costing in total more than \$17,000,000. DGR thus already has experience in working directly with mayors. All MEA projects costing more than \$250,000 should be administered by the mayors with DGR contracting construction management assistance using techniques and methodology essentially the same as that used on market construction for the municipal government of San Salvador. In any event, splitting of projects into small components to stay below the \$250,000 limit is a violation of USAID regulations and should be avoided.

Sustainability

Financial sustainability of the program for infrastructure projects will require funding from sources outside the municipalities. The municipalities can increase revenues to cover operation and maintenance costs, and possibly to buy some of their vehicles; and with increased taxing powers they may be able to raise funds to cover debt service on loans. But they will not raise funds internally to meet the up-front costs of building the infrastructure projects they need.

Whether by loan or grant, external (to the municipality) funding for infrastructure needs will be required in El Salvador just as in municipalities in other countries.

The ANDA water system serving the Municipality of San Salvador required financing from IDB in the amount of about \$100 per capita to supplement the existing water system to meet the needs of the urban population. ANDA also arranged for a loan of about \$25 to \$50 per capita to repair ANDA water systems in municipal towns, but no arrangements were made in the loan for the municipalities which operate their own systems. The MOP/Caminos required a loan of about \$15,000 per existing kilometer of road to repair a portion of the national network, not including all the bridges. Nothing in that loan is devoted to neighborhood, or municipal roads. It is not realistic to expect that municipal governments can do what the capital city and national ministry could not do: meet their needs for infrastructure without external financing.

There are potential sources of funds that might be developed to finance the necessary construction:

- a. Continued grants by expatriate donors, or combination loan- grants.
- b. Revenue sharing from the central government in some form to be determined, to be distributed by impartial formula, not politically. At the very least, municipalities should receive a part of the gasoline tax to maintain roads.
- c. Loans and loan-grants from a revolving loan fund administered by a central government agency. That would require a large initial outlay by a backer of the fund, probably an expatriate source.
- d. A portion of the proceeds from sector loans or grants to the central government by international lending institutions and bilateral donors.

Any sector loan for road rehabilitation, for example, should include an allotment for neighborhood roads. Any loan for municipal water supply systems should include a portion for water supply systems operated by the municipalities. Concentration of loan proceeds in central agencies works against the principle and process of decentralization by cutting local government out of the resource chain.

C. FINDINGS

Findings related to the MEA infrastructure projects are listed here. See Appendix D for further discussion of findings with respect to the specific topics listed in the scope of work.

The MEA program has developed a highly successful methodology for implementing small infrastructure projects. It can be made applicable to large

projects nearly any size by enlisting the assistance of the Director General for Reconstruction to provide construction management services to the mayors.

- The use of private consultants to prepare project documents and plans is a good and workable method, and it releases SRN regional and headquarters personnel to spend more time with mayors and communities to improve the project selection and public participation processes. However, projects cycles would be shortened if the field staff assisted the mayors in preparing documentation for small projects, rather than sending them to consultants.
- Quality of construction is acceptable due to skills and pride of local craftsmen. On larger projects, systematic inspection by professional construction supervisors will be required, as is presently proposed.
- NRECA has made a significant improvement in the quality of construction on electrification projects undertaken by the municipalities.
- MEA unit costs in general are lower than those of central agencies, and are reported by the people to be much lower than those of FIS (see survey results).
- The MEA program is a cost effective way to provide both training and incentive to mayors and the citizens in selecting and implementing projects and in working together for the common good.
- The MEA program and infrastructure projects meet at least some of the perceived needs of the people.
- Success in involving mayors and the people in municipal development is due at least in part to incentives provided by projects the people want. It should not be assumed that any other development program without those incentives would be as successful.
- Needs for infrastructure are much greater than any funding availability now anticipated, but that is true all over the world. A program of steady improvements, even in small increments, however, could sustain the momentum that has been developed.
- There is good depth of construction skills and of engineers and architects throughout El Salvador.

D. LESSONS LEARNED

Certain lessons learned in the MEA program may be transferred to other projects and even to other countries.

- Small projects can make an important difference in the people's lives, and in the way they see themselves relating to their society and government.
- Small infrastructure projects simple in design can be implemented efficiently and economically by employees of the municipality. That success is not necessarily transferrable to larger or more complex projects, nor to projects undertaken by central ministries or authorities.
- Infrastructure programs are successful when led by dedicated professionals who believe in what they are doing and can see that they can make a difference.
- Local professionals, when properly qualified and carefully assigned, can have a strong impact on USAID project success with a minimum of expatriate supervision, provided that the supervisor is knowledgeable, willing to spend time in the field and is fully committed to project success.
- The behavior modification desired in municipal administration practice, and in the relationship between central government and municipalities, appears to be a long term process. A low level of effort over a long period of time probably is more effective than doing the same amount of construction quickly.
- Many municipalities are too small to handle all road improvements and maintenance in the future. Re-assignment of maintenance for neighborhood roads to a departmental organization sometime in the future is probably the ultimate solution.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1. The MEA organization and methodology should be kept in place to support other projects, even if local currency for allocation to the MEA program becomes unavailable.
- 2. SRN and GOES should address the large funding gap in meeting the municipal needs for roads, bridges, and municipal water systems.
- 3. An inventory of infrastructure conditions in the municipalities covering, as a minimum, roads, bridges, water supply, and schools should be conducted at the earliest possible time.
- 4. Strategic development planning should begin in the municipalities targeted in the new Municipal Development Project (No. 519-0388) using the inventory recommended in 3. above.

5. Municipal infrastructure needs in roads and water systems should be addressed with the same or greater urgency than has been demonstrated in arranging loans for national roads and ANDA water systems.

Other recommendations and discussion are included in Appendix F.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The MEA program has had widespread success in building local infrastructure projects, promoting participation in local government, and increasing confidence in local government. It is clear that the MEA program contributes directly to two of USAID's strategic objectives: (1) to help the country make the transition from war to peace by building local level democratic institutions and increasing civic participation; and (2) to promote enduring democratic institutions by strengthening local government and responding to the basic infrastructure needs of the community.

Contrary to the findings of the Washington studies (Sollis, 1993, and Yariv and Curtis, 1992), people see the *cabildos* as a genuine expression of the mayor's concern for the community's needs. They consider the *cabildos* to be a representative forum open to all members of the community. They consider the projects implemented to be beneficial to the community.

The positive impact of the MEA program on attitudes toward local government has been felt almost as strongly in the ex-conflict zones as in the rest of the country. Most surprisingly, the popular image of CONARA is quite positive in both ex-conflict and non-conflict zones, based on the agency's ability to respond to people's needs for infrastructure.

The people of El Salvador are much further along the road to reconciliation than most ideologues and politicos imagine, whether they are from government or non-governmental organizations. A deep-seated faith in legitimate government institutions and a strong lesire to work with them permeate the Salvadoran population.

Yet at the same time something the Washington critics were saying is true. People have great faith in the community itself to solve its own problems. Most of El Salvador's rural communities and urban barrios are organized into legally recognized community associations. Most of them want to work with local government. Mayors should build bridges to the community groups. They are a powerful source of support for local development.

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The main shortcomings of the MEA program are: (1) the cabildos, as currently structured provide insufficient opportunity for popular participation; (2) most of the mayors are still reluctant to promote popular participation or work with community organizations; (3) the people consider that the mayors do not keep them well enough informed; (4) a large percentage of people do not consider the cabildos as being very important in the project identification process; (5) few mayors have asked their constituents to contribute their own resources to MEA projects; (6) the program promotes individual, isolated projects that do not build on each other strategically; (6) some cantons have received no MEA projects;

(7) despite good efforts by USAID to ensure the sustainability of the MEA process, there is a significant risk that the process will halt once USAID funds are exhausted.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1. USAID should examine why some cantons have received no MEA funding and seek to address the reasons.
- 2. To promote reconciliation and the transition to peace, USAID should push for rapid resolution of land tenure issues, which are an impediment to MEA projects. Through the MEA program, USAID could create incentives for municipal governments to help settle property title disputes. These incentives could be tied in with municipal cadastre preparation and property valuations for municipal tax collection.
- 3. The proposals in the MDP to strengthen community/municipal relations should be actively pursued and progress monitored: eg. community advisory boards, geographically rotating *cabildos*, support of community organizations, public education on community-municipal relations, and open municipal council meetings (see below).
- 4. To improve community participation in local government, COMURES should provide training and technical assistance to local government in conducting open meetings and working with community organizations. USAID should establish incentive funds to reward such efforts.
- 5. To address the needs of the first time mayors taking office in 1994, USAID should weigh the efficacy of pursuing cost recovery as rapidly as possible versus allowing less restrictive funds to help the new mayors get more involved.
- 6. To respond to the desire by many mayors to go beyond the construction of individual, isolated projects, ISDEM in conjunction with the Vice Ministry of Housing and Urban Development should provide training and technical assistance to local government for preparing strategic plans. The planning process should incorporate broadbased community participation and address the physical, social, economic, and fiscal dimensions of local development. Once a strategic plan is developed for a given municipality, MEA projects should be defined within the context of this plan,
- 7. The Government of El Salvador should channel all local-serving public infrastructure investments through municipal government.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE DESIGN

APPENDIX A

I. Survey Methodology and Sample Design

The overall methodology utilized in the survey involved personal interviews with a ten-page questionnaire consisting of 142 closed and open-ended questions, administered to a representative sample of 1,034 urban and rural inhabitants, 20 years of age and older. The questionnaire used to conduct the interviews is presented in Section A-1 of this appendix.

Careful attention was given to the selection of the total sample of urban and rural population interviewed in the survey phase of the evaluation. In accordance with the sample design and selection procedure defined by Patricia Wilson and Daniel Carr, 24 municipalities and 46 cantons (for a total of 70 communities) were randomly selected using a strict, probability, multistage process. The methodology used can be broken down into several steps:

- Definition, identification, and classification of the target universe of municipalities (252 in total, excluding 10 municipalities in the San Salvador metropolitan area) in five population strata:
 - A) population size greater than 80,000 inhabitants (4 municipalities).
 - B) 40,000 to 80,000 inhabitants (15 municipalities).
 - C) 20,000 to 39,999 inhabitants (30 municipalities).
 - D) less than 20,000 inhabitants (203 municipalities).
- Classification of 233 municipalities (C and D strata) in two types of zones:
 - 1) Ex-conflict
 - 2) Non-conflict
- Classification of "D" municipalities (grouped by type of zone) in four geographical regions:
 - 1) West, including the departments of Ahuachapán, Santa Ana, and Sonsonate.
 - 2) Central, including the departments of Chalatenango, San Salvador, and La Libertad.
 - 3) Mideast, including the departments of Cuscatlán, Cabañas, La Paz, and San Vicente.
 - 4) East, including the departments of Usulután, San Miguel, Morazán, and La Unión.
- Selection of the weighting process to be used in determining the number of municipalities in each population size group to be included in the survey. In order to obtain a statistically significant and representative sample, it was decided that 24 municipalities would be selected from the subgroups defined above, and distributed as shown in Section A-2 (Table 1).
- Selection of 24 municipalities using a series of computer-generated random numbers. After establishing the sample frame in each region, the municipalities were selected using the probability sampling technique, in which each unit had a known chance of being selected. The 49 municipalities in the A, B and C strata were assigned equal weights within their respective subgroups, while the remaining 203 municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants were weighted proportionately to size.
- Selection of two rural communities in each of the pre-selected municipalities, using random numbers, and assigning equal weights to all the cantons.

Finally, the eligible respondents were selected using equal chance probability sampling procedures. In this case, the date of birth (month and day) closest to the actual day of the interview was chosen to select the family member to be interviewed.

Table 2 provided in Section A-2 shows the classification and design of the sample frame used to select the 24 municipalities in the survey. The list of rural communities selected in each area can be seen in Table 3.

II. Field Work

To carry out the survey, Daniel Carr & Associates selected and trained three supervisors and fifteen interviewers, with experience in similar types of urban and rural population surveys. The field personnel was organized in three teams, and from October 11 through 13, DC&A conducted the training sessions, covering the following fundamental areas:

a) General knowledge of the specific objectives of the survey.

b) Review of the survey instrument.

c) General familiarization with survey techniques, methods of introduction to respondents, how to deal with queries as to why the respondent was chosen for interview, and dealing with unsuitable respondents and possible refusals.

d) Problems and inconveniences to be encountered in the field.

During the 3-day training period, in addition to repeated, role-playing sessions, a field trip was made to urban and rural areas of Apopa, to provide additional experience under actual field conditions, and to confirm the functional effectiveness of the final version of the questionnaire. An additional briefing of the interviewer teams was held on October 14 to clarify the items and instructions related to the questionnaire, and to discuss the daily work plans and routes with the team supervisors before leaving for the field.

From October 14-30, the interviewer teams visited 70 urban and rural communities, located in the 24 pre-selected municipalities. As part of the field work logistics plan, each supervisor received a daily route as well as a quota of interviews for each community (see Table 4). During the first week, the interviewer teams made day trips to the western and central provinces and returned to the central office late in the afternoon, enabling the DC&A staff to maintain a day to day control of the progress of the survey. The questionnaires were delivered on a daily basis, where they were checked for incomplete information, as well as for any deviations in the quality standards set for the survey. By the end of the first week, the interviewer teams had begun work in the mideastern provinces and farther east, in the departments of Usulután, San Miguel, Morazán and La Unión. Due to the travel distance from the central office, the teams were required to establish lodging in the largest town in each area and use this as a base of operations; then each day they would set out by jeep for the neighboring villages.

During the seventeen days of intensive field work, the interviewer teams encountered little if any difficulties. In only one canton, Del Taura located in Tecoluca, San Vicente, community leaders approached the team supervisor, and after reading the contents of the questionnaire, stated that the central committee would have to approve before the work could begin. Given the time constraint, DC&A decided to compensate the sample quota in another rural community.

On October 30, the survey teams completed a total of 1,034 interviews. The distribution and demographic characteristics of the sample, as well as the universe, are presented in Table 5.

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7.			<u> </u>				
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1.	Para comenzar, ¿me puede decir si	su tamilia es original	na de este municipio		1 (Dans a see 0)		
					 (Pase a preg. 3) (Pase a preg. 2) 		
				NO			
2.	¿Cuántos años tiene su familia de v	vivir aquí en esta com	unidad?		(Mínimo 6 meses)		
3.	¿Cuál es la fuente principal de ingre (Agricultura, industria, comercio, se		iros)				
4.	¿A qué se dedica usted actualmen	ite? (Ocupación/activi	idad nrincinal del el	ntrevistado)			
••	(Indagar si tiene trabajo o si está a	• •	• •	Empleado	.1		
			,	Trabajo propio			
				Sin trabajo			
				Otros			
				(estudia, hogar, ju			
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	(-specifical and an espacio con	<i>จะ</i> µบแนเซแเซ <i>)</i>		Básica o más (7+)			

21. La alcaldía municipal

22. El gobierno nacional

24. Los sindicatos

26. La Fuerza Armada

23. Las iglesias, templos o cuitos

25. Los diferentes partidos pulíticos

27. Las organizaciones de su comunidad

ASPECTOS POLÍTICOS

6. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones para alcalde?	811	NO2	N/R3	(Si no	votó - preg.8,
7. ¿Votó usted por el alcalde actual o por otro candidato?		ALCA	LDE	1	
		OTRO	D	2	
		N/R		3	
8. ¿Usted plensa votar en las próximas elecciones para alca	ide?	81.	1 NC)2	N/R3
9. ¿En qué medida está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo	con las sigu	ilentes frases	?		

	DE ACUERDO	DES- ACUERDO	INDIFE- RENTE	NO RESPONDIO
9. Importa mucho por quien se vota a nivel municipal.	1	2	3	4
10. Importa mucho por quien se vota a nivel nacional.	1	2	3	4
11. Los alcaldes emplezan a reparar calles, puentes, etc, sólo cuando se acercan las elecciones.	1	2	3	4

CON	OCIMIENTO Y OPINION SO	BRE LA ALCALDIA MUNICIPAL					
12.	12. ¿Sabe usted el nombre del alcalde actual?				1	NO2	
13.	ل کا De qué partido es el	alcalde actual?		,			
14.	¿Conoce usted el nombre	SI	1	NO2			
15.	Sabe usted si en la alca	ldfa hay un concejo municipal?		SI F	łAY	1	
				NO	HAY	2	
				NO	SABE	3	
16.	Cuando usted tiene algún	problema para exponer a la alc	aldía munici	pal, ¿genera	lmente a c	lónde se dirig	e usted?
		LEA:	Al alcaide			1	
			Al concejo	municipal		2	
			Empleado d	de la alcaldí	a	3	
17.	¿El Señor Alcalde les llan	na a los habitantes para consulta	ar su opinión				
		LEA:	MUCH	D ALGO	POCO	NUNCA	NO SABE
		17. El Señor Alcalde?	1	2	3	4	5
		18. El Concejo Municipal?	1	2	3	4	5
19.	En eu opinión coudi de a	l principal promotor do los inters					
	•	l principal promotor de los intere			ar)		
	Alcalde1 Una o	rganización de la comunidad2	2 Otr	os (Especific	:ar)		<u></u>
20.	Alcalde! Una o	rganización de la comunidad2 se elige un nuevo alcalde de otr	2 Otr o partido	os (Especific	ear) UNOS		
20.	Alcalde! Una o	rganización de la comunidad2	2 Otr o partido	os (Especific ALG		1	

28. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a trabajar en obras

relacionadas directamente con	81	NO	N/S
28. La alcaldía municipal	1	2	3
29. El gobierno nacional	1	2	3
30. Las Iglesias, templos o cultos	1	2	3
31. Los sindicatos	1	2	3
32. Los diferentes partidos políticos	1	2	3
33. La Fuerza Armada	1	2	3
34. Las organizaciones de su comunidad	1	2	3

Se. ¿Cuanto comia usted en su alcabia municipair Moorio..... ALGO.....2 POCO...... (N/R)..................4

37. En su opinión?	CASI SIEMPRE	A VECES	CASI NUNCA	NO La/BE
37. La alcaldía municipal es un obstáculo más para resolver sus problemas.	1	2	3	4
38. La alcaldía municipal opone a trabajar con los líderes de la comunidad.	1	2	3	4
39. La alcaldía municipal nos ayuda a resolver nuestros problemas.	1	2	3	4
40. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con estas frases?	De Acuerdo	En des- acuerdo	Indife- rente	No sabe N/R
40. Ahora, tengo más confianza en la alcaldía municipal que antes.	1	2	3	4
41. Tengo más confianza en la alcaldía municipal que en el gobierno central.	1	2	3	4

42'. ¿Alguna vez ha contactado usted al sefior alcalde para solicitarle su ayuda o su cooperación para resolver un problema personal o comunal? (REPITA LA PREGUNTA PARA CADA UNO)

	SI	NO	N/S
42. Alcalde	1	2	3
43. Algún miembro del concejo	1	2	3
44. Algún empleado de la municipalidad	1	2	3
45. Algún diputado nacional	1	2	3
46. Algún empleado del gobierno central	1	2	3

47. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con las DES-INDIFE-DE NO siguientes frases? **ACUERDO** ACUERDO RENTE RESPONDIO 47. La alcaldía municipal presta más atención a las 1 2 3 4 necesidades del pueblo urbano que a los cantones. 48. El partido del alcalde controla demasiado al señor 2 1 3 4 alcalde. 49. Las organizaciones de la comunidad controlan 1 2 3 4 demasiado al alcaide.

50. ¿Cómo considera usted que le han tratado

ha tenido que ir a una oficina de	MUY BIEN	BIEN	REGULAR	MAL	MUY MAL	N/R
50. La alcaldía municipal?	1	2	3	4	5	6
51. Alguna institución del gobierno?	1	2	3	4	5	6

52. En su opinión, ¿quién podría administrar

mejor	Una empresa privada	el gobierno nacional	o la alcaldía municipal
52. El servicio de agua potable?	1	2	3
53. El servicio de electricidad?	1	2	3
54. Las escuelas públicas?	1	2	3

				والمناوي والمواري والمناول			
CON	OCIMIENTO Y OPINIONES SOBRE LOS	CABILDOS ABIER	тов				
55.	5. ¿Sabe usted que es un cabildo abierto?		81 1	(Pase	a pre	g. 57)	
				NO	? (Pase	a pre	g. 56)
56.	¿Conoce usted las reuniones en dond			81 1	(Pase	a pre	g. 57)
	los habitantes de la comunidad, inclu	iyendo los diferen	tes cantones?	NO	? (Pase	a pres	g. 92)
57.	ASabe usted si ha habido algún cabik	be usted si ha habido algún cabildo ablerto en este municipio?		SI HA HABIDO 1	(Pase	a pred	a. 58)
			•	NO HA HABIDO 2	•		-
				NO SABE	(Pase	a pres	76)
58.	¿Quién o quiénes lo llamaron (o invita	aron, o hicieron la	bulla)?				
-	(LEA:		<i></i>	}		
			•	UNICIPAL 2			
			DIRECTIVOS CO	MUNITARIOS 3	}		
			CONARA/SECRE	TARIA (SRN)4	1		
			OTROS (ESPECI	FICAR) 5	;		
			NO SABE/NO RE	SPONDIO6	3		
59.	¿Para qué llamaron al cabildo? (Indica	•	•	1			
	ES CONDICION PARA LA CUAL EL A						
	PARA SABER LO QUE QUIERE EL F						
	PARA ESTABLECER UN DIALOGO C	ON EL PUEBLO	*************************	4	ļ		
	OTROS (ESPECIFICAR)		***************************************	5	;		
	NO SABE/NO RESPONDIO			6	;		
60.	¿Recuerda usted cuántos cabildos ha	a convocado el ale	calde actual? (Desdi	1991)			
61.	¿ Y cuentos han habido este año (1	1993)?	and the same of th				
62.	Aquí en su municipio, ¿quiénes asister	n a un cabildo?					
		TODOS LOS QU	E QUIEREN ASISTI	R1			
		LOS DIRECTIVO	S DE LA COMUNID	AD2	}		
		LOS INVITADOS			}		
		~					
		NO SABE/NO RI	ESPONDIO	5	i		
63.	¿Usted ha asistido a algún cabildo?			NINGUNO 1	(Pase	a preg	j. 64)
				¿A cuántos?2	(Pase	a preg	j. 65)
64.	¿Usted conoce personas que han asis	stido a algún cabil	do abierto?	SI 1	(Pase	a preg	j. 7 5)
				NO2	(Pase	a prec	ı. 7 5)

MEA V.(10/13/93)	TINO A IIN CABURO	ADIEDTO					5
HAGA LAS PREGUNTAS 65-74 SI HA ASIS 65. ¿Por qué asistió? (indique el principal motivo)	Pedir las necesidades Discutir los problemas Conseguir una parte	de su comu s y desarrolla	r soluc	iones	•••••	2	ella one ante por ella ener alta
	Otros (Especificar)	•••••••		•••••	******	. 4	
					81	NO	N/S
86. ¿Quedó satisfecho con la experiencia?	Children and the second state of the second state of the second s		**************************************			2	3
67. ¿Iría de nuevo?	الدور المروضة الدوران الدوران الدور والمنظلة الدور الموسود والموسود والموسود والموسود والموسود والموسود والموس					2	3
68. ¿Iría al próximo?	فلمباسختان ورور ويود فاخت أخفش جانها ويوكان الانباقية والمكاف فالأكاف فالروي ووجوده	h-ren a support. Made (the let ampost a de la dealer all as				2	3
69. ¿Pidió su comunidad una obra?			****		i	2	3
70. ¿Se llevó a cabo?	<u> </u>	**************************************	<u></u>			2	3
71. ¿Sabe usted si otras comunidades reck	bleron obras?				ī	2	3
72. Si hubieran pocos fondos para repartir,	¿iría al cabildo?			1	i	2	3
73. Y si no hubieran fondos para repartir, ¿	cree usted que iría?			1		2	3
76. Para usted, ¿cuál es más importante, elecciones de alcaide o asistir a un ca					_	ILDO ENTE	
77. En su opinión, ¿los cabildos son más Más importantes1 Menos in	•	•	_	•		•	
Más importantes1 Menos in 78. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo	mportantes2 Igua	al de importan	tes3	No	sabe/	no respo	ndió4
Más importantes1 Menos in	mportantes2 Igua o está usted con las	al de importan	tes3	No IS- IRDO	sabe/ IND RE	no respo	ondió4
Más importantes1 Menos in 78. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo siguientes frases? 78. En los cabildos están representado	mportantes2 Igua o está usted con las os todos los sectores	DE ACUERDO	DI ACUI	No IS- IRDO	IND RE	no respo	NO RESPONDIO
Más importantes1 Menos in 78. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo siguientes frases? 78. En los cabildos están representado de la comunidad. 79. El alcalde convoca a los cabildos s	mportantes2 Igua o está usted con las os todos los sectores sólo cuando tiene	DE ACUERDO	DI ACUI	No ES- ERDO	IND REI	no respo	NO RESPONDIO 4
Más importantes1 Menos in 78. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo siguientes frases? 78. En los cabildos están representado de la comunidad. 79. El alcalde convoca a los cabildos siguientes frases? 80. El alcalde liama a los cabildos porquientes frases?	mportantes2 Igua o está usted con las os todos los sectores sólo cuando tiene que le interesa la	DE ACUERDO 1	DE ACUI	No IS- IS- IS- IS- IS- IS- IS- IS- IS- IS-	sabe/	IFE- NTE	NO RESPONDIO 4
Más importantes1 Menos in 78. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo siguientes frases? 78. En los cabildos están representado de la comunidad. 79. El alcalde convoca a los cabildos siguientes frases? 80. El alcalde liama a los cabildos pora participación de la comunidad. 81. Los cabildos dan pocas y muy bre	mportantes2 Igua o está usted con las os todos los sectores sólo cuando tiene que le interesa la	DE ACUERDO 1 1	DI ACUI	No IS- IS- IS- IS- IS- IS- IS- IS- IS- IS-	sabe/	IFE- NTE	NO RESPONDIO 4 4 4 4
Más importantes1 Menos in 78. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo siguientes frases? 78. En los cabildos están representado de la comunidad. 79. El alcalde convoca a los cabildos siguientes frases? 80. El alcalde liama a los cabildos porquarticipación de la comunidad. 81. Los cabildos dan pocas y muy bre para participar.	mportantes2 Igua o está usted con las os todos los sectores sólo cuando tiene que le interesa la oves oportunidades	DE ACUERDO 1 1 1	Di ACUI	No IS- IS- IS- IS- IS- IS- IS- IS- IS- IS-	sabe/	IFE- NTE 3	NO RESPONDIO 4 4 4 4
Más importantes1 Menos in 78. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo siguientes frases? 78. En los cabildos están representado de la comunidad. 79. El alcalde convoca a los cabildos siguientes para repartir. 80. El alcalde liama a los cabildos porquarticipación de la comunidad. 81. Los cabildos dan pocas y muy bre para participar.	mportantes2 Igual o está usted con las os todos los sectores sólo cuando tiene que le interesa la oves oportunidades	DE ACUERDO 1 1 1 de las mujero	DI ACUI	No PRDO	sabe/	IFE- NTE 3	NO RESPONDIO 4 4 4 4 4 P. 83
Más importantes1 Menos in 78. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo siguientes frases? 78. En los cabildos están representado de la comunidad. 79. El alcalde convoca a los cabildos siguientes frases? 80. El alcalde liama a los cabildos pora participación de la comunidad. 81. Los cabildos dan pocas y muy bre para participar.	mportantes2 Igual o está usted con las os todos los sectores sólo cuando tiene que le interesa la oves oportunidades	DE ACUERDO 1 1 1 de las mujer de los hombre	Di ACUI	No ES- ERDO	sabe/	IFE- NTE 3	NO RESPONDIO 4 4 4 4 4 9 P. 83
Más importantes1 Menos in 78. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo siguientes frases? 78. En los cabildos están representado de la comunidad. 79. El alcalde convoca a los cabildos siguiendos para repartir. 80. El alcalde liama a los cabildos porquarticipación de la comunidad. 81. Los cabildos dan pocas y muy bre para participar.	mportantes2 Igual o está usted con las os todos los sectores sólo cuando tiene que le interesa la oves oportunidades	DE ACUERDO 1 1 1 de las mujer de los hombre	Di ACUI	No ES- ERDO 2 2 2 MAS MENOS	IND REI	IFE- NTE 3 3 3 P. 82	NO RESPONDIO 4 4 4 4 1 P. 83 1 2
Más importantes1 Menos in 78. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo siguientes frases? 78. En los cabildos están representado de la comunidad. 79. El alcalde convoca a los cabildos siguientes frases? 80. El alcalde liama a los cabildos pora participación de la comunidad. 81. Los cabildos dan pocas y muy bre para participar.	proportantes2 Igual o está usted con las os todos los sectores do cuando tiene que le interesa la ses oportunidades des y preocupaciones ades y preocupaciones s más, menos o igual o unicipio invita el alcalós pas?2 o a casi nin	DE ACUERDO 1 1 1 1 de las mujer de los hombre a participar aguna?3 orma en que s	es es? en los e lleva	MAS MENOS IGUAL NO SABI Cabildos BE/NO a cabo	sabe/	P. 82	NO RESPONDIO 4 4 4 4 4 1 2 9. 83 1 2 3 4 4
Más importantes1 Menos in 78. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo siguientes frases? 78. En los cabildos están representado de la comunidad. 79. El alcalde convoca a los cabildos siguidos para repartir. 80. El alcalde liama a los cabildos porquarticipación de la comunidad. 81. Los cabildos dan pocas y muy bre para participar. 82. ¿Los cabildos responden a las necesidamás, menos o igual que a las necesidas. 83. ¿Las mujeres participan en los cabildos. 84. ¿A cuántas de las comunidades del mis LEA: a casi todas?1 a algun. 85. ¿Los habitantes de su comunidad han.	proportantes2 Igual o está usted con las os todos los sectores de la companio de la compani	DE ACUERDO 1 1 1 1 de las mujer de los hombre a participar aguna?3 orma en que s	es es? en los e lleva	MAS MENOS IGUAL NO SABI cabildos BE/NO a cabo BE3	sabe/	P. 82 1 2 3 4 ONDIO bildo? a preg.	NO RESPONDIO 4 4 4 4 4 1 2 9. 83 1 2 3 4 4

Sl....1

NO....2

NO SABE.....3

88. ¿Hay organizaciones en la comunidad que se oponen a los cabildos?

CONOCIMIENTO Y OPINIONES SOBRE CONARA/SRN/MEA

89.), ¿Conoce usted alguna obra que sur	gió de un cabildo abierto, y
	que luego fue realizado con fondos (que llegan al alcalde para
	las necesidades de la comunidad?	

81	1	(Pase	a	preg.	90
NO	2	(Pase	a	preg.	92

90. ¿Cuáles obras? (Codificar según los siguientes tipos de obras)

Vías de acceso	1
Escuelas	2
Salud	3
Acueductos/aicantarillados	4
Edificaciones municipales	5
Electrificaciones	в
Casas comunales	7
Otros (Especificar)	8
No Especificó	9

91. ¿Sabe usted de dónde vinleron los fondos para esas obras?

Gobierno Central	1
CONARA/SRN (Secretaria)	2
FIS	3
AID	4
Del exterior (sin especificar)	5
Programa MEA	6
Iglesia, templo, culto	7
Partido político	8
Alcaldía	9
Otros (Especificar)	10
No sabe/no respondió	11

92. Le voy a mencionar varios organismos que han realizado obras aquí en su municipio. ¿Cuáles organismos conoce usted? (LEA LISTA EN CUADRO ABAJO)

PARA CADA UNO QUE CONOCE

93. ¿Qué opinión tiene usted de...... (mencione cada organismo que conoce)

	2 00	P. 93 OPINION GENERAL					
ORGANISMOS	P. 92 CONOCE	MUY Buena	BUENA	REGULAR	MALA	MUY MALA	N/R
MOP	1	1	2	3	4	5	6
ANDA	2	1	2	3	4	5	6
MINISTERIO DE EDUCACION	3	1	2	3	4	5	6
MINISTERIO DE SALUD	4	1	2	3	4	5	6
CONARA/SRN (Secretaria)	5	1	2	3	4	5	6
FIS	6	1	2	3	4	5	6
AID	7	1	2	3	4	5	6
MEA	8	1	2	3	4	5	6
COMURES	9	1	2	3	4	5	6
ISDEM	10	1	2	3	4	5	6



94.	Ahora le voy leer algunas obras realizadas en su comunidad con fondos de CONARA. ¿Cuáles conoce	usted?
	(Lea lista correspondiente y anote códigos de proyectos/obras en cuadro abajo.	
	SI NO CONOCE NINGUN PROYECTO/OBRA - Pase a pregunta 105)	

95. ¿Usted o su familia han sido beneficiados con uno de estas obras?	Sl 1 (Pase a preg. 9
	NO 2 (Pase a preg. 9

96. ¿Cuáles?

(Anote códigos de proyectos y circule tipo correspondiente en Col. P.96)

97. ¿Y cuá obra ha sido la más beneficiosa para usted o su familia? (Circule tipo en Col. P.97)

PROVECTOR	P.94. CONOCIMIENTO DE	P.96	P.97 MAS BENEFICIOSOS	
PROYECTOS	Códigos Cantidad Total			
Vías de acceso			1	1
Escuelas			2	2
Salud			3	3
Acueductos/alcantarillados			4	4
Edificaciones municipales	<u>,,,,,,,, .</u>		5	5
Electrificaciones			6	6
Casas comunales			7	7
Otros		······································	8	8

	Γ	Cd	digos de Proyec	tos
PARA HASTA TRE	S OBRAS MAS IMPORTANTES:			
(1. La comunidad,	propusieron esta obra? 2. Alcaldía, 3. Gobierno Central, tros (Especificar), 6. No Sabe/No repondió)			
(1. La comunidad,	escogieron esta obra para llevar a cabo? 2. Alcaldía, 3. Gobierno Central, baros (Especificar), 6. No Sabe/No repondió)			
	manejaron la obra? 2. Alcaldía, 3. Gobierno Central, btros (Especificar), 6. No Sabe/No repondió)			
obra? (1. Ninguno	participó la comunidad en la realización de esta 2. Escoger contratistas, 3. Proporcionar mano de uso de los fondos, 5. Otros, 6. No sabe			
¿La alcaldía mante y financiero de es (1. SI, 2. NO, 3. N	i			
1 -	tenido el estado físico de esta obra? LAR, 3. MALO, 4. NO SABE)			
(1. La comunidad,	se han responsabilizado por el mantenimiento? 2. Alcaldía, 3. Gobierno Central, tros (Especificar), 6. No @be/No repondió)			

105	En su	nòiniao	Acree usted	que CONARA	asigna fondos	a su municipio	principalmente por
-----	-------	---------	-------------	------------	---------------	----------------	--------------------

	simpatfa política on of Melaide?	
.EA:	necesidades de দে লোক্সমন্ত্রিব?	. 2
	o per otro motive (nowell)	(
	NO SABE/NO FUSEO COO	. 4

-69 -



106.	¿Hasta que punto cree usted que las obras realizadas co necesidades básicas de su comunidad, en cuanto a cam					r las	
	LEA:	Casi todo)		1		
		Una gran	parte		2		
		Una pequ	eña parte		3		
		• •	•		4		
107.	Y en su opinión, ¿para qué se deberían destinar estos fo	ondos? Det	perian ser	destinado	3		
	• a pequeñas obras de servicios básicos tales como en	ninos, esc	cuelas, agu	a potab y	, etc 1		
	• o, se podría aprovechar mejor para otros tipos de ne	:ssidades1	? (Cuáles).		2		
108.	¿Qué tan importantes han sido los cabildos en la identific	cación de	obras?				
	LEA:	POCO IN	IPORTANT	E8	1		
		ALGO IM	PORTANT	E8	2		
			ORTANTE				
			E/NO RESI				
109.	En su opinión, ¿cuál de estos organismos	ALCAL- DIA	CONARA	FIS	OTRAS INST. GUB.	NIN- GUNO	NO SABE
109.	¿aprovecha mejor los fondos?	1	2	3	4	5	6
110.	¿A cuál acude más la comunidad?	1	2	3	4	5	6
111.	¿Cuál usa más los materiales de este lugar?	1	2	3	4	5	6
112.	¿Cuál usa más empresas constructoras de este lugar?	1	2	3	4	5	6
113.	¿Cuál usa más mano de obra de este lugar?	1	2	3	4	5	6
114.	¿Cuál realiza obras de mejor calidad?	1	2	3	4	5	6
115.	¿Cuál realiza obras más beneficiosas para la comunidad?	1	2	3	4	5	6
116.	¿Cuál da mejor mantenimiento a sus obras?	1	2	3	4	5	6
117.	En su municipio ¿ha pedido el alcalde el aporte de la com pagar parte del costo de las obras?	nunidad pai	r	10	1 2 (F 3 (F		•
118.	¿En qué forma? (LEA SI ES NECESARIO)	Mano de	obra no r	emunerad	a 1		
		Contribuci	lón moneta	aria	2		
		Mayores i	impuestos.		3		
		Pagos po	r uso	*******	4		
		Aporte de	materiale	s	5		
		OTROS (Especificar)	6		
119.	¿Usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo que sa pida es	te aporte?	E	e acuerd	o1 (P	ase a P.	120)
			E	n desacu	erdo 2 (P	ase a P.	122)
120.	¿Está usted dispuesto a aportar más de sus propios recu	ırsos (tales	; <u>s</u>		1 (P	ase a P.	121)
	como: mano de obra, dinero, materiales) para tener más						
	comunidad?				E 3 (P		•
404	Do and dames annualed and the MECERARION				·	400 4 1 .	,
141.	¿De qué forma aportaría? (LEA SI ES NECESARIO)		obra				
			on moneta				
		-	impuestos.				
		- '	r uso de l				
		•	materiale				
		OTROS (Especificar)	6		

400	. Out top do equado o ao departando está ustad con los		Dr. or and SUI ALEADA and Advanced in the Adva			
122.	¿Qué tan de aquerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con las siguientes frases?	DE ACUERDO	DES- ACUERDO	INDIPE- RENTE	NO RESPONDIO	
	122. La alcaldía municipal maneja fondos mejor que antes. (antes de 1991)	1	2		4	
	123. El programa CONARA/SNR da demasiado poder al alcalde.	1	2	3	4	
	124. La alcaidía municipal todavía tiene dificultad para manejar fondos.	1	2	3,	4	
125.	¿Las autoridades (CONARA, SRN, MEA, alcaide) le mantiener sobre la ejecución de las obras?	n informado	8I NO			
	ricipacion en la comunidad	**************************************				
126.	¿Su comunidad escoge directivos comunales?	1 NO	.2 NO SABI	≣3		
127.	¿Usted participa en alguna organización de la colar dad?	A:	MUCHO			
			POCO	3		
128.	En su familia, ¿quién participa más en las organizaciones de el hombre o la mujer?	HOMBRE 1 MUJER 2 AMBOS 3 NINGUNO 4				
129.	¿CONARA/SRN trabaja con las organizaciones de su comunic		1 (Pa 2 (Pa	•		
130.	¿Trabaja bien, regular o mai con ellas? Bien1 Regu	lar2 Mai	3 No sa	be4		
131.	¿Hay un Comité para la Reconstrucción Municipal en su mun	icipio?	NO	1 (Pa 2 (Pa 3 (Pa	se a P. 137)	
1 3 2.	¿La alcaldía ha apoyado los esfuerzos de la comunidad para Comité de Reconstrucción Municipal?	crear un	SI NO NO SABE	2		
133.	¿Participa usted en los proyectos del Comité para la Recons Municipal?	trucción	SI NO			
134.	En su opinión, ¿e? Comité para la Reconstrucción Municipal hi comunidad mucho, algo o poco?	1 2 3				
135.	¿Considera usted que el Comité de la Reconstrucción Munici bien o mai con la alcaldía?	BIEN MAL NO SABE	2			
136.	¿El programa CONARA/SRN colabora con el Comité de la Re Municipal?	construcción	SI NO NO SABF	2		
137.	¿En qué medida está usted en acuerdo o en desacuerdo con	-			HORA FIN	
	Tenemos que superar la desconfianza y reconciliarnos para		Comunicae.			
	AGRADECER Y DES	いたいけっと		Į.	i	

UNICAMENTE SECTOR URBANO

Para terminar, quielera solicitarie algunos datos para nuestra clasificación estadística. Esta información la utilizamos para analizar los resultados de la encuesta y nunca serán usados individualmente.

140.	¿Cuántos vehiculos tiene la	lamilia?	(MAS RE	CIENTE) AÑO		MODELO
141.	¿Tiene servidumbre en su ca	ısa? Ningu	ına1 Sólo	por horas2	Una 3	Dos o más
142.	¿Cuáles de los siguientes en	seres domés	ticos ocupan e	n su hogar?		
T	V SLANCO Y NEGRO 1	REFRIGER	ADORA ELECTP	IICA 4	BETAMAX/EC	QUIPO VIDEO
T	V A COLORES 2	COCINA D	E GAS	5	LAVADORA [DE ROPA
R	ADIO 3	COCINA E	LECTRICA	6	SECADORA I	DE ROPA
			•		TELEFONO	****************
	NSE (APRECIMEN	(JAME)	ABC11	C2	D3	E4

Hora Final:

SECTIONAL SAMBLEDESICH

TABLE 1
SAMPLE DESIGN OF MUNICIPALITIES BY POPULATION STRATA

Y (%);) SHE/AYA	GEO RECION	NUNE.	TOTFAL POPULEATION	DISTRIBUTION		LE GIZE INTERVIEWS				
555	; 60000000 A A.R. 8550000	W. 2000	(60) (60) (40) (555555, A B.B.B L. A B.B.A B.B. 5555558	00000000000000000000000000000000000000	5 6 1 4 4 4				
	Α	4	569,802	26%	1	52				
	В	15	794,675	36%	1	72				
C (E	x-conflict)	11	295,734	14%	1	28				
C (No	on-conflict)	19	523,459	24%	11	48				
SUB-TO	TAL ("A", "B" an	d "C" Strata)	2,183,670	100%	4	200				
p			•		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
D	WEST	25	233,601	14.9%	3	120				
D	Ex-conflict	3	28,628	12%	0	0				
D	Non-conflict	22	204,973	88%	3	120				
D	CENTRAL	64	430,953	27.5%	6	240				
D	Ex-conflict	26	146,817	34%	2	80				
D	Non-conflict	38	284,136	66%	4	160				
D	MIDEAST	38	272,322	17.4%	3	120				
D	Ex-conflict	20	137,674	51%	2	80				
D	Non-conflict	18	134,648	49%	1	40				
D	EAST	76	630,696	40.2%	8	320				
D	Ex-conflict	51	412,316	65%	5	200				
D	Non-conflict	25	218,380	35%	3	120				
SUB-TOTA	AL "D" STRATA	203	1,567,572	100.0%	20	800				
Ex	-conflict	100	725,435	46%	9	360				
Non	-conflict	103	842,137	54%	11	440				

Group	Zone	Region	Dept. Code	Department		Municipality	Total	Weight/	Field of	selection
 	LIA.			Conta Ar-	-	BANTA ANA	202,337	1:4		
-	NO NO	1	2	Santa Ana		التوريب بالكانا المحلط البارداب فانهد يوبيا بالمائلة الرجود مستعلم بيوريس والمراب				
	NC EXC	2	12	San Miguel San Salvador		BAN MIGUEL APOPA	182,817 100,763			
	NO	1		Ahuachapan		AHUACHAPAN	83,885			
SUB TOT			IPALITIES	Ariuacriapari		ANDACHAPAN	569,802			
OUB IUI	AL A :	4 MUNIO	IPALITIES		 		000,002			
 										
B	NC	1	3	Bonsonate	1	SONSONATE	76,200	1:15		
B	NO	1	2	Sente Ana		CHALCHUAPA	63,511	1:15		
B	NO	4	11	Usulutan		USULUTAN	62,967			
B	NO	3	8	La Paz		ZACATECOLUCA	57,032			
В	NC	2	6	San Salvador		SAN MARTIN	54,125			
В	NC	1	2	Santa Ana		METAPAN	53,399			
В	ĐŒ	2	5	La Libertad	7.	OPIOO	53,193			·
В	NO	1	3	Sonsonate	8.	IZALCO	53,033	1:15		_
В	ĐØ	3	9	Caberias	9.	ILOBASCO	51,648	1:15		
8	NO	2	5	La Libertad		COLON	47,517	1:15		
В	NO	1	3	Sonsonate		ACAJUTLA	47,409	1:15		
В	NC	8	10	San Vicente		SAN VICENTE	45,824	1:15		
8	ÐØ	2	5	La Libertad	13.	QUEZALTEPEQUE	44,906			
В	NC	2	7	Cuscatian		COJUTEPEQUE	43,564			
В	NC	2	5	La Libertad	16.	CIUDAD ARCE	40,347			
SUBTOTA	VL "B" :	15 MUNIC	PALITIES			•	794,675			
					<u> </u>					
C	Đ(C	3	9	Cabarias		SENSUNTEPEQUE	38,073			
C	ĐŒ	4	11	Usulutan		NOULLECO	37,384	1:11		
<u> </u>	DC.	3	8	La Paz		SANTIAGO NONUALCO	32,338	1:11		
C	ĐŒ	2	44	Chalatenango		NUEVA CONCEPCION	28,011	1:11		
<u> </u>	D(C	2	4	Chalatenango	_	CHALATENANGO	27,600			
<u> </u>	ĐŒ	2	6	San Salvador		TONACATEPEQUE	25,160			
C	DIC DIC	4	12	San Miguel	_	CUIDAD BARRIOS	23,118	1:11		
C	EXC	4	11 6	Usulutan San Sahadas		BEPLIN NEJAPA	21,947			
0	EXC EXC	2	13	San Salvador Morazan		SAN FRANCISCO GOTERA	21,583 20,497	1:11		
-	EXC EXC	2	6	San Salvador		AGUILARES	20,073			
			T: 11 MUNIC		•••	AdoleAngo	295,734	1.11		
3051017	- 0 .		T. IT MONIO	FALITIES			200,704			
С	NC	1	2	Santa Ana	1.	COATEPEQUE	38,538	1:19		
C	NC	1	1	Ahuachapan		SAN FRANCISCO MENENDEZ	37,061			
c	NC	4	14	La Unión		LA UNION	36,927			
C	NC	2	5	La Libertad		LA LIBERTAD	34,763	1:19		
C	NC	1		Sonsonate		NAHUIZALCO	34,044	1:19		
С	NC	4		Le Unión	6.	CONCHAGUA	32,591	1:19		
С	NC	2		San Salvador	7.	PANCHIMALCO	28,775	1 : 19		
C	NC	1	1	Ahuachapan	8.	ATIQUIZAYA	28,230	1 : 19		
O	NC	1	1	Ahuachapan	9.	JUJUTLA	26,464	1 : 19		
С	NC	2	7	Cuscatlan	10.	SAN PEDRO PERULAPAN	25,279	1 : 19		
С	NC	2	6	San Salvador		SANTO TOMAS	24,459	1 : 19		
С	NC	4		Le Unión		SANTA ROSA DE LIMA	23,788			
C	NC	1		Sonsonate		ARMENIA	23,728			
С	NC	1	3	Sonsonate		JUAYU <i>P.</i>	23,244	1 : 19		
C	NC	4		La Unión		SAN /LEJO	22,638	1 : 19		
C	NC	1	11	Ahuachapan		TACIJBA	21,359			
<u> </u>	NC	1		Santa Ana		CANDELARIA DE LA FRONTERA	20,781	1:19		
С	NC	3		La Paz	_	SAN PEDRO MASAHUAT	20,674			
C	NC_	4		La Unión	19.	PASAQUINA	20,116	1 : 19		
SUB TOTA	AL "C" N	ON-CONFL	JCT: 15 MUN	ICIPALITIES			523,459			
									لـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ	

MEA PROJECT (Source: 1992 Census)

Group	Zone	Region	Dept. Code	Department		Municipality	Total	Weight	Field of	selection
										# 17 T. I.
D	NO	1	1	Ahuachapan	_ 1.	GUAYMANGO	10,932	0.07	1	10,932
D	NC	1	1	Ahuachapan	2.	CONCEPCION DE ATACO	14,080	0.06	16,938	80,982
D	NO	1	1	Ahuachapan	-	APANEOA	7,786	0.03	30,983	38,768
D	NO	1	<u>i</u>	Ahuachapan	4.	BAN LORENZO	7,202	0.03	38,769	45,970
D	NO	1	1	Ahuachapan	5.	BAN PEDRO PUXTLA	6,641	0.03	48,971	52,611
D	NO	1	1	Ahuachapan	6.	TURIN	5,898	0.03	52,612	88,509
D	NO	1	1	Ahuachapan	7.	EL REFUGIO	5,065	0.02	58,510	03,504
D	NO	1	2	Santa Ana	8.	EL CONGO	18,538	0.08	63,565	82,102
D	EDCO	1	2	Santa Ana	9.	TEXISTEPEQUE	17,857	0.08	82,108	99,989
D	NO	1	2	Santa Ana	10.	SAN SEBASTIAN SALITRILLO	9,658	0.04	99,960	109,617
D	NO	1	2	Santa Ana	11.	SANTIAGO DE LA FRONTERA	6,458	0.03	109,618	116,075
D	E000	1	2	Senta Ana	12.	SANTA ROSA QUACHIPILIN	6,405	0.03	116,076	122,480
D	NC	1	2	Sente Ane		EL PORVENIR	5,948	0.03	122,481	128,428
D	E200	1	8	Sente Ane	_	MASAHUAT	4,360	0.02	128,429	132,794
D	NC	1	2	Sente Ane		BAN ANTONIO PAJONAL	8,824	0.02	132,795	136,618
D	NC	1	3	Sonsonate		BAN ANTONIO DEL MONTE	17,639	0.08	136,619	154,257
D	NO	1	3	Sonsonate		BONZACATE	13,760	0.08	154,258	168,007
0	NC	1	3	Soneonate		BAN JULIAN	13,680	0.06	168,008	181,687
<u> </u>	NO		3	Sonsonate		CUIBNAHUAT	10,234	0.04	181,688	191,921
D D	NO	1	3	Sonsonate		SANTA ISABEL ISHUATAN	9,261	0.04	191,922	201,182
<u> </u>	NO	1	3	Sonsonate		NAHUILINGO	8,180	0.04	201,183	209,362
<u> </u>	NC		3	Consonate	22.	SANTA CATARINA MASAHUAT	7,603	0.03	209,363	216,965
D	NO	1	3	Sonsonate	23.	CALUCO	6,618	0.03	216,966	
D	NO	1	3	Sonsonate	24.	SANTO DOMINGO	6,115	0.03	223,584	
<u>D</u>	- XC	1	3	Sonsonate		ZALCOATITAN	3,903	0.02	229,699	233,601
SUB TOT				ESTERN REGION	20.	ZALCOATTAN	233,601	0.02	229,089	233,001
808 101	AL D:	ZO MUNIC	APALITIES - WI	SOIEMN REGION			233,001			
				<u> </u>						
				Obstatements	-	1 4 701 444	40.047			40.045
D	EXC.	2	4	Chalatenango		LA PALMA	10,947	0.07	1	10,947
D	EXC	2	4	Chalatenango		AGUA CALIENTE	9,308	0.06	10,948	20,255
D	EXC	2	4	Chalatenango		SAN IGNACIO	6,444	0.04	20,256	26,699
D	D(C	2	4	Chalatenango		CITALA	5,152	0.04	26,700	31,851
<u>D</u>	D(C	2		Chalatenango		LA LAGUNA	4,943	0.03	31,852	36,794
D	EXC	2	4	Chalatenango		NOMBRE DE JESUS	4,550	0.03	36,795	41,344
D	E)C	2		Chalatenango		OJOS DE AGUA	3,415	0.02	41,345	44,759
D	D(C	2		Chalatenango		ARCATAO	2,397	0.02	44,760	47,156
D	D(C	2	4	Chalatenango		SAN FRANCISCO MORAZAN	2,209	0.02	47,157	49,365
D	D(C	2	4	Chalatenango		LAS VUELTAS	2,202	0.01	49,366	51,567
D	D(C	2	4	Chalatenango		EL CARRIZAL	2,181	0.01	51,568	53,748
D	D(C	2	4	Chalatenango		SAN FERNANDO	2,161	0.01	53,749	55,909
D	DC DC	2		Chalatenango		LAS FLORES	1,761	0.61	55,910	57,670
D	D(C	2		Chalatenango		CANCASTE	1,510	0.01	57,671	59,180
D	Đ(C	2		Chalatenango	_	SAN ANTONIO DE LA CRUZ	1,461	0.01	59,181	60,641
D	Ð(C	2		Chalatenango	_	NUEVA TRINIDAD	1,160	0.01	60,642	61,801
D	D(C	2		Chalatenango		SAN ISIDRO LABRADOR	274	0.002	61,802	62,075
D	D(C	2		Chalatenango		SAN ANTONIO LOS RANCHOS	248	0.002	62,076	62,323
D	Т:	2		La Libertad		SAN PABLO TACACHICO	19,207	0.13	62,324	81,530
D	Ð(C	2	5	La Libertad	20.	SAN MATIAS	7,550	0.05	81,531	89,ú80
D	D(C	2		San Salvador		GUAZAPA	16,177	0.11	89,081	105,257
<u>D</u>	EXC	2		San Salvador		EL PAISNAL	12,027	0.08		117,284
D	EXC	2		Cuscatian		SUCHITOTO	12,776	0.09	117,285	130,060
D	EXC	2		Cuscatian	24.	SAN JOSE GUAYABAL	8,694	0.06	130,061	138,754
D	Ð(C	2	77	Cuscatian	25.	TENANCINGO	4,771	0.03	138,755	143,525
D	ÐC	2		Cuscatlan		EL ROSARIO	3,292	0.02	143,526	146,817
SUB TOT	AL "D" E)	(-CONFLIC	T ZONES: 26	MUNICIPALITIES -	CEN	TRAL REGION	146,817			
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Group	Zone	Region	Dept. Code	Department	1	Municipality	Total	Weight/	Fleid of	selection
D	NO	2	4	Chalatenango	1.	TEJUTLA	13,043	0.08	1	13.043
D	NO	2	4	Chalatenango		EL PARAISO	8,578	0.03	13.044	21.621
D	NO	2	4	Chalatenango		LA REINA	7,610	0.03	21,622	29,231
ō	NO	2	4	Chalatenango	4	CONCEPCION QUEZALTEPEQUE	6,421	0.02	29,232	35,652
D	NO	2	4	Chalatenango	8.	DULCE NOMBRE DE MARIA	5,674	0.02	35,653	41,326
۵	NO	2	4	Chalatenango	6.	SANTA RITA	4,672	0.02	41,327	45,998
D	NO	2	4	Chalatenango	7.	SAN RAFALL	4,500	0.02	45,999	50,498
D	NO	2	4	Chalatenango	8.	COMALAPA	4,387	0.02	50,499	54,885
D	NO	2	4	Ohalatenango	9.	SAN MIGUEL DE MERCEDES	2,315	0.01	54,886	57,200
D	NO	2	4	Chalatenango		POTONICO	1,877	0.01	57,201	58,877
D	NO	2	4	Chalatenango	11.		1,454	0.01	58,878	60,321
<u>D</u>	NO	2	4	Chalatenango	12.		1,420	0.005	60,332	61,751
D	NO	2	4	Chaletenango	_	SAN FRANCISCO LEMPA	942	0.003	61,752	62,693
D	NO	2	5	La Libertad		ZARAGOZA	14,386	0.05	62,694	77,079
D	NO	2	5	La Libertad		TEOTEPEQUE	13,384	0.05	77,080	90,463
D	NO NO	2	5	La Libertad		JAYAQUE TAMANQUE	12,268	0.04	90,464	102,731
D	NO NO	2	5	La Libertad	18.	CHILTIUPAN	11,720	0.04	102,782	114,460
- D	NO NO	2	<u> </u>	La Libertad		COMABAGUA	11,183	0.04	114,461 125,687	125,686 136,869
D	NO NO	2	5	La Libertad		TEPECOYO	10,888	0.04	136,870	147,787
D	NO	2	5	La Libertad	21.		9,349	0.03	147,758	157,106
D	NC	2	5	La Libertad		HUIZUCAR	9,004	0.03	157,107	166,110
D	NC	2	5	La Libertad		SAN JOSE VILLANUEVA	7,336	0.03	166,111	173,446
D	NC	2	5	La Liberted		TALNQUE	6,486	0.02	173,447	179,882
D	NC	2	6	La Libertad	25.	JICALAPA	5,901	0.02	179,883	185,783
D	NO	2	8	La Libertad	26.	NUEVO CUSCATLAN	5,024	0.02	185,784	190,807
D	NO	2	6	San Salvador	27.	BANTIAGO TEXACUANGO	15,912	0.06	190,808	206,719
D	NC	2	6	San Salvador	28.	ROBARIO DE MORA	8,503	0.03	206,720	215,222
D	NC	2	7	Cuecatiar,		EL CATMEN	12,743	0.04	215,223	227,965
D	NC	2	7	Cuscatian		SAN RAFAEL CEDROS	10,855	0.04	227,966	238,820
D	NC	2	7	Cuscatian	31.	CANDELARIA	9,495	0.03	238,821	248,315
D	NC	2	7	Cuscatlan		BANTA CRUZ MICHAPA	8,738	0.03	248,316	257,053
D	NC	2	7	Cuscatian		MONTE SAN JUAN	6,806	0.02	257,054	263,859
D	NC	2		Cuscatian		SAN CRISTOBAL	6,434	0.02	263,860	270,293
D	NC	2	7	Cuscatian		SAN BARTOLOME PERULAPIA SAN RAMON	5,218	0.02	270,294	275,511
D D	NC NC	2	7	Cuscatian Cuscatian		ORATORIO DE CONCEPCION	4,299 2,185	0.02 0.01	275,512 279,811	279,810 281,995
D	NC NC	2	7	Cuecatian		SANTA CRUZ ANALQUITO	2,141	0.01	281,996	284,136
				38 MUNICIPAL TIES			284,136	0.01	201,990	204,130
303.70.		0,00,0	OF THE STATE OF	O MOTON AL TILL			204,100			
					 -					
D	ĐŒ	3	8	La Paz	7.	SAN PEDRO NONUALCO	9,923	0.07.	1	9,923
D	Т;	3	8	Le Paz		SANTA MARIA OSTUMA	5,653	0.04	9,924	15,578
D	EXC	3		Le Paz		PARAISO DE OSORIO	2,826	0.02	15,577	18,402
D	EXC	3	8	La Paz	4.	JERUSALEN	2,020	0.01	18,403	20,422
D	Ð(C	3	8	Le Pez	5.	MERCEDES LA CEIBA	584	0.004	20,423	21,000
D	EXC	3	9	Cabañas	6.	VICTORIA	13,640	0.10	21,007	34,646
D	EXC	3	9	Cabañas		SAN ISIDRO	10,164	0.07	34,847	44,810
D	EXC	3		Cabañas	_	JUTIAPA	7,651	0.06	44,811	52,471
D	EXC	3		Cabafias		DOLORES	5,431	0.04	52,472	57,902
_ <u>D</u>	Đ(C	3		Cabañas		TEJUTEPEQUE	5,024	0.04	57,903	62,926
_ <u>D</u>	D(C	3		Cabañas		GUACOTECTI	3,854	0.03	62,927	66,780
D	EXC EXC	3	9	Cabañas		CINQUERA	798	0.01	66,781	67,578
<u>D</u>	D(C	3		San Vicente		APASTEPEQUE TECCHICA	16,832	0.12	67,579	84,410
D	EXC EXC	3		San Vicente San Vicente	_	TECOLUCA SAN SEBASTIAN	14,865	0.11	84,411	99,275
D	DC DC	3		San Vicente		SAN ILDENFONSO	12,662 7,904	0.09	99,276	111,937
<u> </u>	EXC EXC	3		San Vicente		VERAPAZ	5,699	0.04	111,938	125,540
 	DC DC	3		San Vicente		GUADALUPE	5,103	0.04	125,541	130,643
D	EXC	3		San Vicente		SANTA CLARA	3,881	0.03	130,644	134,524
D	ĐC	3		San Vicente		SAN SEBASTIAN CATARINA	3,150	0.02	134,525	137,674
				MUNICIPALITIES		<u> </u>	137,674			
							1			

MEA PROJECT (Source: 1992 Census)

Group	Zone	Region	Dept. Code	Department	Ţ	Municipality	Total	Weight/	Field of	selection
D	NO	•	8	La Paz		SAN LUIS	16,974	0.13		16,974
 	NO	8	8	La Paz		SAN LUIS LA HYARADURA	16,749	0.12	16,978	88,728
B	NO	3	8	La Paz		OLOGUILTA	14,849	0.11	33,724	48,572
D	NO	3	8	La Paz		BAN JUAN NONUALCO	11,501	0.09	48,873	60,163
D	NO	3	8	La Paz		BAN RAFAEL OBRAJUELO	10,815	0.08	60,164	70,978
D	NO	3	8	La Paz	6.	EL PIOGARIO	9,944	0.07	70,979	80,922
D	NO	8	8	La Paz	7.	BAN JUAN TALPA	6,458	0.05	80,923	87,380
<u>D</u>	NO	3	8	La Paz	8.	BAN FRANSICO CHINAMECA	6,032	0.04	87,381	93,412
0	NC	3	88	La Paz		SAN MIQUEL TEPEZONTES	4,886	0.03	98,413	
<u>D</u>	NO	3		La Paz		GUYULTITAN	4,144	0.08	97,700	101,942
<u>D</u>	NO	3	8	La Paz	-	BAN ANTONIO MABAHUAT	4,063	0.03	101,943	108,005
D_	NO	3	8	La Paz		TAPALHUACA	3,525	0.03	100,008	109,630
D	NO NO	3	8	La Paz		SANJUAN TEPEZONTES	3,036	0.02	109,531	112,566
D	NC NC	3	10	Le Paz Sen Vicente	14.	BAN EMIGDIO BANTO DOMINGO	2,531 5,833	0.02	112,567	115,097
B	NO	3	10	San Vicente		SAN LORENZO	5,679	0.04	115,098	120,930 126,609
0	NC	3		San Vicente		SAN CAYETANO ISTEPEQUE	4,473	0.03	126,610	
D	NO	3		San Vicente		TEPETITAN	3,566	0.03	131,083	
						DEASTERN REGION	134,648	0.00	101,000	107,070
		-14-001#1		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			,04,040			
a	ĐŒ	4	11	Ueulutan	1.	SANTIAGO DE MARIA	18,684	0.05	1	18,684
D	ĐŒ	4	11	Usulutan	2.	JUCUAPA	14,887	0.04	18,685	33,571
D	ĐŒ	4	11	Usulutan	3.	SANTA ELENA	14,442	0.04	33,572	48,013
D	E)C	4	11	Usulutan	4.	ALEGRIA	13,112	0.08	48,014	61,125
D	ĐØ	4	11	Usulutan	5.	JUOUARAN	12,750	0.03	61,126	73,875
D	ĐC	4	11	Usulutan	8.	CONCEPCION BATRES	10,948	0.03	73,876	84,823
D	EXC.	4	11	Usulutan		ESTANZUELAS	10,200	0.02	84,824	95,023
D	ĐŒ	4	11	Usulutan		TECAPAN	9,373	0.02	95,024	104,396
0	Đ(C	4	11	Usulutan		NUEVA GRANADA	7,289	0.02	104,397	111,685
D	EXC	4	11	Ueulutan		EFEGUAYOUN	6,923	0.02	111,686	118,608
D	EXC.	4		Ueulutan		SAN DIONISIO	6,885	0.02	118,609	125,493
<u> </u>	EXC	4		Veuluten		ELTRIUNFO	5,725	0.01	125,494	
D	DC	4		Ueuluten		SAN FRANCISCO JAVIER	5,398	0.01	131,219	
D	£00C €00C	4	11	Usulutan Usulutan		SAN AGUSTIN	3,185	0.01	138,617	
 	ĐC ĐC	4		San Miguel		CALIFORNIA CHINAMECA	2,451 19,117	0.01	139,802	
B	E)C	4		San Miguel		SAN RAFAEL	14,524	0.04		175,893
	EVC EVC	4		9an Miguel		SESCI	10,329	0.03	175,894	
Б	EXC	4		San Miguel		CHAPELTIQUE	9,796	0.02		196,018
6	EXC	4		San Miguel		SANJORGE	8,589	0.02	196,019	
D	DC	4		San Miguel		CAROLINA	7,182	0.02		211,789
D	EXC	4		San Miguel		BAN ANTONIO	6,748	0.02		218,537
D	EXC	4		San Miguel		SAN LUIS DE LA REINA	6,107	0.01	218,538	
D	D(C	4		San Miguel		SAN GERARDO	5,122	3.01	224,645	
D	Ð(C	4		San Miguel		NUEVO EDEN DE SAN JUAN	2,811	0.01	229,767	
D	Ð(C	4		Morazan	26.	CORINTO	17,122	0.04	232,578	
D	EXC	4		Morazan		GUATAJIAGUA	10,682	0.03	249,700	
D	E)C	4		Morazan	_	SOCIEDAD	10,666	0.03	260,382	
D	EXC:	4		Morazan		OSICALA	10,580	0.03	271,048	
D	EXC	4		Morazan		CACAOPERA	9,599	0.02	281,628	
D	Ð(C	4		Morazan	_	SAN SIMON	8,397	0.02	291,227	
D	DC DC	4		Morazan		MEANGUERA	8,289	0.02	299,624	
D	EXC	4		Morazan		DELICIAS DE CONCEPCION	4,847	0.01	307,913	
D	EXC	4		Morazan	_	YOLOAIQUIN	3,877	0.01	312,760	
D	EXC	4		Morazan		SAN ISIDRO	3,679	0.01	316,637	
D	EXC	4		Morazan		YAMABAL	3,655	0.01		323,970
D	EXC	4		Morazan		JOATECA DEDOLETI	3,516	0.01	323,971	
P	EXC	4		Morazan Morazan		PERCUIN CENCELIDEA	3,512	0.01	327,487	
D	EXC	4		Morezen Morezen		SENSEMBRA	3,344	0.01		334,342
D	DC	4	13	Morazan	40.	GUALOCOCTI	3,084	3.01	334,343	337,426

MEA PROJECT (Source: 1992 Gensus)



	7	Boele-	Bent Cada	I necessaries		All sanda and the	Total	Welshad	M1-1-4	
Group D	Zone	Region 4	Dept, Code	Department Morazan	14	Municipality JOCOATTQUE	2.029	Weight/ 0.008	Field of 337,427	
D	ED(0)	-	13	Morazan	-	ARAMBALA	1,861	0.004	339,480	لتتهور بسأنتصل عنات الاباث
<u> </u>	EDC	1-1-	18	Morazan	-	TOROLA	1,263	0.003	341,807	341,306 842,669
- 6	EXC		13	Morazan		EL ROSARIO	1,181	0.003	342,870	THE RESIDENCE STREET
 	ED40	4	13	Morazan		SAN FERNANDO	949	0.002	343,781	344,699
5	ED(C)	4	14	La Unión	-	ANAMOROS	15,100	0.04	844,700	
- 5 -	E)(C)	4	14	La Unión		NUEVA ESPARTA	13,039	0.03	359,869	
- 5	ED60	4	14	La Unión		LIBLIQUE	13,256	0.08	379,608	366,763
D	ED(0)	4	14	La Unión	-	EL GAUCE	9,500	0.02	386,764	396,263
i b	£000	4	14	La Unión	-	PCLOROS	8,703	0.02	396,264	408,056
0	ED(0)	4	14	La Unión		CONCEPCION DE ORIENTE	7,260	0.02	405,057	412,310
				MUNICIPALITIES .			412,316			
			T The state of the		T					*
		1								***************************************
D	NO	4	11	Usulutan	1.	PUERTO EL TRIUNFO	16,164	0.07	1	10,194
D	NO	4	11	Uvulutan		MERCEDES UMAÑA	13,341	0.08	16,165	
D	NO	4	11	Usulutan	3.	OZATLAN	10,972	0.05	29,506	40,477
D	NO	4	11	Veulutan		BANTA MARIA	8,087	0.04	40,478	48,564
D	NO	4	11	Veulutan		SAN BUENA VENTURA	4,015	0.02	48,565	52,579
D	NO	4	12	Sen Miguel		MONCAGUA	19,133	0.09	52,580	71,712
D	NO	4	12	San Miguel		CHIRILAGUA	18,705	0.09	71,713	90,417
D	NO	4	12	San Miguel		EL TRANSITO	15,073	0.07	90,418	105,490
D	NC	4	12	Sen Miguel	9.	LOLOTIQUE	12,930	0.08	105,491	118,420
D	NO	4	12	San Miguel	10.	NUEV GUADALUPE	6,438	0.03	118,421	124,858
D	NC	4	12	San Miguel	11.	QUELEPA	4,560	0.02	124,859	129,418
D	NO	4	12	Ban Miguel	12.	ULUAZAPA	4,117	0.02	129,419	133,535
D	NO	4	12	San Miguel	13.	COMACARAN	3,226	0.01	133,536	136,761
D	NO	4	13	Morezen	14.	JOCORO	10,160	0.05	136,762	146,911
D	NO	4	13	Morazan	15.	CHILANGA	8,294	0.04	146,912	155,205
D	NO	4	13	Morazan	16.	EL DIVISADERO	7,768	0.04		162,973
D	110	4	13	Morazan	17.	LOLOTIQUILLO	4,735	0.02	162,974	167,708
D	NC	4	13	Morazan	18.	SAN CARLOS	3,206	0.01	167,709	170,914
D	NC	4	14	La Unión	19.	EL CARMEN	14,290	0.07	170,915	185,204
D	NO	4	14	La Unión		YACUAIQUIN	8,502	0.04	185,205	193,706
D	NC	4	14	La Unión		INTIPUCA	7,104	0.03	193,707	
D	NC	4	14	La Unión		YAYANTIQUE	5,473	0.03	200,811	206,283
D	NC	4	14	La Unión		BOLIVAR	5,146	0.02	206,284	211,429
D	NC	4	14	La Unión		SANJOSE	3,739	0.02	211,430	215,168
D	NC	4	14	La Unión		MEANGUARA DEL GOLFO	3,212	0.01	215,169	218,380
SUB TOT	AL "D" N	ON-CONFL	ICT ZONES:	25 MUNICIPALITIES	3 - EA	STERN REGION	218,380			
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GROUP	704	NO. MUN.		OTAL	<u> </u>					
	ZUNE			OTAL 15%			 			
B		4	569,802	15%						
C	ĐC	15 11	794,675	21% 8%			ļ			
-6	NC	19	295,734	14%			 			
<u> </u>	EXC	100	523,459 725,435	19%						
- 6	NC NC	103	725,435	22%						
	POPUL		842,137 3,751,242	100%	 -					
	luding Si		3,701,242	10070						
/EXG	GO LEIN	-mr)					 			
										
										
							Ll			

MEA PROJECT (Source: 1992 Census)

er tydinament.		Na.	CANTONS
AHUACHAPAN	CONCEPCION DE ATACO	1.	LOS TABLONES
	physical physical at a second	2.	SAN JOSE
SANTA ANA	SANTA ANA	3.	AYUNTA
		4.	PLANES DE LA LAGUNA
SONSONATE	SAN JULIAN	5.	EL ACHIOTAL
		6.	AGUA SHUCA
		7.	PEÑA BLANCA
SONSONATE	SANTA ISABEI. ISHUATAN	8.	PASO DE CANOAS
CHALATENANGO	SAN IGNACIO	9.	EL PINAR
		10.	EL CARMEN
LA LIBERTAD	JAYAQUE	11.	LAS FLORES
		12.	JUAN HIGINIO O LA CUMBRE
LA LIBERTAD	QUEZALTEPEQUE	13.	ELPUENTE
		14.	SANTA ROSA
SAN SALVADOR	AGUILARES	15.	PIÑALITOS
		16.	LA FLORIDA
SAN SALVADOR	EL PAISNAL	17.	LA CABAÑA
SAN SALVADOR	SANTIAGO TEXACUANGOS	18.	ELMORRO
		19.	JOYA GRANDE
CUSCATLAN	MONTE SAN JUAN	20.	SAN MARTIN
		21.	SAN JOSE
CUSCATLAN	SAN RAFAEL CEDROS	22.	JIBOA
		23.	CERRO COLARADO
LA PAZ	TAPALHUACA	24.	LA BAZA
		25.	LAS LAJAS
CARAÑAS	VICTORIA	26.	EL CARACOL
		27.	SANTA MARTA
SAN VICENTE	TECOLUCA	28.	EL ARCO
USULUTAN	JUCUAPA	29.	EL AMATON
		30.	LOMA DE LA CRUZ
USULUTAN	SAN BUENAVENTURA		EL ACEITUNO
		32.	LA TRONCONADA
USULUTAN	SANTA ELENA		EL VOLCAN
			EL NANZAL
SAN MIGUEL	MONCAGUA		LA ESTANCIA
			EL PLATANAR
SAN MIGUEL	SAN RAFAEL ORIENTE		SANTA CLARA
	<u> </u>		LOS ZELAYA
MORAZAN	GUATAJIAGUA		SAN BARTOLO
			MAIGUERA
LA UNION	EL CARMEN		OLOMEGA
			EL CAULOTILLO
LA UNION	LISLIQUE		EL DERRUMBADO
			ELTERRERO
LA UNION	SANTA ROSA DE LIMA.		EL ALGODON
En VIIIVII	CARTA NOOR DE LINE.		LOS MOJONES
	<u> </u>	40.	LOS INIMONES



LIST OF 115 COMMUNITIES ELIGIBLE UNDER THE NRP

BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

NRP AREAS

CABANAS

- 1. CINQUERA
- 2. GUACOTECTI 3. ILOBASCO
- 4. JUTIAPA 5. SAN ISIDRO
- 6. SENSUNTEPEQUE
- 7. TEJUTEPROUE
- 6. VILLA VICTORIA
- S. VILLA DOLORES

CUSCATLAN

- 10. EL ROSARIO
- 11. SAN JOSE GUAYASAL
- 12. SUCHITOTO
- 13. TENANCINGO

CHALATENANGO

- 14. AGUA CALIENTE
- 15. ARCATAO
- 16. CITALA

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- 17. CHALATENANGO 18. EL CARRIZAL
- 18. LA LAGUNA
- 20 LA PALMA
- 21. LAS VUELTAS
- 22. NOMBRE DE JESUS
- 23. NUEVA TRINIDAD
- 24. NUEVA CONCEPCION
- 25. CUOS DE AGUA
- 26. SAN ANTONIO DE LA CRUZ 27. SAN ANTONIO LOS RANCHOS
- 28. SAN FERNANCO
- 29. SAN FRANCISCO MORAZAN
- 30. SAN JOSE LAS FLORES
- 31. SAN IGNACIO 32. SAN ISIDRO LABRADOR
- 33. SAN JOSE CANCASQUE

LA LIBERTAD

- 34. QUEZALTEPFOLIF
- 35. SAN JUAN OPICO
- 36. SAN MATTAS
- 37. SAN PABLO TACACHICO

LA PAZ

- 38. JERUSALEM
- 38. MERCEDES DE LA CEIBA
- 40. PARAISO DE OSORIO 41. SAN PEDRO NONUALCO
- 42. SANTA MARIA OSTUMA 43. SANTIAGO NONUALCO

LA UNION

- 44. ANAMOROS
- 45. EL SAUCE
- 46. CONCEPCION DE ORIENTE
- 47. LISLIQUE
- 44. NISTVA ESPARTA
- 49. POLOROS

MORAZAN

- 50. ARAMBALA
- 51. CACAOPERA
- 52. COMINTO
- 53. DELICIAS DE CONCEPCION S4. EL ROSARIO
- SS. GUATAJIAGUA
- 56. JOCOAITIQUE
- 57. GUALOCOCTI
- 58. JOATECA 39, MEANGUERA
- 60. OSCICALA
- 61. PERQUIN
- 62. SENSEMBRA
- 61. SCCIEDAD
- 64. SAN FERNANDO
- 65. SAN FRANCISCO GOTERA
- 66. SAN ISIDRO 67. SAN SIMON
- 68. TOROLA
- 69. YAMABAL
- 70. YOLOAIQUIN

SANTA ANA

- 71. MASAHUAT
- 72. SANTA ROSA GUACHIPILIN
- 73. TERSTEPEQUE

SAN MIGUEL

- 74. CAROUNA
- 75. CIUDAD BARRIOS
- 76. CHAPELTIQUE
- 77. CHINAMECA 78. NUEVO EDEN DE SAN JUAN
- 79, SAN GERAROO
- 80, SAN LUIS DE LA RENA 61, SAN ANTONIO DEL MOSCO
- 82. SAN JORGE
- 83. SAN RAFAEL OPIENTE
- 84. SESORE

SAN SALVADOR

- 85. AGUILARES
- 86. APOPA
- 87. EL PAISNAL
- de, Guazapa
- 89. NEJAPA
- 90. TONACATEPEQUE


SAN VICENTE

- 91. APASTEPEQUE
- 92. GUADALUPE
- 23. SAN ESTEBAN
- 94. SAN SEBASTIAN
- 95. SAN ILDEFONSO 96. SANTA CLARA
- 97. TECOLUCA
- 98. VERAPAZ

USULUTAN

- 98. ALEGRIA
- 100. BERUN
- 101, CONCEPCION BATRES
- 102. CALIFORNIA
- 103. EREGUAYOUIN
- 104. ESTANZUELA
- 105. JOUILISCO
- 106. JUCUAPA 107. JUCUARAN
- 108. NUEVA GRANADA
- 109. SAN AGUSTIN 110. SAN DIONISIO
- 111. SAN FRANCISCO JAVIER
- 112. SANTA ELENA
- 113, SANTIAGO DE MARIA
- 114. TECAPAN
- 115. VILLA EL TRIUNFO

MAP OF GEOGRAPHICAL DISPERSION OF THE SURVEY



POP.			SAMPLE	TOTAL					
		***************************************				OPULATION	TOTAL		PULATION
STRATA	DEPARTAMENT	MUNICIPALITY	QUOTA	URBAN	MALE	FEMALE	RURAL	MALE	FEMALE
D1	Ahuachapan	Concepción de Ataco	40	12	6	6	28	14	14
A D1	Santa Ana	Santa Ana	52	30	14	16	22	11	11
D1	Sonsonate	San Julian Santa Isabel Ishuatán	40	12	6	6	28	14	14
	Sonsonate			12	6	6	28	14	14
DX2	Chalatenango	San Ignacio	40	12	6	6	28	14	14
B DN2	La Libertad La Libertad	Quezaitepeque	72 40	32	15	17	40	20	20
CX		Jayaque		13	6	7	27	13	14
	San Salvador	Aguilares	28	10	5	5	18	9	9
DN2	San Salvador	Santiago Texacuangos	40	13	6	7	27	13	14
DX2	San Salvador	El Paisnal	40	12	6	6	28	14	14
DN2 DN2	Cuscatián	San Rafael Cedros	40	13	6	7	27	13	14
	Cuscatlán	Monte San Juan	40	13	6	7	27	13	14
DN3	La Paz	Tapalhuaca	40	14	7	7	26	13	13
DX3	Cabañas	Victoria	40	12	6	6	28	14	14
DX3	San Vicente	Tecoluca	40	12	6	6	28	14	14
DN4	Usulután	San Buenaventura	40	11	5	6	29	14	15
DX4	Usulután	Jucuapa	40	11	5	6	29	14	15
DX4	Usulután	Santa Elena	40	11	5	6	29	14	15
DN4	San Miguel	Moncagua	40	11	5	6	29	14	15
DX4	San Miguel	San Rafael Oriente	40	11	5	6	29	14	15
DX4	Morazán	Guatajiagua	40	11	5	6	29	14	15
CN	La Unión	Santa Rosa de Lima	48	11	5	6	37	18	19
DN4	La Unión	El Carmen	40	11	5	6	29	14	15
DX4	La Unión	Lislique	40	11	5	6	29	14	15
			1,000	321	152	169	679	333	346
STRATA	URBAN (M/F)	RURAL (MF)				 		ļ	 _
<u>A</u>	58% (46/54)	42% (49/51)		<u> </u>		ļ		<u> </u>	
В	44% (47/53)	56% (50/50)			<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u></u>		
CX	36% (47/53)	64% (50/50)				LEGEND			
CN	24% (47/53)	76% (49/51)			<u> </u>	1 West		<u> </u>	
D1	31% (48/52)	69% (50/50)				2 Central	<u> </u>		
DX2	31% (48/52)	69% (51/49)				3 Mideast			
DN2	32% (48/52)	68% (50/50)			L	4 East X (Ex-conflict)			
DX3	29% (47/53)	71% (50/50)				N (Non-conflict)			ļ
DN3	36% (47/53)	64% (50/50)			L	,	<u> </u>		!
DX4	27% (47/53)	73% (49/51)			:				
DN4	28% (47/53)	72% (49/51)	<u></u>		<u> </u>				

TABLE 5

<u>UNIVERSE AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEY TARGET POPULATION</u>

	T/ARGET P	OPULATION	SAMPLE P	OPULATION
	UNIVERSE*	%	TOTAL	%
				 _
TOTAL	3,751,242	100	1,034	100
	0,701,242		1,004	100
TACHINA COSA A ARAFATA COSA I VALIFARI DANO ARAN ARAN ARAN ARAN ARAN ARAN ARAN A				
REGION				
WEST	1,066,824	28	185	18
CENTRAL	1,051,071	28	257	25
MIDEAST	517,911	14	210	20
EAST	1,115,436	30	382	37
-				
TYPE OF POPULATION				
URBAN	1,379,654	37	369	36
RURAL	2,371,588	63	665	64
			,	
ZONE	0.470.700		570	
NON-CONFLICT	2,479,563	66	573	55
EX-CONFLICT	1,271,679	34	461	45
GENDER	4 000 577	4.0	404	4.5
MALE	1,823,577	49	464	45
FEMALE	1,927,665	51	570	55
AGEGROUPS				
20-29	1,472,929	39	274	26
30-49	1,584,984	42	478	. 46
50-65	693,329	18	282	27
00.00	030,023	10		<u> </u>
POPULATION STRATA				1
A (>80,000).	569,802	15	55	5
B (40,000-80,000)	794,675	21	74	7
C (20,000-39,999)	819,193	22	76	7
D (<20,000)	1,567,572	42	829	80

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MEA PROJECT

^{*}Source: Preliminary Results of the National Census - Oct.'92.

Appendix B

SCOPE OF WORK

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APPENDIX B

SCOPE OF WORK

- A. This evaluation shall address the following Project specific questions, raised as consequence of the Project's purpose, strategy, implementation procedures and objectives, as well as certain assumptions which are implicit in them.
 - 1) Do beneficiaries view MEA projects as having been identified by them? If yes, does the *cabildo abierto* figure prominently in the process, are the residents of the municipality that attend the *cabildos abiertos* viewed as representative of the municipality's various communities, or is another mechanism equally or more important? If not, how were projects identified and by whom?
 - 2) Do the responses to the previous question also apply to the larger projects implemented by service ministries or agencies? If not, what is responsible for the difference?
 - 3) How does a sampling of services ministry and agency officials view local responsibility for project identification?
 - Are effective community organization and popular participation fostered and enhanced by this type of project? This question should be focussed from the standpoint of both sustainability and transferability of the Project to host country funding, e.g., if the MEA Project were to disappear what should we expect that communities and smaller municipalities with a limited ax base and administrative capacity would do? Do the beneficiaries view this effort as sustainable?
 - How critical to the success of the MEA Project --and to its infrastructure sub-projects -- is the technical assistance provided by the SRN, ISDEM, COMURES and the USAID? Discuss each organization separately, including the quality of their technical assistance inputs and how long they will be required. Also discuss how each of these organizations are viewed by its clients. distinguish between the requirements of larger and smaller municipalities and discuss the impact of changes in incumbents resulting from elections.
 - As a result of the MEA Project, does a sampling of beneficiaries view heir local government and the central government now in a more positive light than prior to 1987? If yes, why and how significant is the change? If not, why?

- 7) Do beneficiaries believe that the responsiveness of local government and participatory democracy, e.g. the frequency of *cabildos abiertos*, would suffer if outside funding were to cease?
- As a corollary to question 6, is there any evidence to suggest that increased popular support for the constitutional political process exists as a result of these efforts?
- 9) Assess the MEA Project's contributions to the USAID'S Strategic Objectives framework, specifically Objective 1 (assist El Salvador make the transition from war to peace) and 3 (promote enduring democratic institutions and practices).
- 10) Do the beneficiaries believe that the basic infrastructure needs of isolated and traditionally neglected areas are being satisfied to a significant degree?

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- Assess the technical adequacy and quality of construction of MEA Projects, giving due attention to complaints from ANDA, ANTEL and CEL.
- 12) Compare the costs and quality of similar service Ministry and Agency projects to MEA Projects.
- Are there any overlap or other issues for the MEA Project caused by the activities of the GOES's Social Investment Fund (FIS)?
- 14) Compare the maintenance of service Ministry and Agency projects to MEA Projects?
- Assess the local economic impact of locally generated income from labor and the purchase of materials and the related perceptions of local residents.
- 16) To what extent do MEA Project leverage local resources?
- 17) Critically evaluate the actual and/or potential effectiveness of the MEA Project's "new modalities," the Challenge Fund, income producing projects and loan funds. Relate to Project sustainability.
- Assess the probable impact of the USAID's Peace and National Recovery Project and planned Municipal Development Project on the MEA Project and vice versa. Should any changes be made in any of these Projects to strengthen their synergistic effects?
- 19) Have there been any Project spin-offs, i.e., objectives not particularly sought, but achieved, for batter or worse?

- 20) Any other questions of issues which may arise during the course of the evaluation that the evaluators and/or USAID deem significant.
- B. Women in Development issues and objectives should be addressed throughout the report. However, the following questions should be answered in an annex to the report.
 - 1) Design, Appraisal and Implementation:
 - How were the interests and roles of women (compared to men) taken into account in each of the design, appraisal and implementation stages of the Project?
 - In what ways did women (compared to men) participate in these processes?
 - 2) Effects and Impacts Concerning Women:
 - What were the effects, positive or negative, of the Project concerning women's (compared to men's) access to income, education and training, and with respect to workloads, roles in household and community, and health conditions?
 - How were the interests and roles of women (compared to men) taken into account in the evaluation stage?
 - Were significant factors concerning women (compared to men) overlooked at the appraisal stage?
 - 3) Data Availability:
 - Were gender-specific data available for each of the Project stages?
 - *Design
 - *Appraisal/Approval
 - *Implementation
 - *Monitoring
 - *Evaluation
 - 4) Sustainability:
 - How did women's integration in Project activities affect the sustainability of Project outcomes? Were outcomes more sustained (or less sustained) when women were taken into account in Project activities?

- Are the results achieved by the Project equally sustainable between men and women beneficiaries?
- C. The following methods and procedures are envisioned:
 - 1) A two week visit to El Salvador by the Team Leader (Social Scientist and Evaluation Specialist) in August 1993. During this visit the Team Leader shall:
 - a) Receive an in-depth briefing on the Project from the USAID and SRN.
 - b) Visit a small representative sample of projects.
 - c) Gather basic Project Documentation (1988 and 1990 evaluations, Municipal Code; Legislation creating ISDEM, COMURES, the Fondo and the Ley de Arbitrios; SRN, COMURES and ISDEM Action Plans; Project Papers for 0394 and Municipal Development (draft); Municipal Development Strategy; Infrastructure Assessment; etc.)
 - d) Draft a survey instrument for USAID approval and sub-contract, with USAID guidance, for a poll which could provide more reliable and statistically significant answers to a number of questions regarding beneficiary reactions. A firm might ask, for example, if respondents know about SRN/CONARA, MEA, COMURES and ISDEM. If so, how do they view them? Have the respondents received direct benefits from subprojects? What were they? Were the subprojects those that the respondent would have chosen? Are the subprojects having a significant impact on meeting local infrastructure requirements? How do respondents view local government? How do they view central government ministries and service agencies? Are they more responsive or efficient than in the past? Is the project significantly impacting on the development of a culture of democracy?
 - 2) The subcontractor conducts the survey and tabulates the results during September 1993, and provides the results to the USAID and the Contractor.
 - The evaluation team works in El Salvador during October 1993 conducting extensive interviews in San Salvador and the field (SRN, service ministries and agencies and other GOES officials; Mayors; Community Leaders; etc.) and drafting the evaluation.

Appendix C

RESPONSE TO SCOPE OF WORK

APPENDIX C

RESPONSE TO SCOPE OF WORK

1. Project Identification

About 80% of those interviewed consider themselves beneficiaries of CONARA projects in their *municipio*, although only half associated the projects with CONARA. Most beneficiaries view the CONARA projects as having been identified by the community. About half of the beneficiaries consider the *cabildos* to have figured prominently in the selection process. A quarter of the beneficiaries, however, assume the projects were selected by the mayor. The *cabildos* are seen as open to all and broadly representative of the various communities in the *municipio*.

2. <u>Beneficiary Opinion of Project Identification among Larger Public Works</u> Providers

The larger projects implemented by service ministries or agencies, including FIS, are not seen as being identified primarily by the community (see survey results).

3. Opinion of Project Identification Process by Agency Officials

Central agencies do not criticize the MEA process for project identification, but they do not use it themselves.

Central ministries and other agencies plan, arrange for funding, and implement projects for their own sectors independently from the SRN, although some (Caminos) perform work under the PRN if funded by the Secretariat. There is no formal input from the municipalities. Work on some rural roads under USAID Project 519-0320 has been reprogrammed to conform to the national reconstruction plan, but the municipalities did enter directly in that decision.

In the case of FIS, eligible projects are sought out by private sector implementers, who enter into agreement with community organizations to design and build projects after approval by FIS. The amount of actual community input should be high, although there can be an incentive for implementers to sell a project rather than respond to the expressed desire of a community.

4. Sustainability

Project construction activity, whether called MEA or some other name, cannot survive without an infusion of funds. Even if fund infusion were converted to a 100 percent loan program, a large up-front capital outlay would be required to keep the program alive for up to five years until re-flows became consistent and reliable.

As an alternative to converting to a loan program it is suggested that a given percentage of gross national revenues, from 5 percent up to 10 percent, be earmarked for distribution to the municipalities on the basis of some formula incorporating the effects of area, population, tax base, and sales tax generated in the municipality (or something similar and equally equitable). A national program similar to the U.S. community development block grant program should keep the municipalities solvent and growing. (This is being initiated in Ghana on a World Bank decentralization project and gives the municipalities a relatively secure source of revenue with which to survive while local revenues sources develop and grow.) At the very least municipalities should receive a fair portion of the gasoline tax for road maintenance.

5. <u>Institutional Capacity</u>

The major institutional players involved in supporting municipal development are SRN/CONARA, ISDEM, COMURES, and USAID.

SRN/CONARA

while SRN/CONARA has been very effective in establishing a procedural system to "get the funds out" in a timely manner from a project management perspective (because of staff depth in engineering and architecture), it does not give the same attention to the social dimensions of nurturing local participatory democracy. For example, several SRN staff members give the impression that the cabildo abierto is the first step in the project cycle without underscoring the importance of the *cabildo* in strengthening participatory local government. Little emphasis is made on the need for, or importance of, *pre-cabildo* activities and/or the community reconstruction committees as viable mechanisms to strengthen local participatory democracy.

ISDEM

• ISDEM, established in 1988 to provide technical assistance to Salvadoran municipalities, has helped municipalities revamp the User Fee Structure (Ingresos Tributarios). These new user fees were based on costs, and resulted in 210 municipalities updating their tariff schedules and in generating an average increase of 70 percent user fee revenue in 157 municipalities. These recent revenue generation shows the untapped potential of increasing resources at the local level that could be used to begin financing local infrastructure.

COMURES

• COMURES is exemplary in having a non-partisan, or multi-partisan organizational philosophy that is lacking in other institutions. It still lacks depth in managerial and technical areas, however.

The technical arm of the recently established Comisión para Descentralización y Desarrollo Municipal (CDM) is based in COMURES. This Commission consists of the key national entities that are establishing a decentralization framework as part of the on-going state modernization process initiated by GOES as a result of the United Nation's Management Development Programme Project in 1991. Members of the CDM includes the President of ISDEM, the General Manager of ISDEM, the President of COMURES, the Vice-President of COMURES, the Planning Minister, and the Secretary General of the SRN. In the near future the Finance Minster is expected to be included in the Commission. USAID forms part of the Consultancy Committee to the Commission along with the GTZ, and UNDP.

The Technical arm has only recently been organized, and is expected to develop a decentralization framework that will facilitate MEA's goal of strengthening municipal government.

USAID

USAID assists CONARA/SRN with field personnel who monitor the MEA
program by working with CONARA/SRN field offices and attending
cabildos abiertos. However, the mayors do not see them as providing
technical assistance.

6. Attitudes towards Local and Central Government

Those who have attended *cabildos* or even know about the *cabildos* have a much more favorable opinion of both local government and national government than those who have not attended or do not know about the *cabildos*. Most people have some degree of confidence in local government. Confidence in local and national government ranks third and fourth after confidence in community groups and the church. Confidence in local government is at about the same level as confidence in national government.

7. Sustainability of Cabildos Abiertos

Respondents who know about the *cabildos* do not believe that the mayors hold them simply to get money or comply with the law. They strongly believe they are holding them to find out the people's needs. If outside funding were to be reduced or even to cease, people would still attend the *cabildos* Most of the mayors interviewed, however, still show reluctance to hold *cabildos*. Even with strong financial incentives through MEA mayors are not holding the number of *cabildos* required by law. In fact, the number of *cabildos* held did not increase from 1992 to 1993 (see Appendix J).

8. Effect on Popular Support for Constitutional Process

The survey results show that there is a significant level of support for local and national government, and that level is higher among those who know of, or have attended, the *cabildos*. Thus, it can be concluded that these efforts have increased popular support for the constitutional political process.

9. MEA's Contribution to USAID's Strategic Objectives Framework

As the survey clearly shows, the MEA program has contributed directly to two of USAID's Strategic Objectives. By encouraging local participatory democracy, it has helped the country make the transition from war to peace (Strategic Objective No. 1). Primarily through the *cabildos abiertos* MEA has promoted enduring democratic institutions and practices (Strategic Objective No. 3). Not to be overlooked within this strategic objective is the non-partisan nature of COMURES and of that institution's efforts to promote technical instead of political solutions.

10. Infrastructure Needs of Neglected Areas

About 40 percent of the respondents think that rural needs are being addressed as much as urban needs through this program. Most of the respondents think that some--but not most--of their basic infrastructure needs are being met by this program.

11. Technical Adequacy and Quality of Construction

The methodology for engineering studies and preparation of plans is adequate. A review of plans and scope of services for engineering contracts shows that plans can be properly prepared, and are good when prescribed procedures are followed. There is nothing organically wrong with the system for preparation of plans and specifications.

There is no shortage of technically qualified professionals for design, but all projects above ¢500,000 (\$58,000) should be reviewed for technical adequacy by DGR, NRECA, or *Caminos*, as appropriate.

All attempts to split projects into components to keep each contract under \$250,000 ($\cancel{e}2,170,000$) should be disapproved. Conversely, the existing mechanism for accomplishment of projects above \$250,000 exists and should be utilized fully. Many water, and some bridge and road projects will be above the \$250,000 threshold but are critical for the people and for giving credibility to the mayor. They should be pursued with all diligence.

Quality of construction has not been investigated on site extensively by the consultant but is reported to be adequate and improving. Those projects which were observed were deemed adequate.

ANDA did not criticize quality of construction of water systems but one engineer's personal opinion was that "quality will improve with time as they gain more experience."

CEL declined to comment on quality of any electrification projects performed by municipalities. NRECA, however, who works closely with the mayors, is convinced that quality of new work on electric distribution has improved dramatically over the last year. In addition to other technical assistance, NRECA has prepared and issued standard specifications and drawings for electrical work on the MEA projects.

12. Costs and Quality

Compared to other agencies, MEA projects are inherently more cost-effective in the use of resources, and MEA unit costs for equivalent construction are iower. The types of work for which current construction cost comparisons can be made are between MEA and Caminos on roads and between MEA and FIS on water systems. Differences in project selection and implementation procedures between MEA and FIS cause a difference in costs. FIS relies on "implementers", individuals or firms from the private sector, to contact local community groups, and with those groups identify projects to be done. The implementer then designs and builds the project for the client group. The client group is usually a community organization, not a government entity or municipality. The non-competitive design-construct project implementation process, using private sector contractors, is justified on the basis of the number of projects that can be built simultaneously with a minimum of administrative delay.

For most projects of the size and complexity undertaken by MEA, using local material and labor, municipal projects cost less than central agency projects. For instance, contractors working for *Caminos* are bidding competitively on reopening of lower class rural roads, and costs are approximately \$87,000 (\$10,000) per kilometer. Municipalities report \$30,000 -\$\psi40,000\$ (\$3,450 - \$4,600) per kilometer for similar work on municipal roads. The classes of roads on which *Caminos* contractors work are slightly higher than most of the MEA work, and the projects are somewhat larger. The mobilizing of equipment and manpower from outside the municipality for relatively small jobs causes costs to be higher than is the case on the typical MEA project, done close to home with local labor and minimum equipment.

MEA has not done as much as was expected on projects above \$250,000. On those projects, costs should approach the cost of work by other agencies, but probably will continue to be slightly lower because of lower overhead and indirect costs not charged against MEA projects.

13. Overlap between MEA and FIS Projects

Both MEA and FIS work in the fields of water and sanitation, school and health post construction, and to a limited degree in market construction. Overlap is inevitable, therefore, but would not be detrimental if FIS activities were coordinated with the municipality. The needs are so great that not all can be met by the combined efforts of

MEA and FIS. A problem can, and does, arise when FIS undertakes a project already scheduled for construction by the municipality. It should not be detrimental to the FIS program, however, to extend to the mayor the courtesy of advising him of approved projects. To do less tends to undermine the mayor's status, and thus to work at cross purposes with the MEA project.

14. Quality of Maintenance Compared between MEA and Larger Projects

Little difference is observed in maintenance of infrastructure on municipal projects and those of larger agencies. As a general rule all can be said to be underfunded and deficient. However, in some schools the parents of students take a proprietary interest in projects built with MEA funds and do a reasonable job of maintenance.

In defense of the mayors, most do not have a maintenance budget, and it is only very recently that some of them have begun to generate enough revenue to pay for maintenance. According to the survey, communities often feel a responsibility to maintain projects selected in open meetings and constructed by the municipality. They consider maintenance of MEA projects to be better than that of some other agencies.

15. Local Economic Impact

Exact employment data for the projects implemented under the MEA program are not available. However, examination of costs for a small representative sample of different types of projects shows that approximately 27 percent of total project costs was expended for direct labor on site and approximately 48 percent for domestically produced materials. On this basis, MEA funding since 1986 has generated approximately 19,300 person-years of direct labor and 13,600 person-years of indirect labor in production and delivery of materials. These employment rates are not a high percentage in the total national employment picture, but the jobs have been seen by mayors as important to a significant number of families otherwise unemployed. With a spread effect of money in the economy, usually estimated as a factor of 3 or more, the program can be estimated to have generated the equivalent of 130,000 person-years of employment spread throughout the country during the life of the project.

The projections calculated here are not presented as precise, but demonstrate the order of magnitude of the impact of the project on employment in the country.

16. Leverage of Local Resources

There is no indication that municipal funds are being used widely for construction, but that is not surprising since municipal revenues until recently have not been sufficient to cover even operation and maintenance of all government services. The municipalities do administer the projects with municipal funds and employees. However, until very recently most municipal governments have not had money with which to match or contribute MEA project funds. That should change in the future under revenue enhancement programs of

the municipalities, but for the foreseeable future local funds will be adequate to meet only a small percentage of the infrastructure need.

In a limited number of municipalities some projects have been completed or extended by contributions of local citizens, usually as labor but occasionally as money. This is not a general pattern, however.

17. New MEA Initiatives and Project Sustainability

Based on discussion with over thirty mayors, the following capabilities and observations are noted:

- Most mayors felt that the MEA program was probably the best program incountry that responded to citizen needs, and was able to respond in a reasonable amount of time. They were very cognizant that MEA projects were being done at less cost than FIS projects, and with more community involvement.
- The MEA project is the only existing program for municipal infrastructure in-country. There is no other source of funds for municipalities to tap so that infrastructure programs can be implemented. If MEA funding were to cease presently, municipal infrastructure implementation would grind to a halt in practically all Salvadoran municipalities.
- Through the MEA program, the mayors feel that they are receiving technical assistance primarily from SRN/CONARA.
- A number of mayors complain that SRN does not do feasibility studies in a timely manner because there is too much dependence on using outside engineering consultants to develop project profiles. This lack of doing studies in a timely manner makes the mayors hesitant to call another cabildo abierto until they have received a definitive notice from SRN.
- Several Mayors feel frustrated with SRN in not conducting feasibility studies in a timely manner because they feel that it erodes their position as mayor, and makes SRN assume a more important role than is desirable, thereby undermining their authority. This has resulted in several cases of local community leaders going directly to CONARA to determine the status of a given project, and bypassing the Mayor. This was confirmed by one of the evaluators that while at SRN, he was able to observe one incident when eight community leaders came to the Operational Department inquiring about projects for their community, yet not one of them was a mayor.
- Mayors are hesitant to promote more open council meetings. While they appreciate the importance of the *cabildo abierto* to solicit community input

for MEA projects, there is great reluctance to promote citizen involvement in the prioritization process or to promote dialogue to discuss community problems. Mayors generally have not yet made the connection between the desirability of having open meetings as a mechanism to generate community support for projects, and to discuss with the community their willingness to pay or contribute towards projects.

- While mayors still have not placed much emphasis on cost-recovery. As a group they have not appreciated the relationship of the need to generate more revenue from local resources so as to minimize central government transfers, and thereby establish their own autonomy in a decentralized framework.
- Related to the above, there does not appear to be much appreciation of the need to become self-sufficient. Many mayors gave the impression that sustainability will not occur under their mandate, and therefore it is a low priority item.
- A main complaint directed against MEA is that because of funding limitations, projects cannot be funded within the context of a long range strategic plan. Mayors want to develop strategic plans for their communities, and base MEA funding on this plan. However, they feel that the limits on project financing undermined any incentive that could promote strategic planning.
- While there may be new modalities in the MEA program through FFI, FIM, and CED, the importance of the policy criteria behind these special modalities is not clear to the mayors. They continue to think of all funds as part of MEA and as a potential source of "free funds."

18. Relationship between MEA, Peace and National Recovery Project, and Municipal Development Project.

- There are actually two MEA programs. One (MEA regular) is directed towards 146 municipalities. The balance of the 115 municipalities is included in the MEA/PRN which is one of the components of the National Recovery Project. Both programs use the same modus operandi. The average allocation per municipality is higher in the MEA/PRN program.
- The MEA process has proven a good way for mayors to coordinate public investments in their municipalities. The modalities of the MEA process are replicable to other public investment projects, such as schools, and water systems, which may be financed by other mechanisms, such as FIS or within the budget of the various Central Government ministries. Because of the success of the MEA program, it would be desirable for the GOES to develop a policy that any infrastructure project, regardless of funding

source, adopt the MEA process and consult with the mayors and their respective communities before initiating the project.

• The MEA program complements the Municipal Development program in several areas. It has been an exemplary program that has demonstrated the capacity of project implementation at the local level, even though it has been embodied primarily in the mayor. It has been a good first step towards strengthening local government capability. The MDP will build on the lessons learned in MEA, by emphasizing institutional capacity building at the municipal level. The initial synergistic effect will be in the financial management are whereby municipalities can use MEA funds to begin developing two separate budgets: a capital budget, and an operating budget.

19. Project Spin-Offs

One objective not particularly sought but achieved is that of improving public perception of national government by strengthening local government. This relationship is particularly important for legislators (diputados), whose local legitimacy is very weak, according to the survey.

20. Other Questions and Issues

During the evaluation period some ideas surfaced which, while not purely within the purview of the scope of work of the MEA program or the contract, may prove to be worth consideration by USAID and GOES.

They are submitted here as suggestions which may prove useful in the future, not necessarily as recommendations of what should be done under the MEA program. These suggestions are based on observations and experience in other countries and the U.S., and some of them, at least, may be germane in El Salvador.

(1) In many U.S. municipalities, any construction by a private person, group, firm, or contractor, including those working on contracts for government agencies, requires a building permit and business license. The permit is issued to the contractor, or in case of private owners doing their own construction, to the owner. It is the responsibility of the party performing the work to obtain the permit from the municipality and to pay fees established by the municipality. The fees are based on the cost of the work and/or the size of the structure/facility.

Such a system assures the municipal government that it will be aware of all work in the municipality, and if ordinances require, give municipal inspectors the opportunity and authority to inspect the work to assure both compliance with building codes and the public safety.

Such a permit system is extremely valuable for tax purposes, and also helps prevent duplication between municipal projects or programs and construction

undertaken by any other entity, including another government agency. In the instant case, it would be very valuable on FIS projects, and would provide additional municipal revenue.

(2) It has been found useful in some places in the U.S. for small municipalities and towns to hire jointly a professional city manager (also called a "Range Rider" city manager). Two, three, or four small municipalities, none of which can afford nor need a full time city administrator, share the services of a professional to assist the mayors and councils in all aspects of management of municipal affairs. The professional should be aware of the central government law, programs, projects, and policies which affect municipal government and municipal administration.

In El Salvador, such a person would be expert in preparing for and helping mayors to conduct open town meetings and in working with community organizations in the municipality. The person would attend all open town meetings and all council meetings of the mayors and their councils, spending, on average, at least one full day each week in each of the contracting municipalities. Conceivably the person could be involved with the *Consejo Departamental de Desarrollo*.

USAID or SRN might choose to fund a trial of this system in some of the municipalities which have low resources and populations all in the same general area where driving between them is feasible. It may be possible to replace or supplement SRN technical assistance by this mechanism.

(3) The U.S. agency which most nearly resembles the SRN at this point in time probably is the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), although FmHA does not cover as wide a range of activities. The purpose of FmHA is development of small towns and rural areas of the United States. Among other things, it finances water and sewer systems and in the past has financed homes on soft loans for low income rural people. The FmHA deals primarily in loans, but also in combination loan-grant combinations for rural and small town infrastructure. Terms of financing depend on the project and condition of the community.

It should prove profitable to arrange a trip for a team of approximately ten to go to the U.S. for a visit to FmHA headquarters, field offices, communities, appropriate engineers, and a few typical projects. A visit with the congressmen responsible for the FmHA legislation committee might also prove profitable, especially for COMURES and legislative members of the team. A team composed of two or three members each from SRN, COMURES, ISDEM and the National Legislature would probably be appropriate. Such a visit would be highly recommended were FIS funding and programs ever transferred to SRN, or the Ministry of Local Government suggested earlier.

(4) True decentralization would require a legal charter for each municipality recognizing its autonomy and granting it authority, responsibility and jurisdiction

in appropriate areas. This probably is widely known and accepted now, at least culturally, but both the existence and limits of each municipality should be spelled out legally in something equivalent to a charter form.

National legislation shall be encouraged as part of the decentralization process that would set broad parameters so that each municipality could prepare its own charter, with legal assistance, and after approval by popular vote in the municipality, submit it to appropriate national authority for approval. Municipal charters should describe the duties of the municipalities to the central government, as well as the form of government, jurisdiction, privileges, and responsibilities of the municipal government.

To the extent that this has not been done to date, it would provide an excellent vehicle for involving the grass roots in meaningful participation in local affairs and could be incorporated in the development of a community's strategic plan. The municipality, and municipal government, in effect and actually, should be, and should be recognized as, a corporation owned and managed by its citizens.

If municipal citizens were given the opportunity to approve by vote, in their charter, non-partisan local elections and the right to vote for local sales tax to be devoted to municipal infrastructure, those two points alone would make the charter process worthwhile.

(5) GOES should consider the feasibility of putting responsibility for neighborhood road maintenance (that is, all roads not on the national network maintained by *Caminos*) under an organization at the Department level, such as the tentatively proposed Consejos Departamentales de Desarrollo. A Department road maintenance force of forty to sixty laborers, with transportation and tools, and with reasonable supervision should be able to improve existing roads over a few years without a major new road building investment project. That is not the best of all possible worlds, but it may be the best of all feasible worlds.

Appendix D

EVALUATION TEAM

APPENDIX D

MEA PROJECT EVALUATION TEAM

Patricia Ann Wilson, associate professor of community and regional planning at the University of Texas, Austin, served as Team Leader. She was responsible for designing and interpreting the beneficiary survey. Duke Banks, a municipal development consultant from Washington, D.C., was responsible for the institutional analysis and assessment of mayors' attitudes. Lewis Taylor, a civil engineering consultant from Oklahoma, evaluated the effectiveness of project design, construction, and maintenance.

Dr. Wilson was the primary author of Part I; Mr. Banks was the primary author of Part II; and Mr. Taylor was the primary author of Part III.

Dr. Wilson, Mr. Banks and Mr. Taylor were contracted by Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., located in Washington, D.C.

Appendix E

WOMEN AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

APPENDIX E

WOMEN AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Women's awareness of, and participation in, cabildos lags behind men's.

- About 76 percent of the men know what a *cabildo* is, while only 58 percent of the women do.
- Forty percent of the men have attended a *cabildo*, while only 16 percent of the women have.
- Nevertheless, of those who know about *cabildos*, most women (64%) perceive that they participate at least as much as the men, and most women (70%) perceive that the *cabildos* address their needs at least as much as they do the men's needs.

NGOs involved in women's issues have begun to see cabildos abiertos as an accessible vehicle for women to gain a voice in municipal government.

A feminist with an NGO related to *Convergencia* (leftist political coalition) said that "municipalismo para mujeres" (municipalism for women) was going to be introduced in the platform of a broad-based women's coalition of NGOs. She said the idea came from some successful experiences by organized women at cabildos abiertos in the ex-conflict zone. (interview: Angélica Batras, October, 1993).

Women are underrepresented in local government office.

About 12 percent of all mayors in El Salvador are women. A higher percentage of municipal council members are women.

Women's issues are not explicitly considered at SRN, COMURES, or ISDEM.

While top officials at SRN and COMURES are disproportionately female, no special consideration of the role of women appears to be made in the design, approval, implementation, or monitoring of projects. One official explained that problems in the countryside affect men and women equally. COMURES, however, did express awareness of the importance of women's participation in cabildos in an article in La Prensa Gráfica in June, 1993.

Gender-specific data were available on the mayors, but not on the beneficiaries of the MEA project.

Gender-specific data on the beneficiaries was generated only at the program evaluation stage through the survey of beneficiaries carried out as part of this report.

Appendix F

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

APPENDIX F

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Popular Participation

- 1. USAID should examine why some cantons have received no MEA funding and seek to address the reasons.
- 2. To promote reconciliation and the transition to peace, USAID should push for rapid resolution of land tenure issues, which are an impediment to MEA projects.
- 3. Through the MEA program, USAID could create incentives for municipal governments to help settle property title disputes. These incentives could be tied in with municipal cadastre preparation and property valuations for municipal tax collection.
- 4. USAID should promote better working relationships between local government and community organizations. One way to do this is to provide the mayors training and technical assistance on working with community organizations. Another way is to provide a special incentive fund, such as USAID has done in the Philippines and elsewhere, to encourage mayors to work with local NGOs.
- 5. The proposals in the MDP to strengthen community/municipal relations should be actively pursued and progress monitored: eg. community advisory boards, geographically rotating *cabildos*, support of community organizations, public education on community-municipal relations, and open municipal council meetings (see below).

II. Institutional Sustainability

- 1. ISDEM, in collaboration with the Vice Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, should provide technical assistance to interested municipalities to help them develop strategic plans. Once a strategic plan is developed for a given municipality, MEA funded projects should be defined within the context of this plan, plus local community participation. It should be emphasized that the iterative process of developing a strategic plan will encourage community input, which should allow for more open council meetings and improved dialogue between elected local officials and the citizens.
- 2. For municipalities in non-conflict zones (eg. 146 municipalities that participate in the "MEA Regular" program), the minimum base-line requirement to receive initial funding should be the existing requirement of the Incentive Fund (FIM). This recommendation is already contemplated in the MPD, but could be implemented immediately.

- 3. All municipalities who participate in the MEA program should be required to place some portion of increased service fee revenues into an interest earning municipal reserve account. For the vast majority of municipalities the amounts deposited would be insufficient to fund any infrastructure project in the near future. However, with two or more years accumulated growth in that account, there should be sufficient amounts that the reserve funds can be used as counterpart funding for infrastructure projects. Likewise, by this time the MDP would have developed financial management guidelines to assist municipalities on how to use these reserve funds, and municipalities should begin receiving revenue from property taxes, assuming that property tax legislation is passed.
- 4. For those municipalities with a sizable reserve account balance, 70 percent of the reserve balance should be required to be used as counterpart funding for MEA projects. (Note: Balance figure and percentages should be based on the financial capability of the 25 municipalities classified in categories A and B by the GOES).
- 5. Project criteria for the Municipal Strengthening Fund (FFM) should be expanded to allow for funding of the development of municipal strategic plans as well as improved financial management systems.
- 6. Project criteria for the Municipal Strengthening Fund (FFM) should also be expanded to help municipalities establish and develop their operational and maintenance capability.
- 7. More technical assistance and training is required on *pre-cabildo* activity so as to promote more transparent, participatory local government, through open council meetings as a condition for MEA funding in 1994. COMURES should be provided with technical assistance so that they can promote to all mayors the desirability of open meetings. The mayors should also be provided with on-going training on *pre-cabildo* techniques as a continued follow-up to the 1991 and 1992 CLASP Training Program. The iterative process of incorporating the community in developing a strategic plan should facilitate the acceptance by mayors of open council meetings. This would include incorporating the various Social Control, Technical Reconstruction, and Municipal Reconstruction Committees that presently exist. Likewise, the level of dialogue needs to be expanded so that instead of focusing primarily on soliciting from the community what projects they want, mayors also need to find out the degree of willingness of the local community to pay for the services they want.

III. Infrastructure Provision

1. Fifteen municipalities will be targeted for special technical assistance and infrastructure programs. It is strongly recommended that a comprehensive inventory of infrastructure status and assessment of needs be made. The inventory should be such that it can serve as a basis for future planning, and as a model for

- subsequent inventories of the remaining municipalities. It should be conducted in conjunction with a cadastral survey.
- 2. The MEA program in support of Project No. 0519-0388 should remain tightly concentrated on development of responsive and effective municipal governments, and continue to support that goal with infrastructure projects which respond to needs of the local people as they perceive them.
- 3. The roads and water systems for which each municipal government is responsible should be more clearly defined. In the past, confusion on this matter has been detected in communication with various mayors.
- 5. The MEA project implementation apparatus should remain in place in order to support the National Peace and Recovery Project, 519-0394 and Project No. 519-0388.
- 6. The SRN and GOES should address the large unfunded gap in the roads and water sectors between what the national agencies are doing and what the municipalities are doing presently by funding much larger projects in municipal water systems and municipal roads.
- 7. Projects costing more than \$250,000 equivalent should be assigned by SRN to the DGR for implementation in cooperation with the mayors using the same processes as were used with the mayor of San Salvador in construction of municipal markets.
- 8. Any attempt to split large projects into smaller components in violation of USAID regulations should be rejected.
- 9. If infrastructure projects are to be implemented after completion of expenditure of MEA funding, another mechanism or source for funding from outside the municipalities must be found or developed, since initial expenditures cannot be met using only funds generated within the municipalities.
- 10. SRN should expedite processing and approval of technically simple and relatively inexpensive projects by preparation and review of documentation by SRN staff. Contracting for design, estimates, and documentation should be confined to larger or technically difficult projects. A lower limit for project documentation assigned to contractors might be \$\psi 200,000\$.
- 11. There are MEA financed electrification projects on which all consumers are connected to the CEL or other electric utility system and those consumers pay their electric bills to the utility (CEL or other). For those projects the utility should pay the municipality for the project and take over ownership of the installation. To the extent the same situation arises on extensions of ANDA water systems, ANDA should buy the extensions from the municipality also. The MEA

program should not subsidize the utility companies, which have other sources of financing.

Appendix G

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND TERMS

APPENDIX G

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND TERMS

ACRONYMS

AID	Agency for International Development: Agencia para el Desarrollo Internacional
ANDA	Administración Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados: National Administration for Water and Sewers
ANTEL	Asociación Nacional de Telecomunicaciones: National Telephone Company
ARENA	Asociación Republicana Nacionalista: National Republican Association
BID	Banco Interamericano del Desarrollo: Inter-American Development Bank - IDB
Caminos	See DGC
CED	Comité Especial Departamental: Special Departmental Committee
CDM	Comisión para Decentralización y Desarrollo Municipal: Commission for Decentralization and Municipal Development
CEL	Comisión Ejecutiva Hidroeléctrica del Río Lempa: Executive Hydroelectric Commission of the Lempa River
COMURES	Corporación de Municipalidades de la República de El Salvador: Corporation of Municipalities of the Republic of El Salvador
CONARA	Comisión Nacional de Restauración de Areas: National Commission for Area Restoration
CdeC	Corte de Cuentas: GOES Controller's Office
DISCEL	Departamento de Distribución de CEL: CEL Distribution Department
DGC	Dirección General de Caminos: General Directorate for Roads - MOP
DGR	Dirección General para la Reconstrucción: General Directorate for Reconstruction

FFI Fondo de Fortalecimiento Institucional: Institutional Strengthening Fund FIM Fondo de Incentivo Municipal: Municipal Strengthening Fund Fondo de Inversión Social: Social Investment Fund FIS Administración para Viviendas de **FmHA** Farmers Home Administration: Campesinos Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional: Farabundo Martí **FMLN** National Liberation Front Government of El Salvador: Gobierno de El Salvador **GOES** GTZ Cooperación Técnica Alemana: German Technical Cooperation International City Management Association: Asociación Internacional de **ICMA** Gerentes de Ciudades IDB InterAmerican Development Bank: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo -**BID IRD** Infrastructure and Regional Development Office USAID: Salud, Población y Nutrición **ISDEM** Instituto Salvadoreño para Desarrollo Municipal: Salvadoran Institute for Municipal Development LBII Louis Berger International, Inc. **MEA** Municipalidades en Acción: Municipalities in Action MID Major Infrastructure Division: División de Infraestructura Mayor **MOP** Ministerio de Obras Públicas: Ministry of Public Works NGO Non-Government Organization: Organizaciones No Gubernamentales (ONG) **NRD** National Reconstruction Division: División de Reconstrucción Nacional **PNUD** Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo: United Nations Development Program

PRONASOL Programa Nacional de Solaridad: National Solidarity Program

RTI Research Triangle Institute

RUD Regional and Urban Development Division: División de Urbanización

Regional y Urbana

SETEFE Secretaría Técnica de Financiamiento Externo: Technical Secretariat for

Foreign Financing, in the Ministry of Planning

SRN Secretaría de Reconstrucción Nacional: Secretariat for National

Reconstruction

USAID See AID

TERMS

Alcaldía: Mayor's office

Cabildo abierto: Open town meetings

Cantón: Rural jurisdiction in municipality

Caserío: Rural community
Cabecera: Municipal seat

Cédula de identidad nacional:

National identity card

Consejos departamentales

de desarrollo: Development departmental councils

Consejo municipal: Municipal council

Diputado: Member of National Legislature (Assembly)

Directivo comunal: Community leader Ingresos tributatios: User fee structure

Municipio: Municipality, similar to county in U.S.

Occidente: Western
Oriente: Eastern
Pedir: To ask for

Proyecto puntual: Project on schedule

Tenedores: Squatters

Tipo de Cambio: Exchange Rate (US\$1=\phi 8.70 as of Dec. 1,

1993)

Appendix H

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

APPENDIX H

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

USAID

Tom Hawk, Division Chief, IRD/RUD
Aldo Miranda, Deputy Director, IRD/RUD
Jacobo Harrouch, Regional Officer, IRD/RUD
Carlos Pinto, Municipal Development Specialist, IRD/RUD
Jorge Abullarade, Regional Officer, IRD/RUD
Roberto Martinod, Regional Officer, IRD/RUD
Ernesto Palomo, Regional Officer, IRD/RUD

James Habron, Divison Chief, IRD/MID Rafael Callejas, Project Engineer, IRD/MID

Raymond Douglas, IRD/Mission Senior Engineer Flor de María de Rivera, IRD/Assistant to Mission Engineer

Rosa Maura de Mayorga, IRD/NRD

Allen Austin, Senior Technical Advisor, Legislative Strengthening Project Lorien Pace, Consultant, Legislative Strengthening Project

Secretaría de Reconstrucción Nacional

Norma de Dowe, Secretary

Lic. Ludmila de Rodríguez, General Manager

Arq. Elizabeth de Rebollo, Operations Manager

Lic. Claudia María de Anaya, Chief Division of Planning

Lic. José Chicas, Group 2 (11 municipalities), Departmental Office, Zacatecoluca, La Paz

Arq. Carlos Humberto Rodríguez, Deputy Program Manager

Ing. Reynaldo Galdámez, Consultant

Ing. Ricardo Vega, Regional Engineer, Central Region

Ing. Gabriel Soriano, Regional Engineer, Chalatenango

Ing. Mauricio Aguirre, Regional Engineer, Eastern Region

Ing. Tomás Velásquez, Regional Engineer, Western Region

Ing. William Góchez, Regional Engineer, San Vicente

Miguel Angel Ramírez, SRN/CONARA

Victor Valdivieso, Programming and Evaluation Unit

COMURES

Lic. Catty Sánchez Fortis, General Manager of COMURES Arq. Marina Murillo, Director, Analysis Division Lic. Julio César Ríos Andrade, Consultant, Legal Division Raquel Mancía, Promotor, Analysis Division Miguel Coto, Promotor, Analysis Division Lic. Miriam de Meléndez, Director, CDM Division, COMURES Don Bryan, Senior Technical Advisor

ISDEM

Lic. Edgar Mejía Flores, General Manager

Lic. René Medina, Operations Manager

Ing. Roberto Morales, Regional Programs Coordinator

Lic Alberto Rodas, Operations Office

ANDA

Ing. Raúl Rodríguez Rivera, Manager of Works and Projects

CEL

Lic. José Antonio García, Acting Manager DISCEL

DGC/Caminos

Ing. Juan Francisco Bolaños, DGC Director

DGR

Ing. Enrique Vega, Director

FIS

Lic. Herbert Mauricio Blandón, General Manager Ing. Mario Valdez, Project Manager

MIPLAN

Lic. Maura de Montalvo, National Consultant, Modernization of Public Sector Project

Ministerio de Obras Públicas (MOP)

Arq. Roberto Paredes, Vice Minister, Housing and Urban Development and President of FONAVIPO
Ing. Elizabeth Rivas, Director of Urban and Regional Development

NRECA

Ing. Leonel Bolaños, PRN/NRECA Program Coordinator

Office of the President of El Salvador

General Mauricio Vargas, Advisor

FMLN

Mauricio Chávez, Member of Reconstruction Team

GTZ

Prof. Martin Rieger, Director Lic. Peter Dineiger, Public Finance Expert Ing. Edmundo Chichilla M., Consultant

ONUSAL

Michael Gucovsky, Deputy Director

UNDP

Bruno Morro, Deputy Representative Fredy M. Justiniano F., Principal Technical Advisor

Mayors

Department of San Salvador

Juan Mario Gutiérrez Valencia, Mayor of Panchimalco Humberto Chacón Reyes, Mayor of Nejapa José Antonio Ortiz Vásquez, Mayor of Rosario de Mora Rodolfo del Tránsito Bojorquez, Mayor of San Marcos Carlos Sánchez Vásquez, Mayor of Santo Tomás Romeo Humberto González, Mayor of Apopa Filadelfio Váldez Pérez, Mayor of Mejicanos Julio Barrera Fuentes, Mayor of Tonacatepeque Manuel de Jesús Palacios, Mayor of San Martín

Jorge Vásquez Corena, Mayor of Soyapango

Department of La Libertad

Carlos Miguel Romero Alas, Mayor of Ciudad Arce Raul Alberto Pleitez Flores, Mayor of Tepecoyo

Department of Chalatenango

Sofía Rafaela Recinos, Mayor of Chalatenango Manuel Serrano Serrano, Mayor of San Isidro Labrador José Rigoberto Alvarado, Mayor of Nueva Trinidad Osmín Santos Calles Medina, Mayor of San José Las Flores Orbelina Dubón de Herrera, Mayor de Arcatao José Alfredo Guardado Menjívar, Mayor of Las Vueltas José Edwin Peña, Mayor of Nueva Concepción José Efraín Peñate Recinos, Mayor of San Antonio Los Ranchos

Department of Santa Ana

José Gabriel Murillo Duarte, Mayor of Texistepeque

Department of Sonsonate

Abraham Eldifonso López de León, President of COMURES and Mayor of Sonsonate
Francisco Manuel Alfredo González Vega, Mayor of Izalco
Manuel de Jesús Cañas Blanco, Mayor of San Antonio del Monte

Department of La Paz

Saul Rivera, Mayor of Zacatecoluca Ismael Altana, Mayor of Mercedes de La Ceiba Valentín Arístides Corpeño, Mayor of San Luis La Herradura

Department of San Miguel

Enris Antonio Arias, Mayor of Comacarán Lorenzo Saúl Rivas, Mayor of Chinameca Marciano Elmo Chavarría, Mayor of Chapeltique

Department of San Vicente

José Alfonso Pacas, Mayor of Apastepeque

Department of Morazán

Modesto Martínez, Mayor of Guatajuiagua

Community Leaders

Ernesto Edgardo Vásquez, Representative of Ciudad Delgado, San Salvador, Antonio Cabañes, Community Leader, Guarjula, Chalatenango José --, Candidate for Mayor, San Antonio Los Ranchos, Chalatenango

NGOs

Foreign Aid Monitoring Project, Washington, D.C.

Cynthia Curtis, former staff member

CIPHES

Elena Martín de Velásquez, Director

Fundación Segundo Montes

Mireya Melgar

Iniciativa para el Desarrollo Alternativo (IDA)

Leandro Uzquiano, Director Angélica Batras, Proyecto Mujer

Programa de Capacitación y Apoyo a las Comisiones Municipales de Desarrollo y Reconstrucción (PROCAP) - (American Friends Service Committe)

Sandra Dunsmore, Executive Secretary

REDES

Roberto Alfaro, Director

Washington Office on Latin America

Peter Sollis, Senior Fellow, Washington, D.C., and

Also representatives of CCR, CORDES, PROGES, FASTRAS and 16 de Enero

Other

Development Associates, Inc.

Eliseo Carrasco, Country Director

Louis Berger International, Inc.

Ted Tidiken, Advisor to DGC/Caminos David Dounglas, Advisor to ANDA

Appendix I

TABLES OF FINANCIAL INPUTS

APPENDIX I

TABLE I-1

TABLE OF FINANCIAL INPUTS

(Extracted from SRN and USAID Reports, Records, and Funding Documents by the Evaluator)
FUNDING IDENTIFIED FOR THE MEA PROGRAM
Host Country Owned Local Currency - 1,000 colons

Fotal MEA PROGRAM FUNDING	¢548,242.5
MEA/88	¢ 65,313.6
MEA/89	71,313.4
MEA/90	165,980.0
MEA Contingency	65,000.0
MEA/91	45,800.0
MEA/93	134,835.5
Total MEA Program Funding	¢548,242.5

Approximately \$73,100,100 at an estimated average exchange rate of 7.5:1 over the life of the Program to Date.

MEA FUNDING OBLIGATED

Colons from Foreign Exchange - U.S. Dollars	
(Funded in 1992 and 1993)	¢ 1,000
Potable Water and Sanitation - USAID Project No. 519-0320	8,400
National Peace and Recovery Plan - USAID Project No. 519-0394	322,000
Total	¢330,400

Approximately \$37,975,000 at current exchange rate of 8.7:1.

LOCAL CURRENCY FROM OTHER PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED THROUGH MEA

1988 TO 1993	¢ 1,000.0
Emergency Urban Projects	53,334.6
Chalatenango Special Program	26,378.9
Oriente Special Programs	26,427.7
Other Urban Projects	34,824.4
Reforestation	1,308.4
National Recovery Plan	11,731.4
Other	14,566.4
Total	¢168,571.8

Approximately \$22,475.000.

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RECAP OF FUNDING

Equivalent Dollars

Local Currency - MEA	\$ 73,100,000
Local Currency - Other	22,475,000
USAID Project Funds	37,975,000
Approximate Total, All Projects Implemented by MEA to Date	\$133,550,000

Source: SRN and USAID Documents

TABLE I-2

MUNICIPAL INCENTIVE FUND TO SEPT. 30, 1933

DEPARTMENT	NO. OF MUNICIPALITIES	NO. OF PROJECTS	AMOUNT DISBURSED
AHUACHAPAN	12	17	¢ 1,458,192
SANTA ANA	7	14	960,467
SONSONATE	15	25	2,025,367
CHALATENANGO	7	13	855,858
LA LIBERTAD	9	12	1,053,384
SAN SALVADOR	9	12	1,034,259
CUSCATLAN	7	9	857,805
LA PAZ	14	21	1,869,719
CABAÑAS	5	15	600,056
SAN VICENTE	7	12	872,327
USULUTAN	13	15	1,645,613
SAN MIGUEL	11	13	1,334,872
MORAZAN	6	6	738,174
LA UNION	6	6	693,902
TOTAL	128	190	¢15,999,995
AVERAGE			¢ 84,210.50

Source: CONARA-Municipalidades en Acción, Fondo de Incentivos Municipales, Cuenta 1-42-505, computer printout as of September 30, 1993, providing information on projects.

TABLE I-3

MUNICIPAL STRENGTHENING FUND TO SEPT. 30, 1997

DEPARTMENT	NO. OF MUNICIPALITIES	NO. OF PROJECTS	AMOUNT DISBURSED
AHUACHAPAN	4	6	¢ 103,948.60
SANTA ANA	2	4	244,899.11
SONSONATE	5	8	397,344.20
CHALATENANGO	3	3	31,707.74
LA LIBERTAD	3	5	130,001.23
SAN SALVADOR	4	11	1,837,293.00
CUSCATLAN	2	4	318,116.38
LA PAZ	4	5	187,003.00
CABAÑAS	1	1	3,342.00
SAN VICENTE	1	1	5,580.00
USULUTAN	3	5	265,097.05
SAN MIGUEL	4	7	274,724.16
MORAZAN	1	2	74,146.53
LA UNION	2	3	106,390.46
TOTAL	39	66	¢3,999,593.40
AVERAGE			¢ 61,532

Source: CONARA-Municipalidades en Acción, Fondo de Fortalecimiento Municipal, Cuenta 1-42-505, computer printout as of September 30, 1993, providing information on projects.

TABLE I-4

SPECIAL DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE TO SEPT. 30, 1993

DEPARTMENT	NO. OF MUNICIPALITIES	NO. OF PROJECTS	AMOUNT DISBURSED
AHUACHAPAN	12	26	¢ 3,709.900
SANTA ANA	13	23	3,273.402
SONSONATE	14	19	3,186,698
CHALATENANGO	10	14	2,640,466
LA LIBERTAD	7	9	2,242,383
SAN SALVADOR	17	31	3,733,128
CUSCATLAN	11	19	2,470,023
LA PAZ	16	24	3,641,670
CABAÑAS	8	22	3,949,446
SAN VICENTE	13	24	3,724,884
USULUTAN	11	16	3,038,286
SAN MIGUEL	9	11	3,069,787
MORA.7AN	10	11	4,050,500
LA UNION	11	15	3,319,428
TOTAL	162	264	¢46,000,001
AVERAGE			¢ 174,241.42

Source: CONARA-Municipalidades en Acción, Comité Especial Departamental, Cuenta 1-42-505, computer printout as of September 30, 1993, providing information on projects.

Appendix J

TABLE OF CABILDOS ABIERTOS

APPENDIX J TABLE J-1 OPEN TOWN MEETINGS CONVENED ANNUALLY 1988-1993*

YEAR	NUMBER OF MEETINGS	ATTENDANCE
1988	263	3,700
1989	351	77,000
1990	475	121,000
1991	821	208,000
1992	853	208,000
1993	571*	80,225*

* Total documented through September, 1993 Source: SRN-MEA Action Plan for 1993 and CONARA Quarterly Report November, 19, 1993.

TABLE J-2 **OPEN TOWN MEETINGS BY DEPARTMENT** FIRST THREE QUARTERS OF 1993

FIRST THREE QUARTERS OF 1993			
DEPARTMENT	NUMBER OF MEETINGS	NO. OF MUNICIPALITIES	ATTENDANCE
AHUACHAPAN	39	12	4,344
SANTA ANA	26	13	3,340
SONSONATE	29	16	3,767
CHALATENANGO	62	33	6,349
LA LIBERTAD	58	22	10,379
SAN SALVADOR	39	19	9,448
CUSCATLAN	36	16	2,613
LA PAZ	53	22	6,492
CABAÑAS	18	9	2,542
SAN VICENTE	28	13	3,111
USULUTAN	51	23	6,599
MORAZAN	39	26	5,997
SAN MIGUEL	64	20	10,415
LA UNION	29	18	3,239
TOTALS	571	262	80,225

Appendix K

MELIOGNAPHY

APPENDIX K

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